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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On November 11, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals received this case via pour-
over from the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is proper in this Case under Utah Code 
§78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: The trial court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 758-761), Iota's and California Benefit's Trial Brief (R. 
550) and Iota's and California Benefit's Post-Trial Brief (R. 714). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The applicability of the statute of frauds is a question 
of law to be reviewed for correctness. The facts offered regarding part performance 
of the agreement are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. (Colosimo v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646 (Ut. Ct. App., 2004) at \ 8). 
ISSUE II: The trial court erred in not finding and ruling that Iota's and California 
Benefit's claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 761-764). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of mixed law and facts. 
{Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69 (Ut. Ct. App., 2009) at 1f 10). 
ISSUE HI: The trial incorrectly applied the waiver clauses in the Iota promissory note 
and trust deed and in the California Benefit promissory note and trust deed to bar 
Davco's affirmative defense of waiver. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 764). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of mixed law and facts. 
{Richards, at 69). 
ISSUE IV: The trial court's finding that Iota's and California Benefit's breach of the 
contract did not cause the failure of Davco to refinance the promissory notes is clearly 
erroneous. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 757-761, 764-766). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. (Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah, 1998)). 
ISSUE V: The trial court's finding that Iota and California Benefit did not breach the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is clearly erroneous. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 764-766). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of fact that is reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. (Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 204 P.3d 204 
(Utah App., 2009)). 
ISSUE VI: The trial incorrectly determined that it had jurisdiction to hold a contempt 
proceeding and Davco and Mr. Fisher were given due process. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Davco's 
Written Closing Argument (R. 771 -774). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of mixed law and facts. 
(Richards, at 69.) 
ISSUE VII: The trial court erred in denying Davco's Rule 67 motion. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in R. 1127, at 560:22 
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to 562:2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of mixed law and facts. 
(Richards, at 69.) 
ISSUE VIII: The trial court incorrectly concluded that Davco breached the Iota Deed of 
Trust. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was not preserved below but constitutes 
plain error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This presents a question of mixed law and facts. 
(Shar's Cars, L.L. C. v. Elder, 97 P.3d 724 (Ut. Ct. App., 2004) at |14). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UCA § 25-5-1: No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term 
not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
UCA § 25-5-1: (1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from 
the making of the agreement; 
(b) eveiy promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; 
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of 
marriage, except mutual promises to marry; 
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in 
damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his 
own estate; 
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation; and 
(f) every credit agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 6, 2005, Defendant/Appellant Davco Management Company L.C. 
("Davco"), signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") to purchase the Casa 
i 
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I 
Grande apartments from Plaintiff/Appellee California Benefit, Inc. ("California Benefit") 
and to purchase Casa Sonoma apartments from Plaintiff/Appellee Iota LLC ("Iota"). The < 
terms and conditions of the REPC were negotiated by David Fisher ("Mr. Fisher"), the 
sole member of Davco, and Richard Murset ("Mr. Murset"), the managing member of 
Iota and the President of California Benefit. 
The REPC required California Benefit and Iota to provide: 1) rent rolls for all of 
the units; 2) two years of rental history; 3) profit and loss statements; and 4) a copy of all 
lease agreements. However, Mr. Murset only provided: 1) a list of the rents for August 
2005; 2) profit and loss statements for 1/1/05 through 7/31/05 which contained income 
and expenses belonging to other entities as well as the apartment complexes; and 3) a 
sample lease agreement. 
The sale of the apartment complexes did not close in 2005 because Mr. Murset 
told Mr. Fisher that his son, a real estate agent, wanted to improve the apartment 
complexes, raise the rents and sell them for more than the amount that Mr. Murset agreed 
to sell them to Davco. 
In 2006, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Murset again entered into discussions for the 
purchase of the apartment complexes by Davco. On September 29, 2006 Davco signed a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") to purchase the Casa Grande apartments from 
California Benefit. On November 30, 2006, Davco signed a REPC to purchase Casa 
Sonoma apartments from Iota. Davco also executed promissory notes and trust deeds in 
favor of California Benefit and Iota for each purchase. The maturity date for the Casa 
Sonoma promissory note was December 1, 2007 and the maturity date for Casa Grande 
promissory note was December 10, 2007. 
Davco required two years of financial statements and one year of ownership of the 
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apartment complexes to qualify for refinancing to pay the promissory notes on the 
maturity dates. Mr. Murset agreed to Davco owning the apartment complexes for one 
year before refinancing. 
Mr. Murset knew that Davco could not pay the balance of the promissory notes on 
the maturity dates unless it was able to refinance the apartment complexes and that 
Davco could not refinance without two years of financial statements for the apartment 
complexes. Mr. Murset orally agreed to provide the 2005 and 2006 financial statements 
to enable Davco to obtain financing to the pay the promissory notes. 
Relying on Mr. Murset's oral promise to provide two years of financial 
statements, Davco executed the REPCs, the Promissory Notes, and trust deeds, and 
purchased the apartment complexes. 
After closing, Davco, relying on Mr. Murset's promise to provide the financial 
statements, made the payments due under the Promissory Notes, paid the expenses 
incurred by the apartment complexes, made repairs, performed maintenance, spent 
$128,376.00 refurbishing apartments, and otherwise managed the apartment complexes. 
In pursuance of the oral agreement, Mr. Murset provided financial statements to 
Davco. However, the profit and loss statements for 2006 did not include the months of 
June through September for Casa Grande and the months of June through November for 
Casa Sonoma, the 2005 and 2006 Profit and Loss Statement for Iota was not accurate as 
it included the income and expenses for other properties owned by Iota in addition to the 
Casa Sonoma Apartments, and the 2005 Profit and Loss Statement for California Benefit 
was inaccurate as it contained expenses that were not incurred. 
Mr. Murset never provided the financial statements for 2006 that included the 
months past May or corrected financial statements for 2005. 
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After the maturity dates had passed, Mr. Murset continued to tell Mr. Fisher that 
he would provide accurate financial statements and the 2006 financial statements but he { 
did not. The end of March or beginning of April 2008, having failed to provide the 
financial statments, Mr. Murset told Mr. Fisher that Davco could have an extra year to 
create two full years of financial statements under its ownership of the apartment 
complexes. Mr. Murset also told Mr. Darcy Thompson, his real estate agent, that he had 
given Davco an extra year to refinance the apartment complexes. . 
Based on Mr. Murset5s promise, Davco continued to make payments on the 
promissory notes and to pay for refurbishing the apartments. 
In June 2008, before Davco had sufficient time to create two years of financial 
statements and obtain a loan to pay the balances of the promissory notes, Mr. Murset 
demanded that Davco give him deeds in lieu of foreclosure or he threatened to 
commence foreclosure proceedings. Mr. Fisher reminded Mr. Murset that he had 
promised that Davco could have an extra year to create two years of fmancial statements 
under its ownership of the apartment complexes nevertheless offered to give Mr. Murset 
deeds in lieu of foreclosure if he would reimburse Davco for renovations it had made to 
the apartment complexes. Mr. Murset would not commit to reimburse Davco for the 
improvements but offered to extend the maturity dates of the promissory notes if Davco 
paid Mr. Murset an additional $1,000.00 for Casa Sonoma and $1,500.00 for Casa 
Grande each month. Davco refused and believing that Mr. Murset was going to foreclose 
based on his threat to foreclose, placed a stop payment on its September 2008 payment. 
Iota and California Benefit began non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by record-
ing Notices of Default on October 15, 2008. They commenced this suit on October 23, 
2008 requesting the Court to award them judgment against Davco for the rents collected 
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by Davco after August 2008 and requesting judgment against Mr. Fisher based on a non-
extent guarantee allegedly signed by Mr. Fisher in favor of Iota. Mr. Fisher had never 
signed a guarantee. 
On October 29? 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed an ex parte motion 
requesting the Court for an order requiring Davco and Mr. Fisher to pay the rents 
collected from the apartment complexes to be deposited with the Court. On November 3, 
2008, Iota and California Benefit filed a Request for Expedited Ruling on Ex Parte 
Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with the Court, and on November 5, 
2008, prior to Davco and Mr. Fisher having filed any pleadings, the Court entered an 
order requiring Davco and Mr. Fisher to pay rents collected from the apartments to the 
court. Mr. Fisher received a copy of the order by mail on November 10, 2008. 
Iota and California Benefit filed an amended complaint on November 14, 2008, 
and removed Mr. Fisher as a defendant. 
On August 7, 2009, Davco deposited $33,805.33 with the Court representing rent 
payments made to it by tenants of the apartment complexes. The Court on December 18, 
2009, ordered that the monies be released to Iota and California Benefit. 
In May 2009, Iota and California Benefit filed an amended complaint requesting 
the Court to award them deficiency judgments against Davco. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PARTIES 
1. California Benefit Inc. is a California corporation and owned the Casa 
Grand apartments in St. George, Utah. (R. 777, at ffiJ2, 7). 
2. Iota LLC is a Utah Limited Liability Company and owned the Casa 
Sonoma apartments in St. George, Utah. (R. 777, at ^fl). 
7 
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1 
3. Davco Management Company LC is a Utah Limited Liability Company 
authorized to do business in the state of Utah. (R. 777, at p ) . \ 
PLAYERS 
4. Richard T. Murset is a managing member of Iota and California Benefit. (R. 
777,atK4). { 
5. Mr. Murset is a trustee of the Murset Family Trust dated June 26,1998 
which owns California Benefit. (R. 777, at ^  5). 
6. Murset, as agent for Iota and California Benefit negotiated the sale of the 
Casa Sonoma Apartments and Casa Grande Apartments ("Apartment Complexes") to 
Davco. (R. 777, at K 9). 
7. David Fisher is a member and manager of Davco and on behalf of Davco 
negotiated the purchase of the Apartment Complexes with Mr. Murset. (R. 777, at 1f 9). 
BACKGROUND 
8. On August 6, 2005, Davco entered into a REPC to purchase the Casa 
Grande apartments from California Benefit and to purchase Casa Sonoma apartments 
from Iota. (R. 1127, at 464:16-11). 
9. The REPC required California Benefit and Iota to provide: 1) rent rolls for 
all of the units; 2) two years of rental histoiy; 3) profit and loss statements; and 4) a copy 
of all lease agreements. (Exhibit 63, at DT0200). 
10. Mr. Murset did provide: 1) a list of the rents for August 2005; 2) profit and 
loss statements for 1/1/05 through 7/31/05 which contained income and expenses 
belonging to other entities as well as the apartment complexes; and 3) a sample lease 
agreement. (R. 1127, at 465:23 to 468:15). 
11. Mr. Murset did not provide: 1) rent rolls for all of the units; 2) two years of 
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rental history for the apartment complexes; 3) copies of all lease agreements. (R.l 127, 
455:23 to 457:17). 
12. The 2005 year-to-date financial statement for Iota included income and 
expenses not associated with Casa Sonoma. (R.l 127, 467:3-17). 
13. In 2006, Darcy Thompson, the real estate agent for Mr. Murset, contacted Lori 
Muscolino, the real estate agent representing Mr. Fisher, and inquired whether Davco was 
still interested in purchasing the Apartment Complexes. (R. 1127, at 468:16-25). 
PURCHASE OF CASA SONOMA 
14. In September of 2006, Davco entered into a REPC with Iota, LLC to 
purchase the Casa Sonoma apartments. (R. 778, f 13). 
15. On September 29, 2006, Davco executed a Term Loan Promissory Note in 
the principal amount of $1,341,395.00 in favor of Iota, LLC (,fIota Note"). (Plaintiffs' 
Ex. 1;R. 778, f 14). 
16. The Iota Note provided that the entire balance due and owing on the note 
be paid on or before December 1, 2007. (R. 779, \ 15). 
17. Davco executed a Deed of Trust ("Iota Deed of Trust") wherein Davco was 
the trustor and Iota was the beneficiary. (R. 779, If 16). 
18. Davco did not pay the Iota Note at maturity on December 1, 2007. (R. 780, 
f 22). 
19. Davco made monthly interest payments to Iota from December 2007 until 
August 2008. (R. 780, f22). 
20. There are no written amendments executed by Iota for the Iota Note or the 
Iota Trust Deed. (R. 780,\2\). 
PURCHASE OF CASA GRANDE 
9 
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21. In November of 2006, Davco entered into a REPC with California Benefit 
to purchase the Casa Grande apartments. (R. 780, j^ 23). ( 
22. On November 30, 2006, Davco executed an All-inclusive Promissory Note 
in the principal amount of $2,411,596.00 in favor of California Benefit ("California 
Benefit Note"). (R. 7804 24). 
23. The California Benefit Note provides that the entire balance due and owing 
on the note be paid on or before December 10-, 2007. (R. 780, ^ 25). . . 
24. Davco executed a Deed of Trust ("California Benefit Deed of Trust") 
wherein Davco was the trustor and California Benefit was the beneficiary. (R. 781, f26). 
25. Davco did not pay the California Benefit Note at maturity on December 10, 
2007. (R. 781429). 
26. Davco thereafter made monthly interest payments to California Benefit 
from December 2007 to August 2008. (R. 781,1J29). 
27. There are no written amendments executed by California Benefit for the 
California Benefit Note or the California Benefit Trust Deed. (R. 781, Tf 28). 
ORAL AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
28. Mr. Murset knew that Davco would need fmancials statements to refinance 
the apartment complexes. (R. 1125, 176:6-10). 
29. Not providing the financial statements was contrary to what Mr. Murset 
wanted and that was for Davco to refinance and pay him. (R. 1125, 224:4-10). 
30. Mr. Murset knew that he was to provide and testified that he did provide 
the 2005 and 2006 financial statements for the apartment complexes. (R. 1125, 82:12-21; 
176:11-12; 217:15-19). 
31. Mr. Murset prepared Exhibit 3(a) and presented it at his deposition as the 
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financials statements given to Davco for the apartment complexes. (R. 1125, 189:22-25; 
177:9-13; 179:1-4; 194:23 to 195:12). 
32. Mr. Murset testified in deposition that Exhibit 3(a) contains the financial 
statements he gave to Davco. (R. 1125, 177:9-13; 179:1-4; 194:23 to 195:12). 
33. Mr. Murset's testimony that Exhibit 3(a) contains the financial statements 
he gave to Davco is contradicted by his own testimony and the document in Exhibit 3(a) 
because: 1) he admits that he didn't give all of the documents in Exhibit 3(a) to Mr. . 
Fisher even though he had testified in deposition that he had (R. 1125, 178:6-26; 187:12-
20); 2) he admits that Iota's Profit and Loss Statement ("P&L") for 1/1/06 through 
12/31/06 contained in Exhibit 3(a) could not have been provided in 2006 or 2007 or 
2008 by Mr. Murset because it was not printed until 2/27/09 after the lawsuit was filed 
and was not available until the beginning of 2007 (Exhibit 3(a), at PL000272; R. 1125, 
180:16 to 183:24); 3) he testified at trial that he gave Mr. Fisher a year-to-date P&L 
instead of PL000272 when he had testified in deposition that he knew he had given Mr. 
Fisher PL000272 because he does not keep a year to date financial statement (R. 1125, 
184:13 to 185:17); 4) he admits that California Benefit's P&L for 1/1/06 through 
12/31/06 in Exhibit 3(a) could not have been provided in 2006 or 2007 or 2008 by Mr. 
Murset because it was not printed until 2/27/09 after the lawsuit was filed and was not 
available until the beginning of 2007 (Exhibit 3(a), at PL-000273; R. 1125, 188:13 to 
189:12); 5) Iota's P&L for 1/1/05 through 12/31/05 was inaccurate because it contained 
income and expenses for other entities owned by Iota other than the Casa Sonoma 
Apartments (R. 1127, 476:26 to 477:7; 472:6-22); 6) he admits that California Benefit's 
P&L for the period 1/1/05 through 12/31/05 is inaccurate because it contains expenses 
that are not expenses for Casa Grande (Exhibit 3(a), at PL000275; R. 1127, 479:5-23); 
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and 7) he admits that he had not prepared and had not provided to Mr. Fisher PL000276-
279 in Exhibit 3(a) because they were prepared by Mr. Fisher (R. 1125, 188:13 to { 
189:12; 193:3 to 195:12). 
34. After execution of the REPCs, Mr. Murset again promised Mr. Fisher that 
he would provide two years of financial statements for the apartment complexes. (R. 
1127,481:1423). 
35. On March 26, 2008, Mr. Fisher asked Mr. Murset how the 2005 and the 
i 
2006 financial statements are coming and Mr. Murset understood that he was being 
asked to send the fmancials to the mortgage company so that the mortgage company 
knew the financial statements came from him. (Exhibit 18(a); R. 1125, 82:12-21). 
36. Mr. Murset never provided corrected 2005 profit and loss statements for 
the apartment complexes. (R. 1127, 476:21-25; 479:24 to 480:1). 
37. Mr. Murset never provided the 2006 profit and loss statements for the 
apartment complexes that included the months of June through December. (R. 1127, 
480:7-10; 476:21-25). 
38. Davco could not use the 2005 and 2006 profit and loss statements to refinance 
the apartment complexes because they were not accurate. (R. 1127,476:26 to 477:12). 
EXTRA YEAR 
39. Mr. Fisher told Mr. Murset that Davco might need more time to pay the 
balloon payment and reminded him that he had promised to provide the 2005 and 2006 
financial statements for the apartment complexes. (R. 1127, 492:3 to 493:15). 
40. Mr. Murset testified that he never entered into a written or verbal 
extension. (R. 1125, 65:3-5). 
41. Mr. Murset's testimony that he never agreed to a one year extension is 
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contradicted by Darcy Thompson's testimony that Mr. Murset told him that he had given 
Davco an additional year to finance the apartment complexes. (R. 1126, 272:6-10; 274:2-
9; 276:8-11). 
42. Mr. Murset told Mr. Fisher that he would give Davco another year so that it 
would have two full years of fmancials, rental history and everything under its ownership 
of the apartment complexes. (R. 1127, 496:23 to 497:19). 
43. Davco had relied on Mr. Mursef s promise to provide fmancials in 
executing the REPCs, in making payments on the promissory notes, and in refurbishing 
the apartment complexes. (R. 1127, 497:20 to 498:6). 
44. Mr. Murset testified that Davco was performing renovations and agreed 
Davco could make renovations to the apartment complexes. (R. 1125, 206:3-5; 205:10-12) 
45. Mr. Murset states it was Davco's choice to spend $128,376 for improve-
ments. (R. 1125, 154:6-14). 
46. Mr. Murset never sent notices of default to Davco until Davco discontinued 
making payments in September 2008. (R. 1125, 152:23-26; R. 1127, 494:25 to 495:1; 
496:9-13) 
PERFORMANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF THE AGREEMENT 
47. Mr. Murset knew Davco would need to refinance the apartment complexes 
to pay the balloon payments due under the Iota Note and the California Note in 
December 2007. (R. 1125, 176:6-10). 
48. Mr. Murset testified that he provided Mr. Fisher: 1) P&Ls for the apartment 
complexes for the periods of 1/1/02 to 12/31/02, 1/1/03 to 12/31/03; 2) P&Ls for Casa 
Sonoma for the periods of 1/1/04 to 12/31/04, 1/1/06 to 12/31/06; and 3) P&Ls for Casa 
Grande for the periods of 1/1/05 to 12/31/05, 1/1/06 -to 12/31/06. (R. 1125, 177:9-13; 
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179:1-4; 184:13 to 185:3). 
49. Mr. Murset has admitted that the 2006 Iota P&L (PL000272) is inaccurate, < 
and Mr. Murset testified that the P&L he gave Mr. Fisher in February 2007 contained the 
same information as PL000272. (R. 1125, 183:15-25). 
50. Iota and California Benefit failed to produce or have admitted into 
evidence any documents supporting Mr. Murset's testimony that he provided accurate 
2006 financial statements to Mr. Fisher. (R. 1125,218:10 to 223:21). 
51. Mr. Mursefs testimony that he provided the 2006 financial statements to 
Mr. Fisher in February 2007 is contradicted by his testimony that the financial documents 
he gave to Mr. Fisher are contained in Exhibit 3(a). (R. 1125, 177:9-13; 179:1-4; 184:13 
to 185:17; 194:23 to 195:12). 
52. On June 3, 2008, seven months after maturity of the Iota and California 
Benefit Notes, Mr. Murset requested that Davco refinance the Casa Sonoma and Casa 
Grande apartments by the end of July 2008. (R. 783, \ 37). 
53. On August 25, 2008, Iota and California Benefit requested a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure from Davco as a result of Davco's failure to refinance the apartments. (R.784, 
1f40). 
54. On August 26, 2008, in response to the request for a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure, Fisher emailed Murset stating that the lending institutions were changing 
their guidelines on the capitalization rate and he would have to bring in money to close 
since the loan amount would not be enough to cover the debt, that he was expecting a 
settlement on October 2 which would be enough to pay the difference between what 
Davco owed and the loan amounts, and that he had two parties interested in purchasing 
the properties. Mr. Fisher requested that Davco have enough time for either one of these 
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things to happen. (R. 784,1f 41). 
55. Davco could have obtained financing if it had been given the financial 
statements or had sufficient time to create the financial statements under its ownership. 
(R. 1127, 500:20 to 501:3). 
56. Davco agreed to give deeds in lieu of foreclosure if Mr. Murset agreed to 
reimburse it for costs it expended in refurbishing apartments in the sum of $128,376.00. 
(R. 1127; 518:14 to 519:25). ' 
57. On September 3, 2008, in response to Mr. Fisher's request, Mr. Murset 
requested that payments be raised by $1,000 for Casa Sonoma and $1,500 for Casa 
Grande to pay for foreclosure costs. (Exhibit 29). 
58. Davco made its last payments on the apartment complexes on September 8, 
2008, but stopped payment on the check after realizing that Mr. Murset was going to 
foreclose. (R. 784,1f 43; 1127, 518:14 to 519:25). 
59. The trustee's sale of the apartment complexes occurred on February 20, 
2009. (R. 788, % 60). 
RENTS 
60. On October 23, 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed a complaint against 
Davco and David Fisher alleging causes of action for Assignment of Rents and breach of 
an Iota Guaranty by David Fisher. (R. 1). 
61. On October 29, 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed an Ex Parte Motion 
for Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with the Court. (R. 20). 
62. On November 3, 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed a Request for 
Expedited Ruling on Ex Parte Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with 
the Court. (R. 67) 
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63. On November 5, 2008, the Court issued an Order requiring Davco and Mr. 
Fisher to deposit rents with the Court.(R. 73, at |^2) , ^ 
64. On November 10, 2008. Davco received the Notice of Entry of Order. (R. 
1127,531:10-23). 
65. On November 14, 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed an amended 
complaint and removed Mr. Fisher as a Defendant. (R. 94). 
66. On May 12, 2009, Iota and California Benefit filed a second amended 
complaint which did not include Mr. Fisher as a Defendant. (R. 185). 
67. Davco deposited $33,805.33 in rents into the Court. (Exhibit 80) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First. The trial court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds to bar Davco's 
affirmative defenses of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing because there was part performance of the oral agreement requiring Mr. 
Murset to provide the 2005 and 2006 financial statements and partial performance of the 
oral agreement to extend the maturity dates for one year to allow Davco to create two full 
years of financial statements under its ownership of the apartment complexes. 
The trial court's findings that Mr. Murset provided the financial information for 
2005 and 2006 to Mr. Fisher and the mortgage broker are clearly erroneous because the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings is legally insufficient because: 1) it does not 
disprove but supports the evidence presented by Davco that accurate financial statements 
were not provided; and 2) it is contradicted by other evidence presented by Iota and 
California Benefit and thus, has no legal tendency to establish that accurate financial 
statements were given to Davco. (Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495 (Utah, 2005) at ^ |25). 
The trial court's finding that the parties did not orally modify the promissory notes 
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is clearly erroneous because the evidence in support of the trial court's finding is not 
legally sufficient to support the finding because: 1) Mr. Miirset's trial testimony is 
contradicted by his statement to Mr. Thompson that he had given Davco an additional 
year to refinance the apartment complexes; and 2) Mr. Murset's trial testimony is 
contradicted by his deposition testimony and therefore, has no legal tendency to establish 
the truth that there was no agreement to extend the maturity dates for one year. (Id.). 
Second. The trial court erred iirnot finding and ruling that Iota's and California 
Benefit's claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel because Mr. Murset 
failed to provide accurate financial statements and failed to allow Davco an extra year to 
create two full years of financial statements as he agreed to do, Davco relied on Mr. 
Murset's promises and it was damaged by expending more than $128,000 in refurbishing 
the apartments and losing the opportunity to purchase the apartment complexes. 
Third. The trial court incorrectly applied the waiver clauses in the Iota promissory 
note and trust deed and in the California Benefit promissory note and trust deed to bar 
Davco's affimiative defense of waiver because the presence of a non-waiver provision is 
relevant but not dispositive in a determination of whether Iota and California Benefit 
waived its right to default, and parties to a written contract may modify, waive or make 
new terms regardless of provisions in the contracts to the contrary. Iota and California 
Benefit waived their right to foreclose by agreeing to provide the financial statements 
and extending the maturity dates for one year. 
Fourth. The trial court's finding that Iota's and California Benefit's breach of the 
contract did not cause the failure of Davco to refinance the promissory notes is clearly 
erroneous because the evidence in support of the finding consist of admissions and 
contradictions and therefore, is legally insufficient to prove that the breaches of the 
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contracts did not cause the failure of Davco to refinance the apartment complexes. 
Fifth. The trial court's finding that Iota and California Benefit did not breach the
 ( 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is clearly erroneous because the purpose, 
intentions, and expectations of the parties that Davco refinance the apartment complexes 
and pay the promissory notes on the maturity dates was prevented by Iota's and 
California Benefit's failure to provide accurate financial statements and to allow Davco 
the extra year to create the financial statements. 
Sixth. The trial court incorrectly determined that it had jurisdiction to hold a 
contempt proceeding because neither an affidavit nor other initiating pleading was filed 
giving the trial court jurisdiction over a contempt proceeding. Davco and Mr. Fisher 
were not given due process because the trial court did not give notice prior to trial that a 
contempt proceeding would be combined with the trial, thus denying Davco and Mr. 
Fisher the opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare evidence to present at trial, and 
denying Mr. Fisher the opportunity to retain counsel to represent him. 
Seventh. The trial court improperly denied Davco's Rule 67 motion because: 1) 
neither Davco nor Mr. Fisher had filed any pleadings prior to the Ex Parte Order being 
signed by the trial court and therefore, had not admitted in any pleadings that they had in 
their possession or under their control rents due to Iota or California Benefit; and 2) there 
was no examination of Davco or Mr. Fisher showing that they had funds belonging to 
Iota and/or California Benefit at the time the Ex Parte Order was issued as required by 
Rule-67. 
Eighth. The trial court incorrectly concluded that Davco breached the Iota trust 
deed by the recording of a trust deed to Fab 5 Management LLC because Davco was not 
the trustor on the Fab 5 Management LLC trust deed, Iota failed to give notice of the 
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alleged default that provided Davco time to cure the alleged breach, and the recording of 
the trust deed was not a material breach of the Iota trust deed. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Davco breached the Iota trust deed by 
the recording of quit claim deeds to Darwin Fisher because Iota failed to give notice of 
the alleged default that provided Davco time to cure the alleged breach and the recording 
of the deeds was not a material breach of the Iota trust deed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied the Statute of Frauds to Bar Davco's 
Affirmative Defenses of Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Davco claims that: 1) the parties modified the REPCs and the promissory notes to 
require Iota and California Benefit to provide the 2005 and the 2006 year-to-date finan-
cial statements for the apartment complexes to Davco so that Davco could refinance the 
apartment complexes and pay the remaining balances on the promissory notes by their 
maturity dates; and 2) after Mr. Murset failed to provide the financial statements, the 
parties orally modified the REPCs and promissory notes extending the maturity dates an 
extra year to allow Davco to create two years of financial statements under its ownership 
of the apartment complexes. 
Davco further claims that Iota and California Benefit breached the REPCs and 
promissory notes by failing to provide the 2005 and the 2006 year-to-date financial 
statements and by failing to give Davco an extra year to create two full years of financial 
statements under its ownership of the apartment complexes, and breached the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide accurate financial statements and by 
failmg to allow Davco an extra year to create two full years of financial statements thus, 
preventing it from refinancing the apartment complexes. 
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Davco contends that Iota's and California Benefit's breaches of the REPCs and 
the promissory notes, excused Davco's obligation to perform under the contract. (See ^ 
Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 124 P.3d 269 (Ut. Ct. App., 2005) at ^  26) ("It 
is well-settled law that one party's breach excuses further performance by the non-
breaching party if the breach is material"). Thus, Davco contends that it is not liable to 
Iota and California Benefit for breach of the purchase contracts, the promissory notes, or 
the trust deeds. . 
The trial court did not make any conclusion of law regarding Davco's affirmative 
defense that Iota and California Benefit breached the REPCs by failing to provide 
accurate financial statements and failing to allow Davco the extra year to create its own 
financial statements. However, the trial court did conclude that the modifications to the 
promissory notes had to be in writing to be enforceable. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 and §25-5-4 bars Davco's defense that after 
maturity of the Iota and California Benefit Notes in December 2007, there 
was a one-year extension to the Iota Note, Iota Trust Deed, California 
Benefit Note and California Benefit Trust Deed. There are no writings 
executed by either Iota or California Benefit creating any modification of 
the original Notes and Deeds of Trust. (R. 790, at \ 4). 
In support of its conclusion of law that Iota and California Benefit did not breach 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 790, ^5), the trial court found that Mr. 
Murset delivered financial statements as requested by Davco (R. 783, ^ |35), that based on 
the testimony of Jeff Feltwell, the prior owner's financial records were not required for 
refinancing and lenders required the owner of the apartment complex to have two years 
stream of income which Davco did not have. (R. 78, Tf32). 
"The general rule is that 'any modification of a contract that is within the statute 
of frauds must also comply with the statute of frauds.'" (Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 
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1176 (Ut. App. 1995)). When a contract is required to be in writing the alteration or 
modification thereof must also be in writing. (Id.) 
The applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness; however, because a trial court must consider facts offered by the parties 
regarding part performance of the agreement, the standard of review for these subsidiary 
factual determinations is the clearly erroneous standard. (Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 
(Utah, 2002) at f23; RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah, 2004) at ft35). 
A. PART PERFORMANCE 
A recognized and accepted exception to the statute of frauds is part performance 
of the oral modification. (Id.) 
[W]here there is evidence of part performance under a modified agreement 
and where it would be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate the oral 
modification and seek enforcement of the written contract, the oral 
agreement may be removed from the statute of frauds and enforced. 
(Fisher, atpg 1177). 
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is: (1) the oral contract and 
its terms must be clear and definite; (2) the acts done in performance of the contract must 
be equally clear and definite; and (3) the acts must be in reliance on the contract. The acts 
in reliance must be such that (a) it would not have been performed had the contract not 
existed; and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promissor would result in fraud 
on the performer who relied since damages would be inadequate. Reliance may be made 
in numerable ways all of which could refer exclusively to the contract. (Spears, at para. 
24). 
"[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in 
that the possession of the party seeking specific performance and the 
improvements made by him or her must be reasonably explicable only on 
the postulate that a contract exits. The reason for such requirement is that 
the equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel and unless 
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the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the contract, there 
is nothing to show that the Plaintiff relied on it or changed his [or her] 
position to his prejudice..." (Spears, at para. 24) < 
However, under certain circumstances the exclusively referable requirement may 
be relaxed. 'The more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less stringent the 
requirement of exclusively referable acts." (Spears, at para. 24). 
1. Real Estate Purchase Contracts 
First. The terms of the oral contract are clear and definite. 
The terms of the oral contract are established by: 1) Mr. Murset's testimony that 
he knew that Davco would need fmancials to refinance (R. 1125, 176:6-10); 2) that he 
was being asked to provide the financial statements to the mortgage company so that it 
would be known that the financial statements came from him (R. 1125, 82:12-21); 3) that 
he provided financial statements for 2005 and for 2006 which are contained in Exhibit 
3(a) and later gave 2006 fmancials statements to Mr. Fisher in February 2007 (R. 1125, 
176:11-12; 217:15-21; 218:10-18); and 4) that his failure to provide the financial 
statements was contrary to what he wanted which was Davco refinancing the apartment 
complexes and paying him. (R. 1125, 224:4-10). 
The terms of the oral contract are also established by Mr. Fisher's testimony that 
the parties agreed that Mr. Murset would provide the 2005 and the 2006 year-to-date 
financial statements. (R. 1127,468: 26 to 469:14; 493:3-15). 
Lastly, the terms of the oral agreement are set forth in the email dated 3/26/2008, 
where Mr. Fisher is asking Mr. Murset if he had provided the 2005 and the 2006 year-to-
date financial statements to Davco's broker. (Exhibit 18(a)). 
Thus, the terms of the oral contract are clear and definite that Mr. Murset is to 
provide the 2005 and the 2006 year-to-date financial statements for the apartment 
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complexes. 
Second. The acts done in performance of the oral contract are equally clear and 
definite 
Davco expended $128,376 to refurbish the apartment complexes after executing 
the purchase contracts. (R. 1127, 497:20 to 498:6). Mr. Murset knew that Davco was 
performing renovations, agreed that Davco could perform the renovations, and never 
objected or told Mr. Fisher that Davco could'not perform the renovations. (R. 1125, 
206:3-5; 205:10-12). 
In addition, after the maturity dates of the promissory notes, Davco continued to 
refurbish the apartments (R. 1125, 95:11-14), make payments on the notes (R. 1125, 
65:23-26; 1127, 497:25 to 498:2), to manage the apartment complexes, to make repairs, 
and to pay the expenses of the apartments. (R. 1127, 533:4 to 534:2). 
Third. Davco's acts were done in reliance on the contract. 
The REPCs did not require Davco to refurbish the apartment complexes or to pay 
for the refurbishing (Exhibits 7(a); 71, at p. 44; (R. 1125, 154:6-14) which is 
acknowledged by Mr. Murset. (R. 1125, 154:6-14). Yet Davco, prior to the maturity 
dates of the promissory notes, paid tens of thousands of dollars for the refurbishing of the 
apartment complexes. 
And, after the maturity dates of the promissory notes, when Davco could not 
enforce the purchase contracts unless there was an oral agreement, Davco in reliance on 
the oral agreement, continued to perform and pay for refurbishing the apartment 
complexes (R.. 1125, 95:11-14), to pay payments on the notes (R. 1125, 65:23-26; 1127, 
497:25 to 498:2), to manage the apartment complexes, to make repairs, and to pay the 
expenses of the apartments. (R 1127, 533:4 to 534:2). 
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Davco would not have performed these acts if there was not an oral agreement 
because: 1) the purchase contracts did not require Davco to pay $128,376 for refurbish-
ing the apartment complexes; and 2) after the maturity dates of the promissory notes had 
passed, Davco could not enforce the purchase contracts without the oral modifications. 
The exclusivity requirement should be relaxed because of the following direct 
proof of the oral agreement: 1) Mr. Murset's testimony that he provided to Mr. Fisher 
financial statements for the apartment complexes from 2002 through May 2006 (R. 778, 
at f^ 11); 2) Mr. Fisher and Mr. Murset discussed that the financial statements provided 
by Mr. Murset contained inaccurate financial information and that the information would 
have to be corrected (R. 778, at ^  11); 3) Mr. Murset acknowledging that Davco would 
need financial statements to refinance the apartment complexes (R. 1125, 176:6-10); 3) 
Mr. Murset acknowledging that he was being asked to provide the financial statements to 
the mortgage company so that it would be known that the financial statements came from 
him (R. 1125, 82:12-21; 4) Mr. Murset acknowledging that he provided financial 
statements (R. 1125, 176:11-12; 217:15-21); 5) Mr. Murset acknowledging the failure to 
provide financial statements was contrary to what he wanted (R. 1125, 224:4-10); 6) Mr. 
Murset acknowledging he never sent Davco a notice of default (R. 1125, 152:23-26); and 
7) Mr. Murset acknowledging he was continually trying to help Davco to refinance (R. 
1125,153:1-4). 
The failure to perform on the part of Mr. Murset constitutes fraud because: (1) he 
promised to provide financial statements (R. 1125, 176::6-10); 2) which was material to 
Davco executing the purchase contracts and expending $128,376 in making improvements 
to the apartment complexes (R. 1127, 497:20 to 498:5); 3) Mr. Murset knew to be false or 
made recklessly because he provided 2005 financial statements that were not accurate and 
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did not provide the Iota 2006 which he also admitted was inaccurate and never submitted 
a2006 financial statement for California Benefit. (R. 1125,195:16 to 196:20; R. 1127,476:21 
to 477:12; 479:1 to 480:10); (4) for the purpose of inducing Davco to rely upon his 
misrepresentation and execute the purchase contracts and expend $128,376 for 
improvements; and (5) Davco having received the financial statements acted reasonably and 
not Iaiowing that Mr. Murset would not provide corrected financial statements or the 2006 
financial statments (R. 1127, 497:20 to 498:5); (6) did rely upon the misrepresentation and 
executed the purchase contracts and expended $128,376 (R. 1127,497:20 to 498:5); and (8) 
has lost the $128,376 and has lost the opportunity to purchase the apartment complexes. 
Awarding damages to Davco is inadequate because it has lost the opportunity to 
purchase the apartment complexes and has lost income that it could have had by using 
the $128,376 for other projects. 
Since the terms and the acts done in performance of the oral agreement are clear 
and definite, and the acts performed are clear and definite and were in reliance on the 
contract, the trial court's failure to find that there was part performance of the oral 
agreement is clearly erroneous. 
2. The One-year Extension to the Promissory Notes 
First. The terms of the oral contract are clear and definite. 
After Mr. Murset failed to provide accurate 2005 financial statement and failed to 
provide the 2006 financial statments, in March/April 2008, the parties agreed that Davco 
would have another year to create two full years of financial statements under its 
ownership of the apartment complexes. (R. 1127, 496:23 to 497:19). The existence and 
the terms of the oral agreement are verified by Mr. Muset communicating to Mr. 
Thompson that he had given Davco an extra year to refinance the apartment complexes. 
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f 
(R. 1126, 272:6-10; 274:2-9; 276:8-11). 
Second. The acts done in performance of the contract are equally clear and 
definite. 
The following acts were done in performance of the oral agreement: 1) 
refurbishing the apartment complexes and making payment for refurbishing the 
apartment complexes (R. 1125, 95:11-14); 2) making payments on the promissory notes 
(R. 1125, 65:23-26), 1127, 497:25 to 498:2); 3) managing the apartment complexes, 
making repairs, and paying the expenses of the apartments (R. 1127, 533:4 to 534:2). 
Third. Davco's acts were done in reliance on the contract. 
The purchase contracts did not require Davco to refurbish the apartment com-
plexes or to pay for refurbishing the apartment complexes. (Exhibit 71, at p. 44; Exhibit 
7(a); (R.l 125,154:6-14)). Yet, Davco after the maturity dates of the promissory notes, 
refurbished the apartment complexes and paid for the refurbishing. (R. 1125, 95:11 -14). 
Davco also continued to make payments on the notes (R. 1125, 65:23-26; 1127,497:25 
to 498:2), to manage the apartment complexes, to make repairs, and to pay the expenses 
of the apartments (R. 1127, 533:4 to 534:2). 
Davco would not have performed these acts if there was not an oral agreement 
because: 1) the purchase contracts did not require Davco to pay $128,376 for refurbish-
ing the apartment complexes; and 2) after the maturity dates of the promissory notes had 
passed, Davco could not enforce the purchase contracts without the oral modification. 
The exclusivity requirement should be relaxed because: 1) Mr. Murset told Mr. 
Thompson about the extension, establishing that Mr. Murset knew about the extension 
and had agreed to the extension. 
The failure to perform on the part of Mr. Murset constitutes fraud because: (1) he 
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promised Davco an extension to create two full years of financial statements; 2) which 
was material to Davco continuing to make and pay for refurbishing the apartment 
complexes and continuing to manage the apartments, make repairs, etc.; 3) which Mr. 
Murset knew to be false or made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation, (4) for the purpose of inducing Davco to 
continue to make and pay for refurbishing the apartment complexes, etc.; and (5) Davco 
having been told that it would have an extra year to create the financial statements acted 
reasonably and not blowing that Mr. Murset would not honor the oral agreement; (6) did 
rely upon the misrepresentation and refurbished the apartment complexes, etc.; and (8) as 
a result has lost the money it expended in refurbishing the apartment complexes and has 
lost the opportunity to purchase the apartment complexes. 
Awarding damages to Davco is inadequate because it has lost the opportunity to 
purchase the apartment complexes and has lost other business opportunities that it could 
have had from the funds it expended to refurbish the apartment complexes. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THATMR. MURSET PROVIDED THE 
FINANCIAL INFORM A TION FOR 2005 AND 2006 TO MR. FISHER AND THE 
MORTGAGE BROKER ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The trial court found that Mr. Murset provided financial information for 2005 and 
2006 to the mortgage broker and to Mr. Fisher. (R. 783, at f35; 778, at If 11; 790, at %5). 
The evidence that supports the trial court's findings of fact is: 1) Mr. Murset's 
testimony that he knew that Davco would need fmancials to refinance the apartment 
complexes (R. 1125, 176:'6-10); 2) the financial statements that Mr. Murset testified he 
provided in 2006 when Davco did purchase the apartment complexes (Exhibit 3(a); (R. 
1125, 176:11-12; 177:9-13; 179:1-4; 194:23 to 195:9-12; 217:15-19;); 3) the financial 
statements that Mr. Fisher testified he was provided by Mr. Murset in 2006 (Exhibit 4(a); 
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R. 469:12-25); 4) Mr. Murset's trial testimony that he had given Mr. Fisher a copy of 
California Benefit's P&L for the period of 1/1/06 through 12/31/06 in February 2007
 ( 
(R.1125, 190: 25 to 191:7); 5) Mr. Murset's trial testimony that he had given Mr. Fisher 
a copy of Iota's P&L for the period of 1/1/06 through 12/31/06 in February 2007 (R. 
1125, 180:16 to 181:24); 6) trial Exhibit 18(a) which states "I received an e-mail from { 
my broker asking me the status of the 2005/2006 YTD operating statements. How are 
those coming?"; 5) Mr. Murset's testimony regarding Exhibit 18(a) that he "...was being 
asked to, again, provide the 2005/2006 fmancials to the mortgage company so that they 
know it came from me." (R. 1125, 82:6-21); and 6) Mr. Murset's testimony that he 
provided financial statements in 2005 to his real estate agent, Mr. Thompson, when 
Davco first attempted to purchase the apartment complexes (Exhibit 1(a); (R. 1125, 
199:11-13). The evidence supporting the trial court's findings is legally insufficient 
because: 1) it does not disprove but supports the evidence presented by Davco; and 2) it 
is contradicted by other evidence presented by Iota and California Benefit and thus, has 
no legal tendency to establish that accurate financial statements were given to Davco. 
(Parduhn, at 1J25). 
First. Mr. Murset's testimony establishes that the financial statements he provided 
Davco are inaccurate. 
Davco presented evidence at-trial that the 2005 financial statements for Iota and 
California Benefit are inaccurate and could not be used to refinance the apartments. (R. 
1127,476:21 to 477:12; 479:1 to 480:10). Mr. Murset also testified at trial that the 2005 and 
2006 Iota P&Ls for Casa Sonoma contained in Trial Exhibits 3(a) and 4(a) are inaccurate 
because they contain income and expenses for properties other than Casa Sonoma and he 
would have to correct them. (R. 1125, 195:16 to 196:-11; 200:20-26). Iota and California 
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Benefit failed to present any evidence that corrected 2005 financial statements were 
provided to Davco. 
This evidence is not legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding because it 
does not disprove, but supports the evidence presented by Davco that the financial 
statements provided by Mr. Murset were inaccurate and could not be used to refinance 
the apartment complexes. 
Second. Financial statements for 2005 and 2006 supporting the trial court's 
finding were not introduced into evidence. 
Mr. Murset testified that he provided 2005 and 2006 financial statements. (R. 
1125, 82:12-21; 176:11-12; 217:15-19). He testified in deposition that he prepared the 
financial statements for the years 2002 through 2006 and other financial documents in 
Trial Exhibit 3(a) and had given them to Mr. Fisher. (R. 1125, 178:20-22; 189:22-25; R. 
1125, 177:9-13; 179:1-4; 194:23 to 195:12). He further testified in deposition that he 
knew that Exhibit 3(a) contained the financial documents he gave to Mr. Fisher because 
Mr. Fisher had written on some of them. (R. 1125, 178:1-5). 
However, at trial Mr. Murset contradicted his deposition testimony by: 1) admit-
ting that he didn't give all of the documents in Exhibit 3(a) to Mr. Fisher even though he 
had testified in deposition that he had (R. 1125, 178:6-26; 187:1220); 2) admitting that 
he did not provide the Iota P&L for the period of 1/1/06 through 12/31/06 (PL000272) to 
Mr. Fisher in Exhibit 3(a) because it was not available until the beginning of 2007 and it 
has the print date of 2/27/09 (R. 1125, 180:16 to 183:24); 3) testifying at-trial that he 
gave Mr. Fisher a year-to-date P&L instead of PL000272 when he had testified in 
deposition that he knew he had given Mr. Fisher PL000272 because he does not keep a 
year to date financial statement (R. 1125, 184:13 to 185:17); 4) admitting that he could 
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not have given Mr. Fisher the California Benefit P&L for the period 1/1/06 through 
12/31/06 (PL000273) prior to the end of 2006 because it would not have been prepared
 { 
until after 2006 had ended and because it had the print date of 2/27/09 (R. 1125, 188:13 
to 189:12); and 6) that he had not prepared and had not provided to Mr. Fisher 
PL000276-279 in Exhibit 3(a) because they were prepared by Mr. Fisher (R. 1125, 
188:13 to 189:12; 193:3 to 195:12). 
Such contradicting testimony by Mr. Murset is not legally sufficient to support the 
trial court's finding. (See U.S. v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386, 389 (CA8, 1960) 
("Contradictory statements can have no legal tendency to establish the truth of their 
subject matter."). Therefore, this evidence does not disprove Davco's evidence and 
therefore, is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
Third. Exhibit 18(a) does not support the trial court's finding because it does not 
state that Mr. Murset actually sent accurate financial statements to the broker. Nor does 
Mr. Murset's testimony support the trial court's findings because he never testified that 
he sent the financial statements to the mortgage broker but only testified that he was 
asked to provide them. (R. 1125, 82:6-21). The loan officer, Mr. Feltwell never testified 
that he received financial statements from Mr. Murset, but did testify that he received 
financial statements from Mr. Fisher for a part of 2006 and for 2007. (R. 1126, 292:16-
25). And, it is clear from the e-mail that accurate 2005 and 2006 financial statements had 
not been provided prior to March 26, 2008. 
Exhibit 18(a) does not disprove Davco's evidence but supports it and therefore, is 
legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
Fourth. Three months after sending Exhibit 18(a) to Mr. Murset requesting 
accurate 2005 and 2006 financial statements, Mr. Fisher sent Exhibit 27 to Mr. Murset 
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informing him that he has delivered to the loan officer the apartment complexes' 
financial statements for the portion of 2006 and all of 2007 created under Davco's 
ownership of the apartment complexes. 
Exhibit 27 does not support the trial court's finding because it clearly states that 
the loan officer had received updated fmancials from Mr. Fisher, "[t]he loan officer said 
that he received my e-mail with the updated fmancials except for the 07 returns. My cpa 
is making a couple of changes and then sending them back to me for review then I will 
forward them to the loan officer." (Exhibit 27). 
It is clear that it is the financial statements created by Davco under its ownership 
of the apartment complexes that Mr. Fisher is sending to the loan officer. This is verified 
by the loan officer, Mr. Feltwell, who testified that Mr. Fisher provided him with 
financial statements for a part of 2006 and for 2007. (R. 1126, 292:16-25). Mr. Murset 
could not have prepared the 2007 financial statements because Davco was managing the 
apartment complexes and Mr. Murset did not have any of that financial information. 
Exhibit 27 is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding because it 
proves, not disproves, that Mr. Murset failed to provide accurate or any financial 
statements to the loan officer. 
Fifth. Exhibit 4(a) does not support the trial court's finding because it contains the 
same 2005 and 2006 Iota P&Ls as Exhibit 3(a) which Mr. Murset admitted are inaccurate 
and the 2006 P&Ls are only through May 2006. 
Exhibit 4(a) does not disprove but supports Davco's evidence that Mr. Murset 
failed to provide accurate financial statements and financial statements for 2006. 
Sixth. Mr. Murset's testimony that he provided Mr. Fisher the 2006 P&Ls for the 
apartment complexes in Februaiy 2007 does not support the trial court's finding because: 
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1) Mr. Murset has admitted that the 2006 Profit and Loss Statement (PL000272) for Iota 
is inaccurate and Mr. Murset testified that the P&L he gave Mr. Fisher in February 2007
 ( 
contained the same information as PL000272 (R. 1125, 183:15-25); 2) there were no 
documents admitted into evidence supporting Mr. Murset's testimony that he provided 
the 2006 financial statements to Mr. Fisher (R. 1125, 218:10 to 223:21); 3) there is no * 
evidence that the 2006 financial statement for California Benefit is accurate; 4) Mr. 
Murset's testimony that he provided the 2006 financial statements to Mr. Fisher in 
February 2007 is contradicted by his testimony that the financial documents he gave to 
Mr. Fisher are contained in Exhibit 3(a) (R. 1125, 177:9-13; 179:1-4; 184:13 to 185:17; 
194:23 to 195:12); and 5) the trial court's finding is specifically that he gave the 2006 
financial statements to the loan officer and not to Mr. Fisher (R. 783, ^ 35). 
The evidence supporting the court's finding that Mr. Murset provided the 2006 
financial statements is legally insufficient because it does not disprove Davco's evidence 
that accurate financial statements were not provided and is based on Mr. Murset's 
contradictory testimony which is legally insufficient to prove the truth that he provided 
the 2006 financial statements to Davco. 
Seventh. The financial statements given to Mr. Fisher (Exhibit 1(a)) does not 
support the trial court's finding because it does not contain financial statements for 2006, 
the financial statements are only from 1/1/05 through 7/31/05, and Mr. Murset wrote on . 
the financial statement for Iota that "[t]his statement reflects more than the 13 units at 
669 So. 700 E. and also includes many expenses not related to these units." (Exhibit 1 (a) 
atDT019). 
Exhibit 1(a) is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding because it 
does not disprove that Mr. Murset failed to provide accurate financial statements. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTIES DID NOT ORALLY MODIFY 
THE PROMISSORY NOTES IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court found that "[o]n September 30,2008, Mr. Murset sent a letter 
responding to David Fisher's September 24,2008 letter denying any one-year extension 
was made and stating that if an agreement for a one-year extension had been made then 
that agreement would have been honored." (R. 785, at 1f46). 
The evidence that supports the trial court's finding is: 1) Mr. Murset's letter 
stating "I have never, verbally or in writing extended the deadline by one year. I worked 
with you as each possibility came and went, but I never agreed to a one year extension. If 
I had, I would not have been pressing you for something to happen until that second year 
had expired." (Exhibit 32); 2) Mr. Murset's testimony that he never agreed to a one-year 
extension (R. 1125, 65:3-5; 72:22-16); 3) Mr. Murset's testimony that he first heard of 
the extension in September 2008 (R. 1125, 65:7-14); 4) Mr. Murset stated in an e-mail 
that the maturity date had passed (Exhibit 25); 5) Mr. Murset's testimony that he 
requested that the loan be paid (R. 1125, 68: 21-26); and 6) Mr. Murset's testimony that 
he requested a deed in lieu of foreclosure (Exhibit 28). 
This evidence is not legally sufficient to support the finding because: 1) Mr. 
Murset's trial testimony is contradicted by his statement to Mr. Thompson that he had 
given Davco an additional year to refinance the apartment complexes (R. 1126, 272:6 to 
274:9). Based on Mr. Murset's contradictions between his trial testimony and his 
deposition testimony as demonstrated above and his admission to Mr. Thompson, Mr. 
Murset's denial of an extension has no legal tendency to establish the truth of whether 
there was an extension. (U.S. v. Rainwater, at 386, 389). 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Not Finding and Ruling that Iota's and California 
Benefit's Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel 
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The trial court did not make any conclusions of law regarding Davco's affirmative 
defense of equitable estoppel. The factual findings made by the trial court that relate to 
Davco's affirmative defense concern Mr. Murset's promises to provide accurate financial 
statements and to extend the maturity date of the promissory notes. 
Equitable estoppel "is a defensive doctrine preventing one party from taking unfair { 
advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped 
has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has 
been injured in some way."{Bohr v. Imus, 211 P.3d 987 (Utah App.,2009) at ^ 6). 
To establish equitable estoppel Davco must prove: 1) Iota and California Benefit 
made a statement, and/or an admission, and/or acted, and/or failed to act, that is 
inconsistent with their claims for deficiency judgment and rents; 2) Davco took action 
and/or inaction on the basis of Iota and California Benefit's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and 3) Davco will be injured if Iota and California Benefit are allowed to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. (Whitaker v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd., 191 P.3d 814 (Utah App.,2008) at f22). 
The evidence that support the findings that Iota and California Benefit provided 
the financial statements and that Mr. Murset did not agree to an extension of one-year are 
set forth on pages 28-33, in section I subsections B and C above. However, as shown in 
sub-sections B and C, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that Mr. 
Murset provided accurate financial statements, that he provided accurate 2006 financial 
statements, and did not agree to an extension of one-year. 
As shown in Section I above, pgs 22-33, Davco presented sufficient evidence 
from which the trial court should have found that Davco relied on Mr. Murset's promises 
and that Davco was injured by having expended $128,376 for refurbishing the 
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apartments and continuing to manage the apartment complexes. 
Davco established the elements of equitable estoppel by demonstrating that Iota 
and California Benefit promised to provide accurate financials but did not (see above 
Sub-section B, pgs 27-31), that Davco relying on their promises purchased the apartment 
complexes (R. 1127, 497:20 to 498:6), expended $128,376 in refurbishing them (Id.), 
and was prevented from purchasing them by Iota and California Benefit declaring 
default. As such, the trial court erred by failing to find and rule that Iota's and California 
Benefit's claims are barred by equitable estoppel. 
III. The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied the Waiver Clauses in the Iota 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed and in the California Benefit Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed to Bar Davco's Affirmative Defense of Waiver 
The trial court concluded that Iota's and California Benefit's acceptance of Davco's 
payments after the maturity date had passed did not waive their right to declare default. 
"The acceptance of Davco's monthly interest payments from December 2007 to 
August 2008 after the maturity of the Iota and California Benefit Notes in December 
2007 did not waive the rights of Iota or California Benefit to strictly enforce the 
terms of the Iota Note, Iota Trust Deed, California Benefit Note and California 
Benefit Trust Deed. Slee Plaintiffs' Ex. 2, Iota Note, - 12 ("... No delay or failure of 
Lender in the exercise of any right or remedy provided for under this Note shall be 
deemed a waiver of such right by Lender, and no exercise of any right or remedy 
shall be deemed a waiver of any other right or remedy which Lender may have."); 
Plaintiffs' Ex. 3, Iota Trust Deed, -12.7 ("Beneficiary's failure at any time or times 
hereafter to require strict performance by Trustor of any of the undertakings, 
agreements or covenants contained in this Deed of Trust shall not waive, affect or 
diminish any right of Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and 
performance therewith."); Plaintiffs' Ex. 13, California Benefit Note, ~ 11 ("The 
Maker and endorser hereof waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice 
of protest, notice of dishonor, notice of nonpayment and expressly agree that this 
Note or any payment hereunder may be extended from time to time by the Holder 
thereof without in any way affecting the liability of such parties. No course of dealing 
between the Maker and Holder in exercising any rights hereunder, shall operate as 
a waiver of rights of Holder.") (R. 789, at ^ 3). 
The presence of a non-waiver provision is relevant but not dispositive in a 
determination of whether Iota and Califomia Benefit waived its right to default. (Living 
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Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 at N5 (Ut. Ct. App., 1995). Parties to a written 
contract may modify, waive or make new terms regardless of provisions in the contracts 
to the contrary. (ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 245 P.3d 184 (Utah, 
2010) at U 38). 
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a { 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied." (Citations Omitted). 
At trial, it was established that Iota and California Benefit had a right to declare a 
default when the maturity dates passed without payment (Exhibit 1, at ^ 12; Exhibit 3, at 
1J12.7; Exhibit 13, at f 11). It was also established that Iota and California Benefit knew 
of their right to. declare default after the maturity dates but did not (R. 1125, 83:9-12). 
However, as shown above, Mr. Murset promised to provide accurate financial 
statements after the maturity dates and when he failed to do so, promised Davco an extra 
year to create financial statements under its ownership of the apartment complexes. By 
agreeing to an extension of time for the payment of the amount due, Iota and California 
Benefit waived their right to a default for failure to pay the amount due on the maturity 
dates for a one-year period. (See Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284, 287 
(Utah, 1944)). ("In Commercial Credit Co. v. Macht, it was held that by giving an 
extension of time for payment of an amount then due, the seller waived his right to a 
forfeiture. In other words, the extension is in effect a waiver."). 
IV. The Trial Court's Finding that Iota's and California Benefit's Breach of the 
Contract Did Not Cause the Failure of Davco to Refinance the Promissory 
Notes is Clearly Erroneous 
The trial court concluded that "[tjhere was no breach of any obligation of Plain-
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tiffs to cause the failure of Davco to refinance the Iota and California Notes. Rather, the 
reasons for the failure to refinance include the pending foreclosures against David Fisher 
and the reduced appraisal value of the properties during this time. " (R. 791, at [^6). 
The trial court found that: 1) for refinance to occur, the lenders required that 
David Fisher have a two-year income stream as the owner of the properties (R. 782, at 
f 33); 2) the prior owner's financial statements for 2005 and 2006 were not required by 
the lenders and under the guidelines were not needed to obtain a loan for the apartment 
complexes (R. 782, at ^[33); and 3) the loan application for refinancing for Casa Grande 
was denied on February 21, 2008 by the lenders because Mr. Fisher did not have two 
years of income stream as the owner and the appraised value of the Casa Grande 
apartments did not come in as high as anticipated based on the December 2007 appraisal 
of Craig Morley; and 4) David Fisher had credit problems specifically the December 21, 
2007 credit report listed eleven (11) foreclosures, each of these reasons led to denial of 
the loan application for the Casa Grande apartments; and 5)the foreclosures demonstrated 
financial mismanagement by David Fisher (R. 782, at f^ 34). 
The evidence does not support the trial court's findings because: 1) the trial court 
ruled that Mr. Feltwell's testimony was excluded because it is hearsay and therefore, 
there is no evidence that Mr. Fisher had to have two years of income stream as the owner 
to qualify for financing {Kimball v. Kimball, 217 P.3d 733 (Ut. Ct. App., 2009 ) at %LQ 
n.5); 2) the appraisal was not as high as Davco wanted but that only meant that Davco 
would have to bring in more money (Exhibit 28); 3) this was Mr. Feltwell's first attempt 
at brokering commercial loans and relied on what others said were the requirements and 
the court did not admit the hearsay evidence (R. 1126, 297:22 to 298:14; 307:6-26); 4) in 
deposition Mr. Feltwell testified that he did not know if the loans would have been 
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approved if the seasoning requirements had been met, but he changed his testimony at 
trial (R. 1126, 311:11-21); 5) Mr. Feltwell did not know whether the prior owner's 
financial statements could be used to obtain a commercial loan (R. 1126, 312:24-4). 
The contradictions and the admissions that Mr. Feltwell did not know the 
requirements necessary to obtain a commercial loan undermines his testimony and 
therefore is legally insufficient to establish that Iota's and California Benefit's breach of 
the oral agreements did not prevent the refinancing of the apartment complexes. (U.S. v. 
Rainwater, at 386, 389). 
Lastly, Davco still had time to refinance the apartments during the one-year extension 
and therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Iota's and California Benefits' breaches 
were not the cause of its inability to obtain financing. There is no evidence that if Davco had 
created two full years of financial statements under its ownership of the apartment 
complexes, that it would not had been successful in refinancing the apartment complexes. 
V. The Trial Court's Finding that Iota and California Benefit Did Not Breach 
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is Clearly Erroneous 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based 
on judicially recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract. (See 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985)). These duties, unlike the 
duties expressly stated in the contract, are not subject to alteration by the parties. They 
exist whenever a contract is entered into and are imposed on the parties "consistent with 
the agreed common purpose" of the contract. {Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
116 P.3d 259, 261-2 (Utah,2005) TflO). 
"Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises 
that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the 
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other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. (Bastian v. Cedar Hills Investment 
& Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979). A violation of the covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. Beck, 701 
P.2d at 798." (St Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-
200(Utah,1991), 
"The obligation of good faith requires each party to refrain from actions that will 
intentionally 'destroy or injure the other party's right to receive .the fruits of the contract.' 
To determine the legal duty a contractual party has under this covenant, a court will 
assess whether a 'party's actions [are] consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
the justified expectations of the other party.' This court determines the 'purpose, 
intentions, and expectations' by considering 'the contract language and the course of 
dealings between and conduct of the parties."' (Oalcwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, 
Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Utah,2004) 1J43). 
The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties was that Davco refinance 
the apartment complexes and pay the promissory notes on the maturity dates. (Exhibit 
7(a); Exhibit 71, at p. 44). To accomplish the refinancing, it was necessary that Mr. 
Murset provide accurate financial statements for 2005 and 2006. (R. 1125, 176:6-10). 
The trial court found that Mr. Murset delivered the financial statements to Mr, Feltwell as 
requested by Davco and that Mr. Murset's financial statements were not required for 
refinancing. (R. 782, at ffi[32- 35; 783, at f39). 
However as demonstrated in sub-sections B and C above, pgs 27-33, the evidence 
does not support the trial court's findings. Mr. Murset did not provide accurate financial 
statements for 2005 or 2006 for either Iota or California Benefit, and did not fulfill the 
promise to allow Davco an extra year to create two full years of financial ownership 
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under its ownership of the apartment complexes. 
The trial court concluded based on the erroneous findings of fact that Iota and 
California Benefit did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 790, at 
Tf 5). Thus, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Iota and California Benefit did not 
breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
VI. The Trial Court Incorrectly Determined that It Had Jurisdiction to Hold a 
Contempt Proceeding and Davco and Mr. Fisher Were Given Due Process 
On November 5, 2008, the trial court issued an Ex Parte Order requiring Davco 
and Mr. Fisher to deposit all rents collected from the tenants at the apartment complexes 
with the court. (R. 73, at T|2). 
The trial court determined that it had jurisdiction to hold a contempt proceeding 
with the trial because: 1) On April 19, 2010, Iota and California Benefit in their trial brief 
requested the trial court to hold Davco and Mr. Fisher in contempt for failure to deposit 
rents with the trial court without having previously filed an affidavit or other initiation 
pleading setting forth the alleged contempt. (R. 551); 2) Davco responded in its trial brief 
that a contempt proceeding is a separate action from the lawsuit and since Iota and 
California Benefit had not filed an affidavit or an initial pleading setting forth the alleged 
acts of contempt as required by UCA §78B-6-303, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
determine whether Davco and Mr. Fisher should be held in contempt of court in this trial. 
(R. 600-1); and 3) Mr. Fisher was not a party to the lawsuit having been dropped from 
the lawsuit with the filing of the amended complaint on November 14, 2008. (R. 551). 
The evidence relied on by the trial court is legally insufficient to give it jurisdiction 
to hold a contempt proceeding because an affidavit or other initial pleading was never filed 
and Davco and Mr. Fisher were denied due process because they were never informed until 
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after trial was commenced that a contempt proceeding would be combined with the trial. 
The trial court did not notify Davco and Mr. Fisher that it would hold a contempt 
proceeding with the trial of this lawsuit and would be accepting evidence on the 
contempt charges until Mr. Fisher was called to testify and objection was made to the 
introduction of evidence regarding the contempt charges. (R. 1125, 127:7-16). 
UCA § 78B-6-303 controls the procedure that must be followed before a hearing 
on contempt of court charges can be held-when the contempt is not committed in the 
immediate view and presence of the trial court. 
When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge, an affidavit setting forth a statement of the facts by a judicial 
officer shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the 
contempt. 
Here, the alleged contempt that Davco and Mr. Fisher failed to deposit with the 
trial court rents collected from tenants was not committed in the immediate view and 
presence of the trial court. Therefore, an affidavit or initiating pleading had to be filed 
with the trial court to give it jurisdiction over the alleged contempt and the trial court had 
to give notice to Davco and Mr. Fisher to advise them of the nature of action against 
them, to give them time to prepare their evidence, and to give Mr. Fisher an opportunity 
to hire counsel to represent him because he was not a party to the lawsuit. (See Crank v. 
Utah Judicial Council, 20 P.3d 307 (Utah, 2001) at \ 28) ("Thus, in Utah, the statutory 
requirement of an affidavit is a procedural prerequisite to the imposition of any sanctions 
for indirect contempt.") (See also Robinson v. City Court for City ofOgden, Weber 
County, 185 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)) ("A contempt proceeding is separate from the 
principal action, and in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction of the offense when 
committed, an affidavit or initiating pleading must be filed, and unless that is done, 
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subsequent proceedings are void."). Mr. Fisher was not a party to the lawsuit after 
November 14, 2008. 
Indirect contempt, in contrast to direct contempt, can properly be adjudged only in 
a proceeding more tightly hedged about with procedural protections. The due 
process provision of the federal constitution requires that in a prosecution for a 
contempt not committed in the presence of the court, "the person charged be 
advised of the nature of the action against him [or her], have assistance of counsel, 
if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer 
testimony on his [or her] behalf." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d at 1322; see U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV; cf. Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Ogden, 112 Utah at 
42, 185 P.2d at 259 (applying Utah Const, art. I, § 12 to criminal contempt 
proceedings). These protections are amplified upon in the Code, which requires, 
inter alia, that in a case of indirect contempt, an affidavit must be presented to the 
court reciting the facts constituting the contempt in order to ensure that the court 
and the person charged are informed of the conduct alleged to be contemptuous. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987); Robinson, 112 Utah at 41, 185 P.2d at 258. 
{Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah, 1988)). 
Davco also argued in its written closing argument that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on the contempt charges and that Davco and Mr. Fisher 
believed that Iota and California Benefit committed fraud on the trial court by including 
Mr. Fisher as a party to the lawsuit in the original complaint, knowing they did not have 
a cause of action against him, for the sole purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
him to obtain the Ex Parte Order and then dropped him as a party prior to Mr. Fisher 
having filed any pleadings in the case. (R. 772-4). 
At trial, Davco and David Fisher were unable to present evidence of Iota's and 
California Benefit's fraud on the court because they believed that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the contempt charges, they were never given notice prior to trial that 
the contempt proceedings would be combined with the trial and therefore, did not 
conduct discovery or otherwise prepare to present evidence of fraud on the court at trial, 
and Mr. Fisher did not have the opportunity to retain counsel and was not represented at 
trial because he was not a party to the lawsuit. 
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In this case, neither an affidavit nor an initiating pleading was filed; hence, the trial 
court never acquired jurisdiction over the contempt charges. The trial court also failed to 
give notice to Davco and Mr. Fisher that it would combine a contempt proceedings with the 
trial and therefore, they did not have the opportunity to prepare for the contempt proceeding 
by conducting discovery on their belief that Iota and California Benefit committed fraud on 
the trial court to obtain the Ex Parte Order, to prepare testimony on their behalf, and Mr. 
Fisher did not have the opportunity to obtain counsel to represent him. 
The trial court never had jurisdiction over the contempt charges and denied Davco 
and Mr. Fisher due process and therefore, erred in conducting a contempt proceeding 
during the trial, allowing evidence of the alleged contempt at trial, making findings and 
facts and conclusions of law concerning the contempt charges, and awarding judgment 
against Davco and Mr. Fisher for contempt of court. 
VII. The Trial Court Improperly Denied Davco's Rule 67 Motion 
The trial court signed an order granting Iota's and California Benefit's Ex Parte 
Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with the Court. The trial court signed 
the order just 7 business days after the complaint was filed, 4 business days after Davco 
and Mr. Fisher were served with the complaint, and one day after Iota and California 
Benefit filed a request for an expedited ruling. 
The order required Davco and David Fisher to deposit all rents collected from the 
apartment complexes with the clerk of the court. It further provided: "[tjhis order shall 
remain in effect during the pendency of this action, or until further order of the Court." 
Rule 67 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure governs the issuance of orders 
requiring a party to deposit rents with the trial court. 
When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a 
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party, that he has in his possession or under his control any money or other 
thing capable of delivery, which, being the subject of litigation, is held by 
him as trustee for another party, or which belongs or is due to another 
party, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court 
or delivered to such party upon such conditions as may be just, subject to 
the further direction of the court; provided that if money is paid into court 
under this rule it shall be deposited and withdrawn in accordance with Utah 
Code Section 78B-5-804 or any like statute. (U.R.P.C. 67). 
Under Rule 67, Iota and California Benefit had to show that Davco and Mr. Fisher 
had admitted in their pleadings or through an examination that they had in their 
possession or under their control rents due to Iota and/or California Benefit. (Id.; Globe 
Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt Lake, 547 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah, 1976). 
The trial court relied on the affidavit of Mr. Murset which contained the following 
facts: 1) that Davco entered into REPCs , executed promissory notes and trust deeds for the 
purchase of the apartment complexes (R. 3 3, ffi[3 -5; 3 5, ffif 10-13); 2) that the Iota Trust Deed 
and the California Benefit Trust Deed contain an assignment of rents (R. 33, fflf 6-8,14); 3) 
that Davco had defaulted under the promissory notes by failing to pay the interest payments 
and failing to pay the principal amount by the maturity dates (R. 35, ^9; 36, at ^ [15); and 4) 
that Davco continues to collect rents from the apartment complexes (Id.). 
The evidence relied on by the trial court to issue the Ex Parte Order is legally 
insufficient because: 1) it consists of the testimony of Mr. Murset; 2) neither Davco nor Mr. 
Fisher had filed any pleadings prior to the Ex Parte Order being signed by the trial court and 
therefore, had not admitted in any pleadings that they had in their possession or under their 
control rents due to Iota or California Benefit; and 3) there was no examination of Davco 
or Mr. Fisher showing that they had funds belonging to Iota and/or California Benefit at the 
time the Ex Parte Order was issued. (Globe Leasing Corp., at 199). 
The trial court erred in issuing the Ex Parte Order because the requirements of 
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Rule 67 were not met, and thus, erred in denying Davco's motion to set aside the Ex 
Parte Order. 
VIII. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That Davco Breached the Iota Deed 
of Trust 
The trial court concluded that Davco had breached the Iota Deed of Trust by the 
recording of a Trust Deed encumbrance against the Casa Sonoma apartments by Mr. 
Fisher on April 1, 2008 and by recording deeds to Darwin Fisher on October 31, 2007, 
without notice to or the consent of Iota . (R. 791, at ^ 7,8). 
There was no evidence presented, and the trial court did not find that: 1) notice of 
default providing for a reasonable period of time to cure the alleged defaults was given 
by Iota to Davco; and 2) the alleged breaches were material breaches justifying a 
conclusion of breach of contract. 
In order to obtain relief based on plain error, an appellant must establish that: 1) 
error exists; 2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 3) that the 
error harmed the appellant by depriving him or her of the reasonable probability of a 
more favorable outcome. {Nielsen v. Spencer\ 196 P.3d 616 (Ut. Ct. App., 2008) at ^ [14). 
A. TRUST DEED 
First. Error exists because Davco did not encumber the Casa Sonoma apartments 
with a trust deed. (Exhibit 7; R. 516:11-13). Mr. Fisher, individually, signed as trustor 
and not as managing partner of Davco, thus, Davco did not breach the deed of trust as it 
did not encumber the Casa Sonoma apartments. (Exhibit 7). 
The error was obvious to the trial court because Exhibit 7 clearly shows Mr. 
Fisher as the trustor and not Davco, and Mr. Fisher testified that the trust deed is in his 
name and not Davco's name. (Exhibit 7; R. 516:11-13). 
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Second. Error also exists because Iota did not give notice of default to Davco and 
even if there is a breach, it is not a material breach. 
Iota was required to give notice of default to Davco and the notice had to give 
Davco a reasonable time in which to cure the default. (Olympus Hills Shopping Center, 
Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 460 (Ut. Ct. App., 1994)). ("A 
notice of default must 'plainly indicate the nature of the default or breach and give 
reasonable notice that failure to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to 
termination.'" (Citations Omitted)). 
Iota did not give Davco a notice of the default giving reasonable notice that failure 
to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to termination of the contract. Mr. 
Murset did send an e-mail to Mr. Fisher stating that he had discovered the deed but there 
was no mention of a time to cure, and Mr. Murset testified that the purpose of the e-mail 
was to inform Mr. Fisher that the property was in Darwin Fisher's name. (Exhibit 35; R. 
99:25 to 100:8). 
The error was obvious to the trial court because no notice of breach was testified 
to or introduced into evidence as an exhibit. 
Third. Iota had the burden to prove that the trust deed to Fab 5 Management LLC 
("Fab 5M) was a material breach. (Ashby v. Ashby, 191 P.3d 35 (Ut. Ct. App., 2008) at 
^9). To determine whether a breach is material the courts look at the following factors: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to 
which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the 
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, 
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taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; (e) the 
extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform 
comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. (Pack v. Case, 30 P.3d 436 Ut. 
Ct App., 2001) at Tfl8). 
The trust deed to Fab 5 is not a material breach of the Iota trust deed because: 1) 
the trust deed is subordinate to Iota rights to the Casa Sonoma apartments and therefore, 
Iota would not be deprived of any benefit which it reasonably expected because either 
Davco would pay the amount owing to Iota or Iota would foreclose, which it did, and 
eliminate any rights that Fab 5 had in Casa Sonoma (Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 16 P.3d 711 (Ut. Ct. App., 2003) at 1fl5). 
The errors deprived Davco from defeating Iota's affirmative defense of breach of 
contract and harms Davco because Iota is claiming that Davco breached the Iota Deed of 
Trust before Iota breached the REPCs and promissory note by providing inaccurate 
P&Ls for 2005, inaccurate 2006 P&L for Iota, and failing to provide accurate 2006 
P&Ls. If the trial court had not committed the plain error, it would have denied Iota's 
affirmative defense and Iota could not claim that Davco was the first to breach. 
It should be noted that Davco claims that Iota first breached the REPC and 
promissory note because it failed to provide accurate financial statements in 2006 and 
thereafter. 
B. QUIT CLAIM DEEDS TO DARWIN FISHER 
Error exists because Iota did not give notice of default to Davco, and even if there 
is a breach, it was not a material breach. 
First. Iota was required to give notice of default to Davco and the notice had to 
give Davco a reasonable time in which to cure the default. (Olympus Hills, at 446, 460.) 
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Iota did not give Davco a notice of the default giving reasonable notice that failure 
to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to termination of the contract. Mr. 
Murset did send an e-mail to Mr. Fisher stating that he had discovered the deeds but there 
was no mention of a time to cure and Mr. Murset testified that the purpose of the e-mail 
was to inform Mr. Fisher that the property was in Darwin Fisher's name. (Exhibit 35; R. 
99:25 to 100:8). 
The error was obvious to the trial court because no notice of breach was testified 
to or introduced into evidence as an exhibit. 
Second. Iota had the burden to prove that the deeds to Darwin Fisher were a 
materialbreach. (Ashby, at 35), 
The deeds to Darwin Fisher are not material breaches of the trust deed because: 1) 
the deeds are subordinate to Iota rights to the Casa Sonoma apartments and therefore, 
Iota would not be deprived of any benefit which it reasonably expected because either 
Davco would pay the amount owing or Iota would foreclose, which it did, and eliminate 
any rights that Darwin Fisher had in Casa Sonoma (Dunlap, at 711); 2) Davco 
immediately cured any default by recording deeds transferring Casa Sonoma back to 
itself after receiving the e-mail. (Exhibit 8; R. 60:25 to 61:11). 
The errors deprived Davco from defeating Iota's affirmative defense of breach of 
contract and harms Davco because Iota is claiming that Davco breached the Iota Deed of 
Trust before Iota breached the REPC and promissory note. If the trial court had not 
committed the plain error, it would have denied Iota's affirmative defense and Iota could 
not claim that Davco was the first to breach. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Davco respectfully requests the Appellate Court to: 
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1) reverse the trial court's ruling that the statute of frauds bars Davco's 
affirmative defense of breach of contract, and rule that Iota and California Benefit 
breached the REPCs and promissory notes, and/or remand to the trial court Davco's 
affirmative defense of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for findings 
of fact and conclusions of law; 
2) reverse the trial court and rule that Iota's and California Benefit's claims are 
barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel; 
3) reverse the trial court and rule that Iota and California Benefit waived their 
claims against Davco; 
4) reverse the trial court's ruling that Iota's and California Benefit's breach of 
contract did not cause the failure of Davco to refinance the promissory notes; 
5) reverse the trial court's ruling that Iota and California Benefit did not breach 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
6) rule that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to combine a contempt 
proceeding with the trial, and that Davco and Mr. Fisher were denied due process; 
7) reverse the trial court's ruling denying Davco's Rule 61 motion and rule that 
the Ex Parte Order be set aside; and 
8) reverse the trial court's ruling that Davco breached the Iota deed of trust. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2011. 
Darwin C. Fisher ^ " ^ - ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Davco 
Management Company LC 
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WASHINGTON COUNTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT d&UET 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY 
L.C, a Utah limited liability company 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and Davco's Counterclaim came on regularly for 
a bench trial on April 26, 27 and 29,2010. The Honorable James L. Shumate presided. 
Plaintiffs were represented by Paul D. Veasy of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Davco was 
represented by Darwin C. Fisher. 
Having reviewed and considered the pleadings on file herein, the briefs of the parties, the 
exhibits presented at trial, the testimony of the witnesses, the post-trial briefs, and having issued 
its preliminary ruling on the statute of frauds, and good cause appearing, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
(Parties) 
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1. Plaintiff Iota, LLC ("Iota") is a Utah limited liability company. 
2. Plaintiff California Benefit, Inc. ("California Benefit") is a California corporation 
registered to do business in Utah. 
3. Defendant Davco Management Company L.C. ("Davco") is a Utah limited 
liability company authorized to do business in Utah. 
(Players) 
4. Richard T. Murset ("Murset") is a managing member of Iota and the President of 
California Benefit. 
5. Murset is a trustee of the Murset Family Trust dated June 26,1998 which owns 
California Benefit. 
6. Iota's principal asset is the Casa Sonoma apartments located at 669 South 700 
East, St. George, Utah. 
7. California Benefit's principal asset is the Casa Grande apartments located at 735 
East 700 South, St. George, Utah. 
8. David Fisher is a member and manager of Davco. 
9. Murset as agent for Iota and California Benefit and David Fisher as agent for 
Davco negotiated the sale of the Casa Sonoma apartments and Casa Grande apartments. 
(Background) 
10. In 2005, Darcy Thompson, a real estate agent for Murset, and Lori Muscolino, a 
real estate agent for David Fisher, attempted to sell the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande 
apartments to Davco. As part of an August 2005 Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Murset was 
to provide to David Fisher profit and loss statements for the apartment complexes. (Plaintiffs' 
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Exs, 63 and 64), Murset provided David Fisher with the requested financial information. 
(Plaintiffs5 Ex. 61). The 2005 Real Estate Purchase Agreement did not close because David 
Fisher was unable to obtain conventional financing. 
11. In 2006 Murset and David Fisher, through their same real estate agents, again 
began negotiations for Davco to purchase the Casa Sonoma apartments and Casa Grande 
apartments with owner financing. Murset provided to Davicl Fisher financial statements for the 
apartment complexes from 2002 through May 2006. (Defendant's Exs. 1 through 4). David 
Fisher had discussions with Murset over the provided financial statements, including that some 
of the financial information was incorrect. (Defendant's Exs. 3 through 6). Murset cooperated 
with David Fisher and provided additional information to David Fisher. David Fisher made 
purchase offers for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments based upon the seventeen 
months (January 2005 through May 2006) of financial information provided by Murset to David 
Fisher. 
12. The remaining financial information for 2006 could not be provided because the 
year 2006 had not been completed. Murset provided his remaining 2006 financial information to 
David Fisher in February 2007. 
(Casa Sonoma Apartments) 
13. In September of 2006, Davco entered into an agreement with Iota, LLC to 
purchase the Casa Sonoma apartments. Even though David Fisher did not have all the 2006 
financial information for Casa Sonoma apartments in September 2006, Davco chose to close the 
purchase of the Casa Sonoma apartments. . 
14. On September 29,2006, Davco executed a Term Loan Promissory Note in the 
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principal amount of $1,341,395.00 in favor of Iota, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the "Iota 
Note"), (Plaintiffs'Ex. 1). 
15. The Iota Note provided that the entire balance due and owing on the note be paid 
on or before December 1, 2007. 
16. Davco executed a Deed of Trust, Security Agreement Assignment of Rents and 
Leases, and Fixture Filing (hereinafter referred to as the "Iota Deed of Trust") wherein Davco 
was the trustor and Iota was the beneficiary. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 3). 
17. The Iota Deed of Trust granted to Iota a security interest in the Casa Sonoma 
apartments, together with the rents and security deposits. 
18. Paragraph 8.7 of the Iota Trust Deed provides that Davco shall not sell, convey or 
alienate the Casa Sonoma apartments or any portion thereof. 
19. Paragraph 10.1 of the Iota Trust Deed states, in part: 
Upon the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default hereunder, Trustor's 
right to collect and use any of such proceeds shall cease, and Beneficiary, shall 
have the right, with or without taking possession of the Trust Estate, and either in 
person, by agent or through a court appointed receiver (Trustor hereby consents to 
the appointment of Beneficiary or Beneficiary's designee as such receiver), to sue 
for or otherwise collect all such sales proceeds, rents, subrents, issues, royalties, 
income and profits, including those past due and unpaid.... All purchasers, 
tenants, lessees, sublessees and other persons who have any obligation to make 
any payment to Trustor in connection with the Trust Estate or any portion thereof 
are hereby authorized and directed to pay the rents, subrents, issues, royalties, 
income, profits and other payments payable by them with respect to the Trust 
Estate, or any portion thereof, directly to Beneficiary on the demand of 
Beneficiary. 
20. Paragraph 11.1 of the Iota Trust Deed defines an "Event of Default" as follows: 
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Events of Default. The occurrence and continuance of any one of the following 
shall constitute an Event of Default under this Deed of Trust: 
(a) Failure by Trustor to observe and perform any term, covenant or 
condition to be observed or performed by Trustor contained in this Deed of 
Trust, the Note or any of the other Loan Documents. 
(b) Any representation or warranty of Trustor contained in this Deed of 
Trust, the Note or any of the other Loan Documents was untrue when made. 
(c) A default by Trustor under the terms of any other promissory note, 
deed of trust, security agreement, undertaking or arrangement between Trustor 
and Beneficiary now in existence or hereafter arising. 
21. There are no written amendments executed by Iota for the Iota Note or the Iota 
Trust Deed. 
22. Davco did not pay the Iota Note at maturity on December 1, 2007. Iota thereafter 
made monthly interest payments to Iota from December 2007 until August 2008. 
(Casa Grande Apartments) 
23. In November of 2006, Davco entered into an agreement with California Benefit to 
purchase the Casa Grande apartments. Even though David Fisher did not have all the 2006 
financial information for.the Casa Grande apartments in November 2006, Davco chose to close 
the purchase of the Casa Grande apartments. 
24. On November 30, 2006, Davco executed an All-Inclusive Promissory Note in the 
principal amount of $2,411,596.00 in favor of California Benefit (hereinafter referred to as the 
"California Benefit Note"). (Plaintiffs'Ex. 13). 
25. The California Benefit Note provides that the entire balance due and owing on 
the note be paid on or before December 10, 2007. 
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26. Davco executed an All-inclusive Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents 
(hereinafter referred to as the "California Benefit Deed of Trust") wherein Davco was the trustor 
and California Benefit was the beneficiary. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 14). 
27. The California Benefit Deed of Trust granted to California Benefit a security 
interest in the Casa Grande apartments, together with the rents, issues and profits. 
28. There are.no written amendments executed by California Benefit for the 
California Benefit Note or the California Benefit Trust Deed. 
29. Davco did not pay the California Benefit Note at maturity on December 10^  2007. 
Davco thereafter made monthly interest payments to California Benefit from December 2007 to 
August 2008. 
(August 2007 to October 2008) 
30. On August 28,2007, Davco Management Company LLC executed five Warranty 
Deeds conveying the Casa Sonoma apartments to Davco Management Company, LLC. 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 5). The purpose of the five Warranty Deeds was to subdivide the property into 
smaller residential property descriptions to allow for refinancing. Davco notified Iota of these 
conveyances and Iota gave its consent to Davco for the five Warranty Deeds. 
31. On October 31, 2007, Davco conveyed the Casa Sonoma apartments to Darwin 
Fisher (Plaintiffs' Ex. 6) without notice to or the consent of Iota. Iota would not have given its 
consent to these conveyances. Darwin Fisher owned the Casa Sonoma apartments for one year 
or until October 7,2008, when Darwin Fisher conveyed the Casa Sonoma apartments to Davco. . 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 8). During the time Darwin Fisher owned the Casa Sonoma apartments, Davco 
provided no evidence to Iota of refinancing efforts by Darwin Fisher. 
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32, Starting in November 2007 and through March 2008, David Fisher contacted Jeff 
Feltwell, a mortgage broker, to obtain refinancing for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande 
apartments, David Fisher provided to Feltwell financing operating statements for 2007 for the 
Casa Grande apartments (Plaintiffs5 Ex. 68) and a December 21,2007 credit report for David 
Fisher, 
33, Feltwell prepared an application to refinance the Casa Grande apartments in the 
name of David Fisher as the owner. Feltwell was not told by David Fisher that Davco was the 
owner, Feltwell prepared an application to refinance the Casa Sonoma apartments in the name of 
David Fisher. Feltwell was not told by David Fisher that Darwin Fisher was the owner. Feltwell 
forwarded the applications and information to two lenders for review. For refinance to occur, the 
lenders required that David Fisher have a two-year income stream as the owner of the properties. 
Feltwell testified that the prior owner's financial statements for 2005 and 2006 were not required 
by the lenders and under the guidelines were not needed to obtain a loan for the apartment 
complexes, 
34. The loan.application for refinancing for Casa Grande was denied on February 21, 
2008 by the lenders for the following reasons: (1) David Fisher did not have two years of income 
stream as the owner; (2) the appraised value of the Casa Grande apartments did not come in as 
high as anticipated based on the December 2007 appraisal of Craig Morley; and (3) David Fisher 
had credit problems specifically the December 21, 20.07 credit report listed eleven (11) 
foreclosures. Each of each of these reasons led to denial of the loan application for the Casa 
Grande apartments. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 65). Feltwell testified the foreclosures demonstrated 
financial mismanagement by David Fisher. Based on the denial of the Casa Grande loan 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
application, David Fisher withdrew his loan application to obtain refinancing for the Casa 
Sonoma apartments on March 12, 2008. (Plaintiffs' Exs. 69). David Fisher never told Murset 
about being denied refinancing with Feltwell. 
35. On March 26,2008, David Fisher emailed Murset and requested the status of the 
2005 and 2006 year-to-date operating statements for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande 
apartments for David Fisher's broker. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 24). Murset provided the financial 
information for 2005 and 2006 to the mortgage broker. 
36. On April 1, 2008, David Fisher, without notice to or the consent of Iota, recorded 
a $500,000 Trust Deed encumbrance against the Casa Sonoma apartments with David Fisher as 
the trustor and in favor of the beneficiary Fab 5 Management LLC. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 7). At that . 
time David Fisher did not own the Casa Sonoma apartments nor was it owned by Davco. Iota 
would not have given its consent to this $500,000 Trust Deed encumbrance. 
37. Seven months after maturity of the Iota and California Benefit Notes, or on June 
3,2008, Plaintiffs requested that Davco refinance the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments 
by the end of July 2008. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 25), This request for refinancing by the end of July 
2008 was not done by Davco. 
38. On June 20, 2008, David Fisher emailed Murset stating that he would have a letter 
of commitment in seven to ten days for refinancing. The refinancing never occurred. (Plaintiffs' 
Ex.26). 
39. On July 21, 2008, David Fisher emailed Murset stating the loan officer said that 
he received the updated financials except for the 2007 returns which David Fisher's CPA was 
making a couple of changes and then would be sending them back to David Fisher for review and 
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forwarding to the loan officer. (Plaintiffs5 Ex. 27). Again, Davco had the financial information 
but was unable to refinance the apartment complexes. 
40. On August 25,2008, Plaintiffs requested a deed in lieu of foreclosure from Davco 
as a result of Davco *s failure to refinance the apartments. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 28). The deed in lieu 
of foreclosure was requested by Murset without knowledge of the actual ownership of the Casa 
Sonoma apartments by Darwin Fisher and without notice of the recorded $500,000 Fab 5 Trust 
Deed. Davco rejected the request for a deed in lieu of foreclosure. 
41. On August 26, 2008, David Fisher emailed Murset stating that the lending 
institutions were changing their guidelines on the capitalization rate. David Fisher told Murset 
that David Fisher would have to bring in money to close since the loan amount would not be 
enough to cover the debt. David Fisher was expecting a settlement on October 2 which would be 
enough to pay the difference between what he owed and the loan amount. David Fisher also 
stated that he had two parties interested in purchasing the properties. David Fisher requested that 
he have enough time for either one of these things to happen. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 28). Murset 
accommodated David Fisher's request 
42. On September 3,2008, Plaintiffs then requested payment of additional 
consideration from Davco as a result of the failure to refinance the apartments. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 
29). This request was rejected by Davco. 
43. On September 8-5 2008, Davco executed September monthly interest payment 
checks to Iota and California Benefit and then issued a stop payment order on those checks. 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 9). Davco made no further monthly interest payments to Iota and California 
Benefit after stopping the September monthly interest payment checks. 
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44. On September 9, 2008, David Fisher for the first time requested from Murset that 
Davco be paid for its alleged 2007 improvements to the two apartment complexes. (Plaintiffs' 
Ex. 31). At this time, Davco had not paid Plaintiffs the September monthly interest payments 
under the Iota and California Benefit Notes. Plaintiffs refused to pay Davco for its alleged 
improvements, but rather wanted Davco to refinance the apartments. 
45. Non-payment of the September 2008 monthly interest payments by Davco to 
Plaintiffs placed Murset in a predicament with having to pay the monthly senior note obligations 
against the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments. 
46. On September 24, 2008, Davco sent a letter to Murset stating, among other things, 
that it wanted to be paid for the improvements and stating for the first time to Murset that 
Plaintiffs had previously agreed to a one-year extension agreement on the Iota and California 
Benefit Notes. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 31). The letter fails to -notify Murset that the Casa Sonoma 
apartments were owned by Darwin Fisher and of the $500,000 Fab 5 Trust Deed, all of which 
information should have been disclosed to Murset, and fails to address Davco 5s non-payment of 
the September monthly interest payments to Iota and California Benefit. 
47. On September 30, 2008, Murset sent a letter responding to David Fisher's 
September 24, 2008 letter denying any one-year extension was made and stating that if an 
agreement for a one-year extension had been made then that agreement would have been 
honored. Murset also proposed a solution to the dispute which was rejected by Fisher. 
(Plaintiffs'Ex. 32). 
48. Between October 3 and October 8, the parties exchanged emails hoping to resolve 
their dispute. (Plaintiffs'Exs. 33 and 34). On October 8,2008, Murset emailed Fisher stating 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Davco's failure to address withholding the September and on October monthly interest 
payments was unacceptable. (Plaintiffs5 Ex. 35). In that email, Murset disclosed to Fisher that 
Murset had ordered a foreclosure report and for the first time discovered that the Casa Sonoma 
apartments had been owned by Darwin Fisher since October 2007 and for the first time 
discovered the $500,000 Fab 5 Trust Deed against the Casa Sonoma apartments. David Fisher 
responded to Mursefs October 8, 2008 email with an email on October 9, 2008 stating that the 
he had put the apartments in Darwin Fisher's name as another route to'try and obtain financing. 
As of October 9, 2008 they were now back in the name of Davco. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 35). In his 
email, David Fisher failed to address the $500,000 Fab 5 Trust Deed encumbrance against the 
Casa Sonoma apartments. 
49. At the time of Mursefs October 8,2008 email, Davco had not presented to 
Plaintiffs any letter from a lender stating that it was going to refinance the apartments. 
50. As of October 2008, Davco had two years of income stream for the Casa Sonoma 
apartments. By December 2008, Davco had two years of income stream for the Casa Grande 
apartments. 
(Rents and Security Deposits) 
51. After Davco stopped the September monthly interest payments and made no 
further monthly payments from September 1, 2008 until the trustee's sales on February 20, 2009, 
Davco and David Fisher exercised self-help and collected the rents and security deposits from the 
tenants for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments and failed to remit any payment of the 
rents and security deposits to either Iota or California Benefit. During this time, Davco and 
David Fisher collected $163,243 in rents and $30,050 in security deposits for a total income to 
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David Fisher and Davco of $193,293. After application of credits, the net amount of rents and 
security deposits owed by Davco to Iota and California Benefit is $132,844.96. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 
80). David Fisher collected these amounts to reimburse Davco for the alleged 2007 
improvements made by Davco to the apartments rather than apply the rents and security deposits 
towards the debt obligations. 
52. On November 5, 2008, this Court issued its Order on Plaintiffs5 Ex Parte Motion 
for Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with the Court ("Ex Parte Order") that all rents were 
to be deposited with the Court. At that time David Fisher was a defendant in the -lawsuit. David 
Fisher was served with the Ex Parte Order on November 10,2008. 
53. After service of the Ex Parte Order on November 10, 2008, David Fisher willfully 
and knowingly collected $71,119.17 in rents and security deposits to pay himself back for 2007 
improvements. (Plaintiffs5 Ex. 81). 
54. David Fisher testified he still had in his possession security deposits which he 
failed to provide to Plaintiffs for payments towards the debt obligations of the Iota and California 
Benefit Notes. 
55. Davco's and David Fisher's retention of the rents and security deposits left Murset 
with no basis to pay the senior note holders under the Iota and California Benefit Notes. As a 
result of the actions of Davco and David Fisher, Murset was left with no choice but to foreclose 
the apartment complexes and to commence litigation to recover the retained rents and security 
deposits. 
(Foreclosures and Lawsuit - October 15, 2008 to February 20, 2009) 
56. On October 15,2008 Iota and California Benefit commenced non-judicial 
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foreclosures of the Iota and California Benefit Deeds of Trust by having the successor trustee file 
Notices of Default with the Washington County Recorder's Office pursuant to the provisions of 
the Deeds of Trust and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23, et seg, (Plaintiffs' Exs. 10 and 16), 
57. Davco received copies of the Notices of Default, 
58. Iota and California Benefit commenced this lawsuit on October 23,2008. 
59. Davco did not make payment on the Iota and California Benefit Notes after 
• receiving the Notices of-Default. Iota and California Benefit then noticed the Casa Sonoma.and 
Casa Grande apartments for trustee's sales. (Plaintiffs5 Exs. 11 and 17), 
60. The .trustee's sales occurred on February 20,2009. Iota was the successful bidder 
for the Casa Sonoma apartments with the credit bid amount of $934,000 against the Iota Note. 
California Benefit was the successful bidder for the Casa Grande apartments with the credit bid 
amount of $ 1,800,000 against the California Benefit Note. Iota and California Benefit became 
. the owners of the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments with recording Trustee's Deeds 
with the Washington County Recorder, (Plaintiffs' Exs. 12 and 18). 
61. Davco did not object to or attempt to stop the trustee's sales. 
62. At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma apartments, the delinquent 
debt on the Iota Note was $1,649,438.30. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 74). 
63. At the. time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma apartments, the fair market 
of the apartments was $1,260,000. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 70). 
64. At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma apartments, the deficiency 
amount owing after, applying the fair market value of the Casa Sonoma apartments was 
$389,438.30. (Plaintiffs'Ex. 74). 
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65. At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande apartments, the delinquent 
debt on the California Benefit Note was $2,522,266.20. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 74). 
66. At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande apartments, the fair market 
value of the apartments was $2,250,000. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 70). 
67. At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande apartments, the deficiency 
amount owing after applying the fair market value of the Casa Grande apartments was 
• $272,266.20. (Plaintiffs'Ex. 74)/ 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the above-captioned action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-5-102(l) (2008). 
2, Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-301 (2008). 
3. The acceptance of Davco's monthly interest payments from December 2007 to 
August 2008 after maturity of the Iota and California Benefit Notes in December 2007 did not 
waive the rights of Iota or California Benefit to.strictly enforce the terms of the Iota Note, Iota 
Trust Deed, California Benefit Note and California Benefit Trust Deed. See Plaintiffs' Ex. 2, 
Iota Note, f 12 ("... No delay or failure of Lender in the exercise of any right or remedy provided 
for under this Note shall be deemed a waiver of such right by Lender, and no exercise of any 
right or remedy shall be deemed a waiver of any other right or remedy which Lender may 
have."); Plaintiffs' Ex. 3, Iota Trust Deed, <[ 12.7 ("Beneficiary's failure at any time or times 
hereafter to require strict performance by Trustor of any of the undertakings, agreements or 
covenants contained in this Deed of Trust shall not waive, affect or diminish any right of . 
Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and performance therewith."); Plaintiffs' Ex. 
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13, California Benefit Note, ^ 11 ("The Maker and endorser hereof waive presentment for 
payment, protest, demand, notice of protest, notice of dishonor, notice of nonpayment and 
expressly agree that this Note or any payment hereunder may be extended from time to time by 
the Holder thereof without in any way affecting the liability of such parties. No course of dealing 
between the Maker and Holder in exercising any rights hereunder, shall operate as a waiver of 
rights of Holder.") 
4.* Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 and 25-5-4 bars Davco's defense that after maturity of • 
the Iota and California Benefit Notes in December 2007, there was a one-year extension to the 
Iota Note, Iota Trust Deed, California Benefit Note and California Benefit Trust Deed. There are 
no writings executed by either Iota or California Benefit creating any modification of the 
original Notes and Deeds of Trust. 
5, Davco claimed that Plaintiffs violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and, having breached that covenant, they cannot recover on the Notes and Deeds of 
Trust. Davco 5s allegation of breach rests upon the claim that Plaintiffs failed to provide 
updated financial statements for 2005 and 2006 to enable Davco to refinance the apartments. 
The Court has found that those financial statements were delivered as requested by Davco. (See 
Finding #35 above) In addition, based on the testimony of Jeff Feltwell, the prior owner's 
financial records were not required for refinancing. Lenders required the owner of the apartment. 
complex to have two years stream of income which Davco did not have. 
6. There was no breach of any obligation of Plaintiffs to cause the failure of Davco 
to refinance the Iota and California Benefit Notes. Rather, the reasons for the failure to refinance 
include the pending foreclosures against David Fisher and the reduced appraisal value of the 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
properties during this time. 
7. Davco's October 31, 2007 conveyance of the Casa Sonoma apartments to Darwin 
Fisher without notice to or the consent of Iota was a violation of the Iota Deed of Trust, 
specifically paragraph 8.7. 
8. David Fisher's April 1,2008 recording of a $500,000 Trust Deed encumbrance 
against the Casa Sonoma apartments with David Fisher as the trustor in favor of the beneficiary 
Fab 5 Management, LLC without notice to or the consent of Iota was a violation of the Iota Deed 
of Trust, specifically paragraph 8.7. 
9. Davco's defense claiming an off-set for 2007 improvements to the apartment 
complexes is dimissed as a matter of law. Under paragraph 6.2 of the Iota Deed of Trust, Davco 
may not claim a set-off or make a demand for payment in the form of a counterclaim or 
otherwise for these improvements. Moreover, under the Iota Deed of Trust and the California 
Benefit Deed of Trust, improvements are part of the trust estate. At the trustee's sales, the 
alleged improvements were presumed to be taken into account in increasing the fair market value 
of the apartments and thereby reducing any potential deficiency judgment. 
10. Davco and David Fisher's collection of rents and security deposits from the 
tenants from September 1, 2008 until February 20,2009 was a violation of the Iota Note, Iota 
Deed of Trust, California Benefit Note and California Benefit Deed of Trust. 
11',. On the Sixth Cause of Action for a deficiency judgment for the Casa Sonoma 
Note, the Court awards Judgment againstDavco and in favor of Iota in the principal, amount of 
$389,438.30 as of February 20,2009. Iota has satisfied the three elements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32, specifically the amount of the indebtedness at the time of the trustee's sale on 
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February 20, 2009 was $1,649,438.30, the amount for which the Casa Sonoma apartments was 
sold at the trustee's sale was $934,000 and the Court determines the fair market value as of the 
date of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma apartments to be $1,260,000. In addition, lota is 
awarded since February 20, 2009, the date of the trustee's sale, to May 28, 2010 its reasonable 
attorney's fees in the amount of $76,577,75, interest at 18% per annum from the date of the 
trustee's sale to the date of Judgment with interest to accrue thereafter at the default interest rate 
* of 18% per annum. Credit shall be given to Davco for rents remitted by the Court to Iota of 
$20,602,67 on December 18, 2009. Allowable costs should be submitted pursuant to Rule 54(d) 
of the Utah Rues of Civil Procedure. Attorneys' fees and costs will continue to accrue. 
12. On the Seventh Cause of Action for a deficiency judgment for the Casa Grande 
Note, the Court awards Judgment against Davco and in favor of California Benefit in the 
principal amount of $272,266.20 as of February 20,2009. California Benefit has satisfied the 
three elements of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32, specifically the amount of the indebtedness at the 
time of the trustee's sale on February 20,2009 was $2,522,266.20, the amount for which the 
Casa Grande apartments was sold at the trustee's sale was $1,800,000 and the Court determines 
the fair market value as of the date of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande apartments to be 
$2,250,000. In addition, California Benefit is awarded since February 20,2009, the date of the 
trustee's sale to May 28,2010, its reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $76,451.75, 
interest.at 7% per annum from .the date of .the trustee's sale to the date of Judgment with interest 
to accrue thereafter at the default interest rate .of 7% per annum. Credit shall be given to Davco 
for rents remitted by the Court to California Benefit of $2.0,602.66 on December 1.8, 2009. . 
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Allowable costs should be submitted pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Attorneys' fees and costs will continue to accrue. 
13. On its First through Fifth Causes of Action for rents, declaratory relief and 
accounting, the Court awards Judgment against Davco and in favor of Iota and California Benefit 
in the amount of$ 132,844.96 for Davco's failure to pay the rents and security deposits to Iota 
and California Benefit from September 1,2008 through February 20,2009. Retention of the 
rents and security deposits was a violation of the Iota and California Benefit Deeds of Trust, 
. Davco through its agent David Fisher is ordered to provide an accounting to Plaintiff of the 
security deposits and to immediately remit all security deposits in Davco's or David Fisher's 
possession to Iota and California Benefit. If paid, this amount will reduce the Judgments 
awarded in the Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action. 
14. In addition, the Court awards Judgment against Davco and David Fisher and in 
favor of Iota and California Benefit for contempt of this Court's November 5,2008 Ex Parte 
Order in the amount of $71,119.17. Davco and David Fisher violated Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
301 by knowingly disobeying this Court's November 5,2008 Ex Parte Order in failing to turn 
over the rents to the court clerk for further disposition by Order of this Court. David Fisher has 
knowingly and wrongfully retained the security deposits and has failed to deliver those amounts 
to Iota and California Benefit to apply towards the debt obligations. Iota and California Benefit 
are awarded their reasonable attorney's fees and costs for having to prove contempt for violation 
of the Court's November 5, 2008 Ex Parte Order. Davco.and David Fisher are ordered to 
provide an accounting to Plaintiff of the security deposits and to immediately remit all security 
deposits in Davco's or David Fisher's possession to Iota and California Benefit. If paid, this 
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amount will reduce the judgments awarded in the Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action. The 
defense in this matter argues that only Davco should be liable under this finding of contempt. It 
is true that-the causes of action in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint allege liability only 
against Davco, but the Defendant David Fisher was a party to the case at the time of the entry of 
the November 5, 2008, order, the order was served upon him personally, and he personally 
collected and retained the funds from the tenants in violation of this Court's Order. 
15. Davco's Counterclaim and First Cause of Action for alleged breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is dismissed. There are no violations of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by either Iota or California Benefit. 
16. Iota and California Benefit are awarded their reasonable attorneys5 fees and costs 
as the prevailing party in this litigation under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2001) and under 
paragraph 11.7 of the Casa Sonoma Deed of Trust and paragraph 10 of the Casa Grande Note. 
However, as the defense has pointed out, the Court has the responsibility to determine reasonable 
attorney's fees in this case. The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney's Fees 
and agrees that there is the appearance of "double billing'5 of hours for the drafting of pleadings 
for each of the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the calculation of attorney's fees shall be reduced by one-
half for the hours claimed for drafting pleadings. Other hours of attorney's fees will not be 
reduced. The defense-claim of excessive and .unjustified attorney's fees for the collection of rents, 
and security deposits are unpersuasive in the judgment
 :of the Court. While, the statute on trust 
deed foreclosure and deficiency actions may not permit the recovery of attorney's fees in the 
collections of unpaid rents and security deposits, the Notes and Deeds of Trust in this action do. 
The Court is not totally convinced that the statute on Trust Deed Foreclosure does not allow for 
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the recovery of the rents and security deposits when the purpose of the statute seems to be 
broadly drawn in favor of full recovery for all costs and attorney's fees. The breadth of the 
statute and the contracts between the parties to this action support the Court's award of attorney's 
fees as set forth herein. 
17. Counsel for the Plaintiffs will prepare and submit a Judgment in accordance with 
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2010. 
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF.SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 2010,1 caused to be mailed a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to the following: 
Paul D. Veasy 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Darwin C. Fisher 
40 North 300 East,-.#101 
St. George, UT 84770 
\J>ISTRICT COURT CLEI 
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TERM LOAN 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$1,341,395.00 September 29, 2006 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
L.C., an Utah limited liability company ("Borrower"), promises to pay to the order of IOTA, LLC, an 
Utah limited liability company ("Lender"), at 164 N. 160 E., Hurricane, Utah 84737, or at such other 
place as Lender may from time to time designate, the principal sum of ONE MILLION THREE 
HUNDRED FORTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY-FTVE DOLLARS 
($1,341,395.00), together with all subsequent advances made, expenditures authorized and additional 
payments provided for in this Term Loan Promissory Note, and in any of the Loan Documents (defined 
below). 
1. Definitions. As used in this Note, the following terms shall have the meanings 
set forth below: 
"Deed of Trust" means the Deed of Trust, Security Agreement, Assignment of 
Rents and Leases, and Fixture Filing, dated the same date as this Note, executed by Borrower, as 
grantor, in favor of Lender, as beneficiary, and encumbering the Property. 
"Even! of Default" shall have the meaning given in the Deed of Trust. 
. . "Loan" means the term loan advanced by Lender to Borrower in the principal 
amount of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE 
HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE DOLLARS ($1,341,395.00)). 
"Loan Documents" means the following documents executed in conjunction 
with this Note: the Deed of Trust; a Certificate and Indemnity Regarding Hazardous Substances, 
a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement; one or more Guaranties in favor of Lender; 
and such other documents as may now be given or as may be entered into after the date of this 
Note by Borrower, any guarantor of Borrower's obligations under this Note or any other party for 
the benefit of Lender as security for this Note. 
"Maturity Date" shall mean December 1, 2007. 
"Month" means a calendar month. 
"Note" means this Term Loan Promissory Note and any extensions, renewals or 
modifications thereof. 
"Payment Date" means the 1st day of each Month on which Borrower shall pay 
to Lender accrued interest, on the outstanding principal of this Note, as required by the terms of 
this Note. 
"Principal Indebtedness" means at any time and from time to time during the 
term of this Note all advances, disbursements, expenditures and payments made by Lender after 
* the date of this Note pursuant to the terms of this Note or any of the Loan Documents, and 
includes the unpaid principal balance of the Senior Note. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Property" means certain real property located in Washington County, Utah, as 
more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached to and incorporated in this Note by 
reference. 
"Senior Note" means that certain note in the amount of $500,000 made by 
Lender in favor of LaSalle Bank National Association 
2. Security. This Note is to be secured by the Deed of Trust, and other Loan 
Documents. Reference is made to such documents for a description of the property and interests 
encumbered or pledged as security for this Note, and the rights, remedies and obligations of Lender with 
respect thereto. 
3. Interest Accruals. Interest shall accrue on the unpaid Principal Indebtedness at 
an annual rate of 7.0%. 
4. Interest Calculation Basis. All interest accruing under this Note shall be 
calculated on the basis of a 365-day year for the actual number of days elapsed. 
5. Payments of Accrued Interest.
 y0^Tl n 
(a) Beginning on Qsisker 1, 2006, Borrower shall make monthly interest 
only payments to Lender of accrued interest on the unpaid Principal Indebtedness in the amount 
of $7,824.81. 
(b) The entire unpaid Principal Indebtedness, together with all accrued and 
unpaid interest thereon, if not sooner paid, shall be due and payable in full on the Maturity Date, 
with Borrower receiving a credit at the Maturity Date in the amount of security deposits held by 
Lender with respect to the Property.. 
6. Default Rate of Interest. During any period of time in which an Event of Default 
has occurred and is continuing, interest shall accrue against the outstanding Principal Indebtedness 
evidenced hereby at an annual rate equal to eighteen percent (18.0%), calculated on the basis of a 365-day 
year for the actual number of days elapsed. 
7. Late Fee Charges. If any payment required by this Note or any of the Loan 
Documents is not received by Lender within ten (10) days after such payment is due, a late fee charge 
equal to five percent (5.0%) of such late payment shall be due and payable. 
8. Usury Savings Clause. It is the express intent hereof that Borrower not pay and 
Lender not receive, directly or indirectly in any manner whatsoever, interest in excess of that which may 
be legally paid by Borrower under applicable law, and this Note is subject to the express condition that at 
no time shall Borrower be obligated or required to pay, nor shall Lender be permitted to collect, interest 
on the Principal Indebtedness at a rate which could subject Lender to either civil or criminal liability as a 
result of being in excess of the maximum rate which Borrower is permitted by law to agree to pay. If any 
such excess amount of interest is contracted for, charged, paid, received or applied under the Loan 
Documents or this Note, or in the event the maturity of this Note is accelerated in whole or in part or the 
principal of or interest on this Note shall be prepaid, so that under any of such circumstances the amount 
of interest contracted for, charged, paid, received or applied under the Loan Documents or this Note shall 
exceed the maximum amount of interest permitted by applicable law, then in any such event: (a) neither 
Borrower nor any other person liable for payment of the indebtedness evidenced hereby shall be obligated 
to pay the amount of such interest to the extent that it is in excess of the maximum amount of interest 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
permitted by applicable law; (b) any such excess which may have been collected shall, at Lender's option, 
either be applied as a credit against the then unpaid principal amount of this Note (without payment of a 
prepayment premium) or refunded to Borrower; and (c) the effective rate of interest shall be automatically 
reduced to the maximum lawful rate of interest allowed under applicable law, as now or hereafter 
construed by the courts having jurisdiction thereof. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all 
calculations of the rate of interest contracted for, charged or received under the Loan Documents or this 
Note which are made for the purposes of determining whether such rate exceeds the maximum amount.of 
interest permitted by applicable law shall be made, to the extent permitted by applicable law, by 
amortizing, prorating, allocating and spreading in equal parts during the period of the full stated term of 
this Note, all interest at any time contracted for, charged or received in connection with the indebtedness 
evidenced by this Note. 
9. Application of Payments. All payments on this Note shall, at the option of 
Lender, be applied first to the payment of accrued interest and after all such interest has been paid, any 
remainder shall be applied toward repayment of any additional advances Lender has made under the 
terms of any of the Loan Documents which have not already been added to the Principal Indebtedness 
then outstanding, and the balance, if any, toward the reduction of the Principal Indebtedness, 
10. Incorporation of Loan Documents. The terms, conditions, covenants, provisions, 
stipulations and agreements of the Loan Documents are hereby made a part of this Note by reference to 
such documents in the same manner and with the same effect as if the Loan Documents were fully set 
forth herein. Borrower hereby 
covenant and condition set forth 
covenants and promises to abide by and comply with each and every 
in this Note and the Loan Documents. 
Jl- Prepayment. Borrower may prepay all or any portion of the Principal 
Indebtedness before it is due, without notice to Lender and without payment of any prepayment fee or 
premium. 
12. Waivers, Substitution of Security. Borrower waives presentment for payment, 
notice of dishonor and protest, and consents to any extension of time with respect to any payment due 
under this Note, to any substitution or release of collateral, and to the addition or release of any party. No 
waiver of any payment under this Note shall operate as a waiver of any other payment. No delay or 
failure of Lender in the exercise of any right or remedy provided for under this Note shall be deemed a 
waiver of such right by Lender, and no exercise of any right or remedy shall be deemed a waiver of any 
other right or remedy which Lender may have. 
13. Governing Law. This Note is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah, without giving effect to principles of conflicts of laws. 
14. General. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the occurrence and continuance of 
an Event of Default, Lender shall have, in addition to all rights and remedies available to Lender at law or 
in equity, all rights and remedies specified in any of the Loan Documents. 
n
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DATED effective as of the date first above written. 
BORROWER: 
DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, L.C., an Utah 
limited liability company 
David Fisher its Managing Member 
PT 0 0 0 1 5 4 
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EXHIBIT "A 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
The following described real property is located in Washington County, Utah: 
PARCELS: 
THE SOUTH ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, BLOCK 4, PLAT "B", ST. GEORGE CITY SURVEY, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFJCIAL PLAT THEREOF, RECORDS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
PARCEL #2: 
THE WEST ONE-HALF OF LOT 3, BLOCK 4, PLAT "B", ST. GEORGE CJTY SURVEY, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFJCIAL PLAT THEREOF, RECORDS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Property Address: 669 S 700 East, St. George, UT 84770 
P.IJ SG-763 & SG-762-B 
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Notes to California Benefit Profit and Loss Statement: 
1. This income is correct. We do not show income for the managers 
apartment, which th$y receive rent free, nor do we show their work as an 
expense. If we did there would be $7320 more income arid the same, 
amount shown for management expense. The properties we foreclosed 
on were never rented. 
2. This is a property that we foreclosed on that was sold during 2003. 
A more detailed explanation Is on another sheet 
3. This change was due to advertising the properties that we 
foreclosed on. 
4. This insurance amount shows two years of payments, one made in . 
January for the year 2003, and the other made in December for 2004. 
5. with the exception of $1100, all of this amount is concerned1 with the 
foreclosure and judgments on other property, A more detailed explanation 
is on another sheet 
6. See #1 concerning management fees. For 7 months we paid them 
$100 permonth to cut lawns and fix sprinklers. 
7. Some of the maintenance was for the foreclosed on properties. The 
driveway was resurfaced at a cost of $4959 which would need to be re -
done every five years or so, but is not a yearly expense. 
8. Most of this was on the repossessed properties. 
4^w*^.^ki£A 
Richard T. Murset 
prepared 4/22/04 
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Notes to lota LLC Profit and Loss Statement: 
General note: If an exact amount was not'able to be determined, it was 
calculated on this basis; lota at the time owned 17 rental units and the 
percentage that the ^ 3 units comprises makes up approximately 76%, so 
the available numbers were multiplied by that amount to arrive at a figure. 
Although there are other expenses involved in operating a business, such 
as transportation and telephone I have only included those directly 
a)nnected|6 these 13 units. 
Notes: 
1. This was arrived at using the renwoll, 
2. This is from a home that was built and sold, this was it's profit. A 
more/detailed account is on another sheet. 
3. This number includes $2437 that was for the parking lot resurfacing, 
and is usually done about every 5 years, and is not a yearly cost 
4. This includes two new AC units. Part of the proceeds of this loan is 
for l^Q replacement of the other eleven units to reduce future repair costs. 
• ^ ^ U ^ f e - ^ ^ a | A ^ 
Richard 7 .set 
prepared 4/22/04 
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TRUST DEED 
"When Recorded Mail To: 
St. George, UT 84790 
Tax Serial # SG-762-C, SG-762-B, 
SG-763-C, SG-763-B, SG-763 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this j l d a y of April, 2008, between DAVID FISHER, as Trustor, whose address 
is St. George, Utah, PRESTIGE TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC, as Trustee, and FAB5 MANAGEMENT LLC, as 
Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TOUST WITH POWER OF SALE, the 
following described property, situated in Washington County, State of Utah; 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED 
Together with all building, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with 
said property, or any part thereof, 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
herewith, in the principal sum of $500,000.00, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with 
interest as therein set forth, and payment of any sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and assessments on 
water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance on 
improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in 
event of default in payment of the indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the 
services performed by Trustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be 
mailed to him at the address hereinabove set forth. 
DAVID FISHER, Trustor 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
On this I day of April, 2008, before me, a notary' public, personally appeared DAVID FISHER, proved 
on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to THis Instrument, ;aiid acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. Witness my hand and official seal, 
MATArtV Ol )OI 
PENI C O x " 
40 N 300 E SUITE 101 
ST GEORGE, UT 84770 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
08/21/2011 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public .;:• jn-\-
PBQHO0: 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
to Trust Deed dated April 1,2008 
PARCEL i: Tax ID No,; SG-762-C 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block No. 4, Plat B of St. George City Survey and running thence N 0Q08'44" 
E along the East Right of Way of 700 East Street 49.97 Feet; thence S. 89o51'30lf East 132.01 feet to a point on the East 
line of a parcel more particularly described in instrument #00641842 recorded and on file at Washington County 
Recorder's Office, State of Utah; thence S O'OSW W along said line 49.97 feet to the Southwest corner of said parcel, 
said point also being on the North line a parcel more particularly described in instrument #624716; thence N 89° 5130" 
W along said parcel 132.01 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a Grant of Easement, Instrument #467954, more particularly described as: Beginning at the Southwest corner 
of Lot 3, Block 4, Plat "B", of the St, George City Survey, as platted on the official map of said survey in the Washington 
County Recorder's Office, State of Utah, and running thence North along the block line of said block, 55.00 feet; thence 
East, parallel to the south line of said Lot 3, Block 4, St. George City Survey, 30.00 feet; thence South parallel to the west 
line of said block, 55.00 feet to the south line of said Lot 3; thence West along the south line of said Lot 3, 30.00 feet, 
more or less, to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Tax ID No.: SG-762-B 
Beginning N Q°0V44n E along the East Right of Way line of 700 East Street 49.97 feet from the Southwest corner of Lot 
3 Block No. 4, Plat B of St. George City Survey and running thence N 0°08'44" E along said Right of Way 82.02 feet to 
the Northwest comer of a parcel more particularly described in instrument #00641842; thence S 89Q51'44" E along the 
north line of said parcel 132.01 feet to the Northeast corner of said parcel; thence S O°0V44n W along the East line of 
said parcel 82.03 feet; Thence N 89°51'30" W 132.01 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a 26.00 foot public utility easement, and ingress and egress easement across, below and above the 
following described parcels: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 4, Block No. 4, Plat B St. George City Survey and Running 
thence N 0°0V44" E along the East Right of way of 700 East Street 66.00 feet, said point also being the 
Northwest Corner of a parcel described in Book 1328, Page 2204, recorded and on file at Washington 
County Recorder1 s Office, State of Utah; thence S 89°51 '51" E along the North line of said parcel 81.84 
feet; thence S 0°08'44,f W 66.00 feet to the South line of said parcel; thence S 89°5 V44" W along said 
south line 81.84 feet to point of beginning. Contains 0.12 acres. 
Beginning S 89Q51 !44M E along the South line of Lot 4, Book No, 4, Plat B, St. George City Survey 81.84 
feet and running thence N 0°08'44" E 66.00 feet to a point on the South line of a parcel more particularly 
described in instrument #960637; thence S 89°51,51" E along said South line 81.82 feet; thence S 
0°08'44"W 66.00 feet to the South line of Lot 4; thence N 89°51 '44 W along said South line 81.82 feet 
to the point of beginning. Contains 0.12 acres 
PARCEL 3: TAX ID No.: SG-763-C 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Lot 4 Block No. 4, Plat B of St. George City Survey and running thence N 0°08'44" 
E along the East Right of Way of 700 East Street 66.00 feet, said point also being the Northwest corner of a parcel 
described in Book 1328 Page 2204, recorded and on file at Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah; thence 
S 89°51'5r E along the north line of said parcel 81.84 feet; thence S O ^ W W 66.00 feet to the s^^^^s^d 
parcel; thence S 89°5 VW W along said south line 81,84 feet to the point of beginning. /%\\ _ A h / X 
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PARCEL 4; TAX ID No.: SG-763-B 
Beginning S 89051,44,, E along the South line of Lot 4 Block No, 43 Plat B of St. George City Survey 81.84 feet and 
running thence N 0°08'44" E 66.00 feet to a point on the South line of a parcel more particularly described in instrument 
#960637; thence S 89°51'51" E along said South line 81.82 feet; thence S 0°08;44" W 66.00 feet to the south line of lol 
4; thence N 89°5r44M W along said South line 81.82 feet to the point of beginning. Contains 0.12 acres. 
Together with a 26.00 foot public utility easement, and ingress and egress easement across, below and above the 
following described parcel; 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 4, Block No. 4, Plat B St. George City Survey and Running thence N O ^ W 
E along the East Right of way of 700 East Street 66.00 feet, said point also being the Northwest Corner of a parcel 
described in Book 1328, Page 2204, recorded and on file at Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah; thence 
S 89°5r51" E along the North line of said parcel 81.84 feet; thence S 0°08'44" W 66.00 feet to the South line of said 
parcel; thence S 89°5 r44H W along said south line 81.84 feet to point of beginning. 
PARCEL 5: TAX ID No.: SG-763 
Beginning S 89051,44" E along the South line of Lot 4 Block No. 4, Plat B St. George City Survey 163.66 feet and 
running thence N 0°08,44,r E 66.00 feet to the south line of a parcel more particularly described in instrument #960637; 
thence S 89°51'51" E along said south line 100.35 feet to a point on the east line of lot 4; thence S 0°08'44" W along said 
east line 66.01 feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 4; thence N 89°51 '44" W 100.35 feet to the point of beginning. 
Contains 0.15 acres. 
Together with a 26.00 foot public utility easement, and ingress and egress easement across, below and above the 
following described parcels: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 4, Block No. 4, Plat B St. George City Survey and Running thence N 0°08'44" 
E along the East Right of way of 700 East Street 66.00 feet, said point also being the Northwest Corner of a parcel 
described in Book 1328, Page 2204, recorded and on file at Washington County Recorder's Office, State of Utah; thence 
S 89°51,5P E along the North line of said parcel 81.84 feet; thence S 0o0844" W 66.00 feet to the South line of said 
parcel; thence S 89°5r44" W along said south line 81.84 feet to point of beginning. Contains 0.12 acres. 
Beginning S 89°51 '44" E along the South line of Lot 4, Book No. 4, PlatB, St. George City Survey 81.84 feet and running 
thence N 0°08'44" E 66.00 feet to a point on the South line of a parcel more particularly described in instrument #960637; 
thence S 89°51 '51" E along said South line 81.82 feet; thence S 0°08,44,,W 66.00 feet to the South line of Lot 4; thence 
N 89°51 '44 W along said South line 81.82 feet to the point of beginning. 
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a 
ALL-INCLUSIVE PROMISSORY NOTE 
(Secured by All-Inclusive Trust Deed) 
$2,411,596,00 November 30, 2006 
• . St. George, Utah 
IN INSTALLMENTS AS HEREIN STATED, for value received, DA VCO MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY LLC, hereinafter referred to collectively as "Maker", promises to pay to CALIFORNIA 
BENEFIT INC hereinafter referred to as "Holder", or order, ai 164 North 160 East. Hurricane, Utah, 
the sum ofTwo Million Four Hundred Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Six and No Dollars 
($2,411,596.00) with interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum, said principal and interest 
being payable as follows: 
Beginning January 1, 2007, and each month thereafter, a payment of interest at the 
rate of seven percent (7%) in the amount of 514,067.64 plus pro-rated taxes and 
hazard insurance. A balloon payment of the principal balance of$2,4l 1,596,00 plus 
unpaid interest, taxes and insurance, due on or before December 10, 2007. 
Any such prepayment shall be first applied to all accrued and unpaid interest, and the balance to the 
reduction of principal. 
2. The total principal amount of this Note includes the unpaid principal balance of any 
existing Promissory Notes ("Senior Notes") secured by Trust Deeds. Such Trust Deeds are 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "Senior Encumbrances". The Senior Notes are more 
particularly described as follows: 
(A) A Promissory Note dated January 1J, 2005, in favor of La-Salle Bank as Holder, 
with California Benefit Inc. as Maker, in the original pnncipal amount of $700,000.00; 
3. At the option of Maker, and at any time, Maker prepay the amounts required herein, 
provided, however: 
(a) Maker shall designate at the time the prepayment is made whether the 
prepaymerit shall be credited to unpaid principal or in prepayment offuture installments due under 
this Note; and 
(b) In the event that Holder is required under the terms of this Note or the All-
inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note, to make prepayments on the Senior Notes as a direct result 
of any prepayment(s) on this Note by Maker, and Holder thereby incurs a prepayment penalty under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Senior Notes, then in such event, Maker agrees to pay to Holder, on demand, the full amount of 
such prepayment penalty. Any prepayment penalties so paid by Maker shall not reduce the unpaid 
balance of this Note. 
4. When all the sums payable pursuant to the terms of this Note and the Trust Deed 
securing this Note have been paid in full, Holder shall; (I) immediately pay all remaining sums to 
be paid under the terms of the Senior Notes and Senior Encumbrances; and (2) surrender this Note 
to Maker marked paid in full and execute and deliver to the Trustee of the Trust Deed a Request for 
Full Reconveyance of the Trust Deed securing this Note. 
5. Provided Maker is not in default under any terms of the Note or the All-Inclusive 
Deed of Trust securing this Note, Holder shall pay when due all installments required under the 
terms of the Senior Note(s) and Senior Encumbrance(s). In the event of any default by Maker under 
any terms of this Note or the All-Inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note, Holder's obligation to 
make payments on the Senior Note(s) shall be deferred until any such default is cured. All penalties, 
charges and other expenses incurred under the Senior Notes and the Senior Encumbrances as a result 
of any such default by Maker shall be added to the principal amount of this Note and shall be 
immediately payable by Maker to Holder. Should Holder default in making any payments on the 
Senior Notes as required herein, Maker may make said payments directly to the Holder of such 
Senior Notes; any and all payments so made by Maker shall be credited to this Note. 
6. When all sums due pursuant to the terms of this Note and the All-inclusive Trust 
Deed securing this Note, at anytime, are equal to or less than the unpaid balance of principal and 
interest then due under the terms of the Senior Notes, then: 
(a) Upon (i) assumption by Maker of the Senior Note(s) and (ii) release of Holder 
from all liabilities and obligations on the Senior Notes and Senior Encumbrances, Maker, at Maker's 
option, may request and shall receive from Holder, cancellation and delivery of the Note, and Holder 
shall execute and deliver to the Trustee a Request for Full Reconveyance of the All-Inclusive Trust 
Deed securing this Note; or 
(b) Even in the absence of assumption and release under subsection (a), above, 
Holder, at his option, may cancel this Note and deliver same to Maker and execute and deliver to 
Trustee a Request for Full Reconveyance of the All-Inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note; or 
(c) In the event neither Holder.nor Maker exercises the options provided in (a) 
and (b) of this section, and this Note and the All-Inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note therefore 
remain in effect, then the payments and interest rate shown in Section I of this Note, to the extent 
they differ from the Senior Notes shall immediately and automatically be adjusted to equal the 
payments and interest rate then required under the Senior Notes, and Maker, in addition to such 
adjusted payments, shall also pay a monthly servicing fee to Holder of an amount equal to -0- percent 
2 
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(0%) of such adjusted monthly payments. 
7. Holder shall have no further obligation under the terms of this Note or the All-
inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note, after: (1) foreclosure by Holder or his Trustee of the All-
Inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note, or (2) delivery by Holder to Trustee of a Request Tor 
Reconveyance of the All-inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note. 
8. in the event the Holder of the Senior Notes is entitled to any remedy pursuant to any 
due on'sale, non-alienation, or non-assumption provision as a result of the execution of this Note 
and/or any document(s) related hereto, the entire unpaid balance of this Note, without further notice, 
shall become immediately due and payable thirty (30) days following written notice to the Maker 
of this Note of the intent of the Holders of the Senior Notes to exercise any such remedy. 
9. In the event that any payment under this Note is not made, or any obligation provided 
to be satisfied or performed under this Note or the All-Inclus-i ve Trust Deed securing this Note i$ not 
satisfied or performed at the time and in the manner required, or in the event Maker is adjudged a 
bankrupt or executes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, Holder, at Holder's option and 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance, all amounts of accrued interest 
and all other amounts then due under the terms of this Note and the AU-inclusive Trust Deed 
securing this Note immediately due and payable. After acceleration, the unpaid principal balance 
and all other sums owed hereunder shall bear interest at the Default Rate. The acceptance of any 
payments of installments thereafter by Holder will not constitute a waiver by Holder of the right to 
accelerate. 
10. In the event that any payment under this Note is not made, or any obligation provided 
to be satisfied or performed under this Note or the All-Inclusive Trust Deed securing this Note is not 
satisfied or per-formed at the time and in the manner required, the defaulting party shall pay any and 
all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether or not incurred in 
connection with the exercise of the power of sale provided for in the All-Inclusive Trust Deed 
securing this Note) which may be incurred by the Maker or Holder hereof in connection with the 
enforcement of any rights tinder this Note, including, without limitation, courts costs, reasonable 
attorney's fees, and other costs incurred byHoider in pursuing any such remedies, with such amounts 
to bear interest at the Default Rate. 
11. The Maker and endorser hereof waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, 
notice of protest, notice of dishonor and notice of nonpayment and expressly agree that this Note or 
any payment hereunder may be extended from time to time by the Holder hereof without in any way 
affecting the liability of such parties. No course of dealing between the Maker and Holder in 
exercising any rights hereunder> shall operate as a waiver of rights of Holder. 
12. This Note shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon respective successors 
3 
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and assigns of the Maker and Holder. 
13. This Note shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
14. In this Note, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the 
feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
15. If Maker consists of more than one person, Maker's obligations hereunder shall be 
joint and several. • - • 
16. This Note is secured by an All-Incjusi ve Trust Deed of ever) date herewith. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Promissory Note \s execute on the 30th day of November 
2006. 
MAKER: 
DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY LLC 
By: C . .Cfog^j 
David Fisher, Managing Member, Maker 
ACCEPTANCE BY HOLDER 
The undersigned hereby accepts the foregoing All-inclusive Promissory Note and agrees to 
perform each and all of the terms thereof on the part of the Holder to be performed. 
HOLDER: 
California Benefit inc. 
Richard T. Murset, Vice President 
PL000014 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
David Ftsher | American Mortgage 
J^rom: David Fisher | American Mortgage [dfisher@amfs-usa.com] 
>ni: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 9:02 AM 
- «o: 'RichMurset' 
Subject: RE: mortgage stuff 
Thanks. I received an e-mail from my broker asking me the s t a t u s of the 2005 2006 YTD 
operat ing s ta tements . How are those coming? 
Orig inal Message 
From: Rich Murset [mailto:lagunawelding@gmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 25, 2008 10:04 PM 
To: David Fisher ; David Fisher I American Mortgage 
Subject : mortgage s tu f f 
I asked my normal mortgage 'broker i f he had some more leads for you and 'I w i l l forward a 
couple of them to you. 
Rich • 
J 
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David Fisher [ American Mortgage 
<>m: David Fisher | American Mortgage [dfisher@amfs-usa.com] 
nt: Monday, July 21, 2008 2:20 P M 
J: 'Rich Mursef 
Subject: RE: progress 
Good. The loan officer said that he received my e-mail with the updated financials except 
for the 07 returns. My cpa is making a couple of changes and then sending them back to mme 
for review then I will forward them to the loan officer. 
Original Message 
From: Rich Murset [mailto:lagunawelding@gmail.com] 
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2008 7:33 PM 
To: David Fisher 
Subject: progress 
I was just checking on if you are making any progress since I spoke with you last? 
Thanks, Rich 
Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 3284 
(20080721) 
The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. 
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David Fisher | American Mortgage 
"3# 
.From: David Fisher | American Mortgage [dfisher@amfs-usa.com] 
>nt: Tuesday, August 26, 2008 10:10 AM 
J : 'Rich Mursef 
Subject: RE: progress? 
Actually there is progress but the lending institutions are changing their guidelines. 
They will no longer accept the cap rate given by the market which now is between 6 and 
6.5%. instead they will use a 8.5 to 9% cap rate to establish value then only lend up to 
75 % of that. Therefore I have to bring in money to close since the loan amount will not 
be enough to cover the debt. I am expecting a settlement on October 2nd which will be 
enough to pay down the difference between what I owe and the loan amount. Also I have 2 
parties interested in purchasing the properties. I would like enough time for either one 
of these things to happen. 
Original Message 
From: Rich Murset [mailto:mac_wad@sisna.com] 
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 6:39 PM 
To: David Fisher I American Mortgage 
Subject: progress? 
Dear Dave, 
I am assuming that no news is bad news. We have let this go plenty of time beyond 
our agreement. We would like a deed in lieu of foreclosure, so it will be cleaner and 
quicker. We would entertain the thought of you continuing to manage the properties, if you 
are interested. Let me know your thoughts. 
Rich 
Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 3386 
(20080825) 
./he message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. 
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David Fisher | American Mortgage -V
s) 
fom: Rich Murset [mac__wad@sisna.com] 
.Kent: Wednesday, September 03, 2008 10:59 AM 
i'o: David Fisher 
Subject: terms 
David, 
I have thought about what you have said and the possibilities for your 
refinance/sale or whatever. We have lost a lot of money and opportunities over the past 
year by not being able to do what we planned. Here is what I would like to do to help 
cover the cost of our missed opportunities and to help pay for foreclosure if it comes to 
that. I would like to add $1000.00 per month to the Casa Sonoma payment and $1500 to the 
Casa Grande payment both starting in Sept. I would like you to make those checks to 
Carolyn Murset. I know you are trying hard and it is a very strange market, especially 
with the mortgage industry, but something needs to happen soon. 
Thanks, Rich 
Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 3409 
(20080902) 
The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus, 
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9/30/08 
David, 
I have looked over the info that you have sent to me. First let me clarify two things. 
1. 
I never, verbally or in writing extended the deadline by one year. I worked with 
you as each possibility came and went, but I never agreed to a one year 
extension. If I had, I would not have been pressing you for something to happen 
until that second year had expired. 
2. I have never said that I have not benefited from the the sale of these properties to 
you. You have done precisely what I expected you to do and that was to improve 
them and to raise the rents and to make the payments as you agreed. When I 
speak of being injured, it is simply because I have not had the money to work with 
that you agreed to pay me. I make money by using money and my hands have 
been tied by not having the money. I also could have paid off mortgages that I 
have and continue to pay on. I have missed many many opportunities because of 
this, and that is how I have been injured and continue to be injured, not from 
monthly payments. 
This is what I propose: 
I would go with your option A (you continue to manage and maintain the apartments 
and you continue trying to get the financing to be able to pay me off) subject to 
compliance by you to the following conditions; 
1. That I have a cashiers check for both of the payments ($8451.85 for Casa 
Sonoma, $15,205.83 for Casa Grande) with late fees, that you stopped payment 
on for your September payments by tomorrow, Wednesday Oct. 1 st at 5PM. 
2. That I have a cashiers check for both of your payments ($8451.85 for Casa 
Sonoma, $15,205.83 for Casa Grande) for October to me by October 6th. 
3. You have all subsequent payments to me in the form of cashiers checks no later 
than the 6th of that month. 
4. I will have my attorney draft and we will both sign a formal agreement extending 
our existing agreement until April 1, 2009. You would have until that time to 
refinance as you have been trying to do. 
5. You must agree to this in writing and have it to me no later than October 1, 2008 at 
12 Noon. 
6. If you can't agree to this then we will go forward with the foreclosure and all of the 
provisions in the originaldocuments. 
Sincerely, 
Rich Murset 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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• 
PS, if you decided to continue to look for financing, I have a lead for you. Call Ryan 
Bolton at Superior Lending. His number is 627-0494 or cell # 801-558-9632 
/ 
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David Fisher | American Mortgage 
i?jT 
m: David Fisher | American Mortgage [dfisher@amfs-usa.com] 
. Jnt: Thursday, October 09, 2008 12:21 PM 
To: 'Rich Murset" 
Subject: RE: Response 
I put the apartments in my Darwin's name as another route in t ry ing to obta in f inanc ing . 
They are in my name now. 
Original Message 
From: Rich Murset [mailto:mac_wad@sisna,com] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 08, 2008 3:11 PM 
To: David Fisher j American Mortgage 
Cc: Paul Veasy 
Subject : Response 
>> 
>> October 8, 2008 
>> 
>> David Fisher, 
>> My last response dated October 3, 2008 had nothing new in it that 
>> my previous letter, dated September 30th, 2008 did not, other than 
>> the timing of payments and the tenant meeting, which you were aware 
>> of. Regardless, you have failed to address the default of the loans 
>> by Davco Management. 
>> Again, I did not grant you a one year extension; either orally or 
•>> in writing, but rather was patient with you in allowing you to 
N> pursue the refinancing of the properties. 
1 Now that you are withholding monthly payments and rents as well, 
...•"> you have pushed us to take action. I have discovered that you 
>> have also taken out a $500,000 loan with Fab5 Management on Casa 
>> Sonoma and that you have conveyed ownership of the property to 
>> Darwin Fisher without my consent, which is a breach of the terms of 
>> the Deed of Trust. 
>> The failure to satisfy my two written offers is unacceptable. We 
>> will commence foreclosure on the properties and will take separate 
» action on the monthly payments of rent and our liability as a 
>> Guarantor. 
>> 
>> Sincerely, Richard T. Murset 
> 
CC: Paul Veasy 
. Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 3505 
(20081008) 
The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. 
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REAuotr REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT raw. 
T h i s is a legally binding contract. Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this f o r m Buyer a n d Sel ler , however, may agree to alter or 
delete its provisions or lo u s , a different Jorm. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor. 
, ., . EARNEST I^NEY RECEIPT 
B u y e r _ J ^ Z ^ ^ tffajjf^£ti* o f 1 ^ ^ P 4 ( c h a 5 e t h e p™perty 
describej^QlDw and7 hereby 6e\\vers to^h^Brokerage, &s Ea$est Money, the amount of S jD.» X ' l / in the form 
nf / T$ /J// — which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as 
defined VrSection 23 Wshall be deposited in accordance with state taw. 
Received by: J^juJ/^^ • — o n -
TofagenVbrokei acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money) (Date) 
Brokerage: ^ / r f l z f j ^ J j / A . _ _ Phone Number [fiW'fOO^ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
Jy-tfffh/iP.. County oU'A A.<fa*h*C&3*±-. State of Utah, Zip l(Yl^ 
T * - ^ > ^ ' (the 'Property*) 
1. PROPERTY 
as 
City of ytf^$\^L> 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to 
foe Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light 
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; 
window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite d\shes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic 
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. T h e tollowing items shall also be 
included \n this sate and conveyed npder separate Bill o^Saje with warranties as to title:. 
^p<<fh> J<* • '/fab X^XT 
1.2 Excluded Items. The folfewifiq it£ms are excluded from this sale: 
1.3 Water Rights. The following water rights are \nc\u6ed in this sale:. 
2. P U R C H A S E PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Proper^ \s $ i^<, . -^ ^ q . > , -r-w $**>K?*>-<*> . t^KJ 
2.1 Metbr-* r:f Payment. The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
.->. fC> Q(XJ (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain condit ions descr ibed in this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSfT MAY B E C O M E TOTALLY N O N - R E F U N D A B L E . 
% (b) Uew Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided m Section 2.3. Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans: [ ) CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ] VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) 
.If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum. 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
 : -—~ 
(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
$. (e) Other (specify) : __ 
S (f) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
{ j ^ S j f f i v Q PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) -L) I U1 9 4 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) \jA Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property \S conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s) 
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condit ion/ 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Properiy \S NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. Section 
2.3 does not apply. 
if) tfaU 
buyer's I n i t i a l s \ H ^ Date,/ U / ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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2.3 Application for Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 241^ 
apply for the Loan. "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed and del y_fr s h a , ! 
lender (the "Lender") the initial loan application and Documentation required by the Lender; and (ii) 'oaVJ T ^ 
application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will pnDrn°?|n 
provide the Lender with any additional documentation as required by the Lender. ^ ^ 
(b) Procedure if Loan Application is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
does not approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial"). Buyer shall., no later than three calendar days thereafter 
provide a copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of'such notice' 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 
2.3(b): (i) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(6)t the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received 
by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as 
Sellers exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this 
Section 2.3(b) shalfc have no effect on the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to 
the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Propeny U] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. This condition is referred to as the "Appraisal Condition*. If the 
Appraisal Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised for 
less than the Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"). Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of 
such written notice to Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a 
cancellation under this Section 2.4: (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the 
Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (ii) if the Notice 
of Appraised Value was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and 
Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to 
cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation 
pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on a date upon which Buyer and 
; Seller agree in writing. "Settlement* shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller 
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by \he 
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office 
in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/dosing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer 
shall each pay one-half (?) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process. 
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as 
set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited 1o, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepsld 
rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of the 
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such 
writing could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of the following have been completed; (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
the Lender to Seller or. to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed 
within four calendar days of Settlement. 
possession to Buyer within: [ ] hours [ ] days after Closing; A. SPOSSESSION. Setler^ajJ de|faer physical  
[ $) ther (specify) # f ^ f l g & & ^ 
5. CONFIRMATION ^ p A Q ^ N C Y DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
f ] Seller's Init ialsmk/u Buyer's Initials -v 
The Listing Agpnt, R&t&J^^ represents [A] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
/VJ v ^ / - * • f) j r a s a Limited Agent; 
ffiltfiJ-ptL&J' represents \A Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
/ I A \ as a Limited Agent; 
The -Spiling Aynt . /P@lt fdJ^fifc.te represents [ ] Seller L f lBuyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
<V A 0/ s*Ji -y $ / - \ as a Limited Agent; 
The Selling B roke r ,Z / i f o fe / v c? (l4^^^QcJCl^2, represents [ ) Seller H) Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
X j r ^ ( J ^ ^
 a s a Limited Agent 
The Listing Broker, y 
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6. TFTLE INSURANCE. At Settlement.. Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance 
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), Seller shall 
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
(b) a commitmen! for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
|d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and. 
fe) Other (specify)
 : — — 
8. BUYER'S RJGHT TO CAhJCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (check applicable boxes); ' • 
(a) [Y) IS I ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7; 
(b) [V| IS L ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(c) [ J IS [)'] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"); 
(d) [ Y] IS I ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms and availability of homeowner's insurance 
coverage for the Property; 
(B) IV] *s I J *S NOT conditioned ypon Buyer's^pprov^of the following tests and evaluations of the Property; (specify) 
_____ . . " ...., ' .'. _• '_ • ^ p ^ ^ / ^ , A ^ / / ^ -
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, B.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do 
not apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the 
• walk-through inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Evaluations & Inspections Daadlme. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections 
are acceptable to Buyer. 
5.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer, or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel 
this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shali not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer \f this Contract Is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted 
in Section 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [ J f A RE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. JUhere 
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [ ) Addendum N o — 1 
[ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ J FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum 
I ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure Is required by law) 
{ J Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law) 
[ ) Other (specify) -
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
1D.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and marketable 
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions) and 
rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing 
Buyer agrees to be responsible tor taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other services 
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Seller 
will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller 
will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
S E L L E R DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-
related damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense: . 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will 
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes; 
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order 
and fit for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance. 
10,3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from the warranties 
provided^VySelier under Sections 10.1 and 10.2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home Wananty Plan 
[ ] WILL m WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be ordered by [ ] Buyer 
| ] Sellerand shall be issued by a company selected by [ 3 Buyer [ ] Seller. The cost of the Home Warranty Plan shall 
not exceeo $ and shall be paid for at Settlement by [ ] Buyer I ] Seller. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented/ meaning that 
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, B.4 and 10.2 ("the items") are respectively present, repaired/changied as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair 
the items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender \f applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none " 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; 
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bmd Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. . 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
fkheck applicable box) 
[VsHALL 
[ ' ] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. \f the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through 
a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parlies. Each party agrees to bear Its own costs of mediation. U 
mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 
shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable reiief pending mediation. 
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16. DEFAULT. \i Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or 
o return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Comract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, 
•in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elec; either tc accep: from Seller a sum equal to the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other 
remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to 
Buyer upon demand. It is agreed that denial o\ a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a defaul; and is governed by 
Section 2.3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, in the event of litigation o( binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for 
participation in mediation under Section 15. 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed 
by the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and -17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must 
be agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each 
Section of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; 
and (b) the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which 
triggers the timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced 
herein shall not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract except as 
otherwise agreed to in writing by such non-party. 
i2. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: 
(a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the 
other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES! Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline i l i i ^ U ^ / ' . r / ^ ; .T ! (Date) 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline ^xQ<.£j £?J\ JcV)> (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline (Date) 
(e) Appraisal Deadline ^{ / ( A **->
 f < ^
u
 > (Date) 
(j) Settlement Deadline T^/ZftZm (Date) 
%lfi 
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25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer otters tcxpwchase the Property on tfre abov^terms and conditions. 
If Seller does not accept this oiier t ' 'Jg.OQ [ ] AM p() PM Mountain Time o n / ^ ^ , ^ tf\ (Date), this offer 
shall la^se; and the brokerage shaw ....;.the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer. r 
(Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) 
The later of the above Ofler Dates shall be reierreti to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
(Offer Dale) 
(Buyers* Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Adoress) (Zip Code) (Pnone) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO P U R C H A S E : Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions 
specified above. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in \he attached ADDENDUM NO 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) 
[ ] REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer 
(Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
(Sellers Signature) (Dare) (Tune) (Setter's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
» • » * - * - * - • • * • * * * * • 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Fill in applicable 
section below.) 
I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures: 
Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
B. I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ] faxed [ ] mailed [ ] hand 
delivered o n _ (Date), postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer. \ 
Sent/Delivered by (specify). 
THIS F O R M A P P R O V E D BY THE UTAH R E A L E S T A T E COMMISSION A N D T H E O F F I C E OF T H E U T A H A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L , 
EFFECTIVE A U G U S T 5, 20D3. IT R E P L A C E S AND S U P E R S E D E S A L L P R E V I O U S L Y A P P R O V E D V E R S I O N S O F THIS F O R M . 
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regarding the Property located at 
following terms are hereby incorporated 
FERJo that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the MREPCM) with 
, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
as Byyer, and -, j ^ — as Seller, 
IS AN [J] ADDENDUM [ ] CpUNTERp/FER. 
Ffer Reference Date of //UOkvf Y'fJQX. 
 .. *bttl{J0L.M^/fxaw yr-tas tiMy . a _ ^ _ _  l r, 
QBi-C^1^ Wr^(Jl^ .. . . ^
 r. The 
a^ted as part of the R E P ^ ' j r f ^ y £ ) •• W / J , - ^ •?&?# - j ^ #>& 
/Q_ 
PK ptfaJ^ib j(fatu'«j (fas/ Uf 
^I^JOi/hL^J 
,$efaQ <€<&{&** f 
^^L/iAAx~uJ^ifL 6f ^ i ^ < / m ^ / 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: 
To the extent the tehrrs of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior adden-
da and counteroffers, these terms shall controL All other t^ rms-of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by thbfftPDENp.U^I shall remain the same. FK] Seller I ] Buyer shall have until (y (J) [ ]AM[V] PM 
Mountain Time onM^y /) /j^ patf*) to accept the termsjn this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 
pe REBQ. jjnjajs so accepted, the offen as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
4M/J (Jtffr . ,J$k 7 Time ( ) Buyer | J Setter Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
I ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROEEER:[ ) Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO,. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ) Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Dale) (Time) 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THJS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
cncnr-m/p AUGUST 5. 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
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Summary of Activities of David Fisher & Davco from 9/1/08 to 2/20/09 
Charges: 
How much was collected from tenants from 9/1/08 to 2/20/09? $163,243 
Before 11/4/08 court order? $68,971 
After court order? $94,272 
Total $163,243 
What is the source of this info? Detailed accounting records for each unit 
provided by David Fisher and Davco. 
What is the amount of deposits (security & cleaning) collected for the 
37 units? (includes $2,711.00 recorded in detailed records) 
$30,050 
From Casa Sonoma? $ 11,450 
From Casa Grande? $18,600 
Total $30,050 
What is the source of this info? Tenant leases and detailed accounting records 
for each unit provided by David Fisher and Davco. 
Total income to David Fisher and Davco from 
9/1/08 to 2/20/09 
Source: Same as above $193,293 
Credits: 
How much was deposited in compliance with the court order by tenants, 
And not collected by David Fisher or Davco? $7,400.00 
Source: Court records 
How much was deposited with the court by David Fisher and Davco after 
the hearing in August 2009? 
Source: Court records 
How much was refunded to tenants from deposits from 9/1/08-2/20/09? 
Note: 24 move outs during this period 
Source: Detailed accounting records for each unit. 
What is the total amount of debt service, i.e. repairs, utilities, garbage, 
cleaning, yard care, pest control for the period of 9/1/08 to 2/20/09? 
$16,078.21 
Source: invoices submitted by David Fisher and Davco 
What is the net amount of rents and security deposits owed by 
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 




Judge | # * 
Plaintiffs complain against defendants and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Iota, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company. 
2. Plaintiff, California Benefit, Inc. ("California Benefit") is a California corporation 
registered to do business in Utah. 
' i ' l \ ' "» ' 
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PAUL D.VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 
FISHER, an individual; 
Defendants. 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER 
REQUIRING RENTS TO BE 
DEPOSITED WITH THE COURT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge Shumate 
Pursuant to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs Iota, LLC and 
California Benefit, Inc. move this Court, ex parte, for an order requiring all rents from the Casa 
Sonoma Apartments and the Casa Grande Apartments be deposited with the Court during the 
pendency of this lawsuit, or until further order of the Court. 
Defendant Davco Management Company L.C. ("Davco") executed trust deeds which 
include assignment of rent provisions for two apartment complexes it purchased from plaintiffs. 
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PAUL D.VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 
FISHER, an individual; 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF RICHARD T. 
MURSET 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge Shumate 
I, Richard T. Murset, declare as follows: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
2. I am a managing member of Iota, LLC and the Vice President of California 
Benefit, Inc. Iota, LLC and California Benefit, Inc. are the plaintiffs in this action. I have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Declaration. 
A 
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3. In September of 2006, defendant Davco Management Company, L.C. ("Davco") 
entered into an agreement with Iota, LLC to purchase certain real property and improvements 
commonly known as the Casa Sonoma Apartments in St. George, Utah. 
4. On or about September 29, 2006, Davco executed a Term Loan Promissory Note 
in the principal amount of $1,341,395.00 in favor of Iota, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Iota Note"). The Iota Note required payment of interest on the principal balance and late fees 
if payments were not paid timely. 
5. The Iota Note required the entire balance due and owing on the note be paid on or 
before December 1, 2007. 
6. As part of the same transaction and as security for the payment of the Iota Note, 
Davco executed and delivered to Iota a Deed of Trust, Security Agreement Assignment of Rents 
and Leases, and Fixture Filing (hereinafter referred to as the "Iota Deed of Trust") wherein 
Davco was the trustor and Iota was the beneficiary. A true and correct copy of the Iota Deed of 
Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Iota Deed of Trust granted to Iota a security interest 
in the real property located in Washington County, State of Utah, commonly known as the Casa 
Sonoma apartments located 669 South 700 East, St. George, Utah, 84770, more particularly 
described as follows: 
PARCEL #1: 
THE SOUTH ONE-HALF OF LOT 4, BLOCK 4, PLAT "B", ST. 
GEORGE CITY SURVEY, WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
PARCEL #2: 
THE WEST ONE-HALF OF LOT 3, BLOCK 4, PLAT "B", ST. 
4846-7778-9699.1 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9. Davco has defaulted under the Iota Trust Deed by failing to make interest 
payments when due and by failing to pay off the principal amount of $1,341,395.00 due 
December 1, 2007. Iota, LLC has demanded that all rents for the Casa Sonoma Apartments be 
made to Iota, LLC but Davco has refused to voluntarily assign the rents to Iota, LLC. Davco 
continues to collect rents from the Casa Sonoma Apartments but Davco has not made any 
payments to Iota, LLC on the Iota Note since August of 2008. 
10. In November of 2006, Davco entered into an agreement with California Benefit to 
purchase certain real property and improvements commonly known as the Casa Grande 
Apartments in St. George, Utah. 
11. On or about November 30, 2006, Davco executed an All-inclusive Promissory 
Note in the principal amount of $2,411,596.00 in favor of California Benefit (hereinafter referred 
to as the "California Note"). The California Note required payment of interest at the rate of 
seven percent (7%) on the principal balance, plus pro-rated taxes and hazard insurance and late 
fees if payments were not paid timely. 
12. The California Note required the entire balance due and owing on the note be paid 
on or before December 10, 2007. 
13. As part of the same transaction and as security for the payment of the California 
Note, Davco executed and delivered to California Benefit a All-inclusive Deed of Trust and 
Assignment of Rents (hereinafter referred to as the "California Deed of Trust") wherein Davco 
was the trustor and California Benefit was the beneficiary. The California Deed of Trust granted 
to California Benefit a security interest in the real property located in Washington County, State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 
FISHER, an individual; 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED RULING 
ON EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER 
REQUIRING RENTS TO BE 
DEPOSITED WITH THE COURT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge Shumate 
Plaintiffs Iota LLC and California Benefit, Inc. (referred hereafter as "Plaintiffs"), 
respectfully request the court submit its Ex Parte Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be 
Deposited with the Court for an expedited decision and/or hearing. The motion requests that 
rents for two apartment complexes be deposited with the Court during the pendency of this 
lawsuit. Said rents will be collected for November over the next few days. Accordingly, an 
expedited ruling on the motion is necessary in order to determine where the November rents 
should be deposited. 
4829-7188-8387.1 
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
A tiorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 
FISHER, an individual; 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE 
MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
RENTS TO BE DEPOSITED WITH 
THE COURT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be deposited 
with the Court. 
The court has considered the motion, memoranda, declaration and accompanying exhibits 
and materials submitted by Plaintiffs, for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be deposited with the 
Court is GRANTED. 
Fll f 
I I L i t 
Date / / / 5 / ^ 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
By. 
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2. Defendants Davco Management Company L.C. and David Fisher shall deposit all 
rents collected from the real property commonly known as the Casa Sonoma Apartments located 
at 669 South 700 East, St. George, Utah, 84770 and the real property commonly known as the 
Casa Grande Apartments located 735 East 700 South, St. George, Utah, 84770 with the clerk of 
the court of the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. This order shall remain in 
effect during the pendency of this action, or until further order of the Court. 
3. All tenants at the Casa Sonoma Apartments located at 669 South 700 East, St. 
George, Utah, 84770 and all tenants of the Casa Grande Apartments located 735 East 700 South, 
St. George, Utah, 84770 shall deposit their rent checks with the clerk of the court of the Fifth 
Judicial District Court located at 220 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 84770 under Civil No. 
080502981, until further order of the Court. 
DATED this Jj_ day of /Vft (/ , 2008. 
JAMESt. SHUMATE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
4810-8340-2243.1 ^ 
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PAUL D.VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone; (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
FIFTH OiST-FUGT-COUl 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Civil Process Sen/ices 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, and DAVID 
FISHER, an individual; 
Defendants, 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE 
MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
RENTS TO BE DEPOSITED WITH 
THE COURT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Ex Pane Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be deposited 
with the Court. 
The court has considered the motion, memoranda, declaration and accompanying exhibits 
and materials submitted by Plaintiffs, Tor good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Order Requiring Rents to be deposited with the 
Court is GRANTED. 
4SIO-S310-2243.1 
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiffs complain against defendant and allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Iota, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company. 
2. Plaintiff, California Benefit, Inc. ("California Benefit") is a California corporation 
registered to do business in Utah. 
3. Defendant, Davco Management Company L.C. ("Davco") is a Utah limited 
liability company. 
4. David Fisher is a member and manager of Davco. 
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiffs complain against defendant and allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Iota, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company. 
2. Plaintiff, California Benefit, Inc. ("California Benefit") is a California corporation 
registered to do business in Utah. 
3. Defendant, Davco Management Company L.C. ("Davco55) is a Utah limited 
liability company. 
4. David Fisher is a member and manager of Davco. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS5 TRIAL BRIEF 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiffs IOTA LLC and California Benefit, Inc. (collectively "Plaintiffs") submit the 
following trial brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is scheduled for a four-day bench trial beginning on Monday, April 26, 2010. 
This lawsuit arises from defendant Davco Management Company L.C.'s ("Davco") purchase of 
two apartment complexes located in St. George, Utah from Plaintiffs. Davco purchased an 
apartment complex known as the Casa Sonoma Apartments from Iota, LLC in September of 
2006 and another apartment complex known as the Casa Grande Apartments from California 
Benefit, Inc. in November of 2006. The apartment complexes were "seller-financed" under the 
4R1R-Q649-6901J 
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it became entitled to reimbursement from Plaintiffs for any all improvements made to the 
apartment complexes. 
III. DAVCO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT PAROL EVIDENCE 
THAT CONTRADICTS THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACTS AND 
VIOLATES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
"The rule is well settled in Utah that if the original agreement is within the statute of 
frauds, a subsequent agreement that modifies any of the material parts of the original must also 
satisfy the statute." Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243 1J29, 166 P.3d 639, 648 (quoting 
Allen v. Kingdom 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986)). Utah's Statute of Frauds requires that any 
"estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, [or] any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any many relating thereto" must be in 
writing. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1. The agreements at issue in this case are subject to the statute 
of frauds. 
Even if the contracts at issue in this case were not subject to the statute of frauds, 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible because the contracts are integrated and unambiguous. 
"[A]n integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more 
terms of an agreement." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51 |^22 (internal quotations and cites 
omitted). In this case, "the language of the contract [is] not susceptible to contrary, tenable 
interpretations," and therefore, Davoc cannot submit parol evidence that is inconsistent with the 
language of the contracts. Id. ^30 (internal quotations and citation omitted). For example, the 
notes are perfectly clear as to when the principal amounts become due and owing. Despite this, 
Davco wants to submit parol evidence at trial regarding the date the amounts under the notes are 
due. Moreover, Davco seeks to add new oral terms and conditions to the written contracts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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regarding providing financial statements that clearly were not contemplated nor required by the 
written contracts entered into between the parties. As is well established under Utah law, the 
court should "determine what the parties have agreed upon by looking first the plain language 
within the four corners of the document." South Ridge Homeowners' Assoc, v. Brown, 2010 UT 
App 23 | 1 (quoting Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc.; 2009 UT 54, fl3). 
IV. BOTH DAVCO AND DAVID FISHER SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF 
COURT. 
It is undisputed and will be established at trial that prior to the filing of this lawsuit, 
Davco did not pay the note obligations and stopped making payments under both the Iota Note 
and the California Note. As a result of the defaults, Plaintiffs became entitled to all the rents, 
security deposits, and cash proceeds from the apartments. Davco knowingly refused to 
voluntarily comply with its obligations under the assignment of rents provisions during the time 
period from when it defaulted under the notes until the apartment complexes could be sold at 
foreclosure, requiring Plaintiffs to obtain an order from the Court compelling Davco and David 
Fisher to deposit rents with the Court. The Court's November 4, 2008 Order required Davco and 
David Fisher to "deposit all rents collected from the real property commonly known as the Casa 
Sonoma Apartments located at 669 South 700 East, St. George, Utah, 84770 and the real 
property commonly know as the Casa Grande Apartments located 735 East 700 South, St. 
George, Utah, 84770 with the clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah." 
November 4, 2008 Order. At the time the Order was issued, David Fisher was a named 
defendant in the lawsuit and was personally served with the Order. 
Davco and David Fisher refused to comply with the Court's November 4, 2008 Order, 
instead David Fisher admitted in his deposition that he and his LLC (Davco) kept the rents from 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DARWIN C. FISHER, #1080 
A Professional Corporation 
40 N. 300 East, Suite 101 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone No. (435) 688-1170 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 
Civil No.: 080502981 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from the purchase by Defendant Davco Management Company L.C. 
("Davco") of the Casa Grande apartments from Plaintiff California Benefit, Inc. ("California 
Benefit") on September 29, 2006, and of the Casa Sonoma apartments from Plaintiff Iota LLC 
("Iota") on November 30,2006 (collectively "apartment complexes"). 
Davco executed promissory notes and trust deeds in favor of Plaintiffs for each purchase. 
The maturity date for the Casa Sonoma apartments was December 1,2007 and the maturity date for 
Casa Grande apartments was December 10,2007. Davco was unable to pay the balance due on the 
r! r i 
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not mention improvements or renovations. 
Davco should receive payment or an offset for the renovations that Davco made to the 
apartments. 
VI. CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
Plaintiffs request in the Pretrial order that David Fisher be held in contempt of court for 
Davco's failure to timely pay the rents it collected from August 31,2008 to February 20, 2009. 
However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the contempt charges. For the Court to have 
jurisdiction, an affidavit of the facts constituting the contempt must be given to the Court. (See UCA 
§ 78B-6-303) ("When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge, an affidavit setting forth a statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt."); (see also Crank v. Utah 
Judicial Council, 20 P.3d 307 (Utah,2001) atf 28) ("Thus, in Utah, the statutory requirement of an 
affidavit is a procedural prerequisite to the imposition of any sanctions for indirect contempt.") (See 
Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden, Weber County, 185 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)) (UA 
contempt proceeding is separate from the principal action, and in order for the court to acquire 
jurisdiction of the offense when committed, affidavit or initiating pleading must be filed, and unless 
that is done, subsequent proceedings are void."). 
Since a contempt proceeding is separate from this lawsuit and Plaintiffs have not filed an 
affidavit setting forth the alleged acts of contempt, this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether 
Mr. Fisher should be held in contempt of court in this trial. 
At the contempt hearing, if the Court finds Mr. Fisher in contempt, "the court may impose 
26 
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PAUL D. VEASY (3964) 
DAVID R. HALL (9225) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS5 POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
Case No. 080502981 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Plaintiffs IOTA LLC and California Benefit, Inc. (collectively "Plaintiffs") submit the 
following Post-Trial Brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Iota and California Benefit Notes matured in December 2007. Thereafter, Iota and 
California Benefit cooperated with Davco in allowing Davco time to refinance the Notes. 
Because of that cooperation Iota and California Benefit have been the victims of the acts of 
Davco. Rather than pay the Notes, the evidence at trial shows that Davco offered one excuse 
after another for its failure to refinance the Notes and Davco and David Fisher knowingly took 
i 
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Davco's first primary defense of an alleged one-year extension on the Iota and California 
Benefit Notes after their maturity in December 2007 was addressed by the Court at the third day 
of trial. The Court found there are no writings executed by either Iota or California Benefit to 
the original Notes and Deeds of Trust and then ruled as a matter of law that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-1 and 25-5-4 bars Davco's defense that there was a one-year extension to the Iota Note, 
Iota Trust Deed, California Benefit Note and California Benefit Trust Deed. 
As to Davco's second primary defense that Murset failed to provide updated financial 
documents for 2005 and 2006, this defense also lacks merit. At trial, Murset testified that he 
provided seventeen months (January 2005 to May 2006) of financial documents for 2005 and 
2006 to David Fisher. Murset testified that Davco's basis for its purchase offer for each 
apartment complex was from the seventeen months of financial statements. (Defendant's Exs. 1 
through 4). Murset testified he provided his remaining months in 2006 to David Fisher in 
February 2007. There is nothing in the Notes or Deeds of Trust discussing an obligation to 
provide two complete years of financial documents for 2005 and 2006. At each closing, Davco 
chose to close the purchases of the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande apartments. 
In contrast, David Fisher testified that Murset had failed to provide updated financial 
documents for 2005 and 2006. David Fisher testified that he continued to ask for updated 
financials and never received them from Murset up until July 2008. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 27). 
Initially, this defense begs the question of Murset's testimony of why he would not provide 2005 
and 2006 updated financial operating statements for the apartments especially if Davco had 
produced a lender committed to refinance and pay the Notes. Murset wanted to be paid for the 
apartments. In addition, based on the testimony of Jeff Feltwell and existing guidelines, the prior 
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A Professional Corporation (JF)/1 
40 N. 300 East, Suite 101 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone No. (435) 688-1170 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOTA LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 




DAVCO MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.C., 
a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT 
Civil No.: 080502981 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
Defendant Davco Management Company L.C. (hereinafter "Davco"), through counsel, 
Darwin C. Fisher, submits this Written Closing Argument. 
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT 
There are four issues to be decided by the Court: 1) Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to 
deficiency judgments; 2) Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the rents collected by Davco from 
September 1,2008 through February 20,2009; 3) Wliether Plaintiffs breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; and 4) Whether Davco and/or David Fisher (hereinafter "Fisher") are in 
contempt of Court. 
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to deficiency judgments because: a) the amount of indebtedness 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Less the rents paid to the court. $20,602.92 
Total amount of indebtedness $2,493,744.41 
Less: Mr. Smith's Fair Market Value -$2,650.000.00 
Deficiency None ($156,255.59) 
Less: Mr. Lawlis'Fair Market Value -$2,250,000,00 
Deficiency $243,744.41" 
D. WHETHER DAVCO WAS JUSTIFIED IN DISCONTINUING PAYMENTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Davco denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to: 1) deficiency judgments; or 2) the rents collected 
by Davco from September 1, 2008 to February 20, 2009 for the following reasons: 
A. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by their breach of the purchase contracts. 
First, Plaintiffs' breach of the Real Estate Purchase contracts by failing to provide Davco 
with corrected fmancials and by failing to honor their promise that Davco could have another year 
to create fmancials under its ownership of the apartment. Plaintiffs' breach of the Real Estate 
Purchase contracts relieved Davco of its obligation to perform under the contact, if the breach is 
material. (Orlobv. Wasatch Medical Management, 124P.3d269 (Utah App.,2005) at^[26). Whether 
a breach of a contract constitutes a material breach is a question of fact which is reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. (Id.) 
The courts consider the following factors to determine if the breach was material: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent 
to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) 
the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his 
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failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. {Pack v. Case, 30 
P.3d436(UtahApp.,200l)at1fl8). 
Trial testimony established that without the financial statements, Davco could not obtain a 
loan to refinance the apartment complexes and would lose the apartment complexes in foreclosure, 
which did happen. It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that Davco lost the apartment 
complexes through foreclosure, and that Davco lost $128,633.35 in the improvements to the 
apartments. Mr. Murset testified that he knew that Davco could not obtain financing without 
Plaintiffs providing the fmancials to Davco. The evidence at trial established that Plaintiffs did not 
provide corrected fmancials to Davco that would have allowed Davco to obtain financing. 
Thus, the breach by Plaintiffs is material and relieves Davco of its duty to perform under the 
purchase contracts. 
Second, the oral modification of the purchase contracts is not barred by the statute of frauds. 
"The general rule is that 'any modification of a contract that is within the statute of frauds must also 
comply with the statute of frauds.'" Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Ut. App. 1995). When 
a contract is required to be in writing the alteration or modification thereof must also be in writing. 
Id. However, a recognized and accepted exception to the statute of frauds provides that where a 
party has changed his position under the modified agreement and where it would be inequitable to 
permit a party to repudiate the oral modification and seek enforcement of the written contract, the 
oral agreement may be removed from the statute of frauds and enforced. Id. 
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[WJhere there is evidence of part performance under a modified agreement and where 
it would be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate the oral modification and seek 
enforcement of the written contract, the oral agreement may be removed from the 
statute of frauds and enforced. (Fisher, Id., at pg 1177). 
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is: (1) the oral contract and its terms 
must be clear and definite; (2) the acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and 
definite; and (3) the acts must be in reliance on the contract. The acts in reliance must be such that 
(a) it would not have been performed had the contract not existed; and (b) the failure to perform on 
the part of the promissor would result in fraud on the performer who relied since damages would be 
inadequate. Reliance may be made in numerable ways all of which could refer exclusively to the 
contract. (Spears, Id. at para. 24). 
"[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that the 
possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements made by 
him or her must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract exits. 
The reason for such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is 
based on estoppel and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable 
to the contract, there is nothing to show that the Plaintiff relied on it or changed his 
[or her] position to his prejudice..." (Spears, Id. at para. 24) 
However, under certain circumstances the exclusively referable requirement may berelaxed. 
"The more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less stringent the requirement of 
exclusively referable acts." (Spears, Id. at para. 24). 
First. The terms of the oral contract are clear and definite. Mr. Fisher testified that Mr. 
Murset promised to provide fmancials for the apartment complexes so that Davco could obtain 
refinancing for the apartment complexes and when that did not happen, Plaintiffs, in March 2008, 
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promised to allow Davco an additional year to create two years of fmancials for the apartment 
complexes under its ownership. 
Mr. Murset testified that there was no reason for him not to and in fact he did provide 
fmancials to Davco because he wanted to be paid for the apartment complexes. Mr. Thompson and 
Mr. Fisher testified that Mr. Murset stated in March 2008 that Davco would have an additional year 
to refinance the apartment complexes. In addition, both Mr. Fisher and Mr. Murset testified that they 
knew that Davco could not obtain refinancing of the apartment complexes without at least two years 
of financial statements. Lastly, in the email dated 3/26/2008, Mr. Fisher is asking Mr. Murset if he 
had provided the fmancials to Davco's broker. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24/Defendant's Exhibit 18). 
In reliance on Plaintiffs' representation, Davco did make payments on the notes, did pay the 
costs for the improvements, attempted to get the refinancing, continued to manage the apartments 
after the maturity dates of the notes in December 2007, and increased the rents. Thus, Davco changed 
its position and partially performed the oral contract. 
Second. The acts done in performance of the contract are equally clear and definite. Davco 
performed and paid for the improvements on the property, it continued to seek refinancing of the 
apartment complexes after December 2007, and it continued to manage the apartment complexes and 
to increase the rents of the apartment complexes. Mr Fisher testified that, without Plaintiffs' 
representations, he would not have purchased the apartment complexes, he would not have 
performed-and paid for the improvements, nor continued to seek financing, nor continued managing 
the apartment complexes and increasing the rents. 
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Third. Davco's acts were done in reliance on the contract. Mr. Fisher testified that Davco 
purchased the apartment complexes and performed and paid for the improvements based upon 
Plaintiffs' representations that they would provide the financial statements and give Davco an 
additional year to refinance the apartments. He also testified that he relied upon Plaintiffs' 
representations in continuing to manage the apartments and increasing the rents after December 1, 
2007, and seeking financing. 
Thus, the oral agreement is taken out of the statute of frauds by the doctrine of part 
performance. And, "In an equity review of facts, if the record shows a fair preponderance or even 
if the evidence is balanced unevenly, the trial court finding should be sustained. If the evidence is 
so vague and uncertain that the finding is obviously erroneous, there may be a new finding on 
review." {Spears v. Ware, 44 P.3d 742 (Ut. 2002) at [^23). 
It would be inequitable to permit Plaintiffs to enforce the unmodified agreement. By so 
doing, Plaintiffs would unfairly benefit from the $128,633.35 in improvements plus the additional 
payments made by Davco on the purchase contract from December 1,2007 through August 31,2008. 
B. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by equitable estoppel. 
Equitable estoppel "is a defensive doctrine preventing one party from taking unfair advantage 
of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another 
person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in some way." 
(Bahr v. Imus, 211 P.3d 987 (Utah App.,2009) at %6). 
To establish equitable estoppel Davco must prove: 1) Plaintiffs made a statement, and/or an 
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admission, and/or acted, and/or failed to act, that is inconsistent with their claims for deficiency 
judgment and rents; 2) Davco took action and/or inaction on the basis of Plaintiffs' statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and 3) Davco will be injured if Plaintiffs are allowed to contradict 
or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. (Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
191 P.3d 814 (Utah App.,2008) at ^22). 
Davco was required to pay the balance due on the Iota Note on December 1, 2007 and on 
the California Note on December 10, 2007. Mr. Murset, in deposition testimony, admitted that he 
knew and understood that Davco would have to obtain loans to pay the balances due on the 
promissory notes, and Mr. Murset testified that he did give Davco financial statements for the 
apartment complexes. 
Mr. Fisher testified that in March 2008 after Plaintiffs failed to provide two years of 
financial statements, Mr. Murset promised Davco could have sufficient time to create two years of 
financial history under its ownership of Casa Grande and Casa Sonoma. Based on Plaintiffs's 
statement, Davco continued to pay monthly payments to Plaintiffs and continued to refurbish the 
apartments and to pay the refurbishing costs. Davco paid $128,633.35 in refurbishing costs. 
In June 2008, before Davco had owned the apartment complexes for sufficient time to create 
the financial history required to obtain a loan, Mr. Murset told Davco to execute deeds in lieu of 
foreclosure or he would commence foreclosure proceedings. Mr. Fisher testified that he told Mr. 
Murset that even though Plaintiffs had promised Davco another year to create the fmancials, Davco 
would execute deeds in lieu of foreclosure if Davco was reimbursed by Plaintiffs for Davco's costs 
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expended in refurbishing several of the apartments even though Plaintiffs had promised Davco could 
have an additional year to create two years of fmancials under its ownership of the apartment 
complexes. 
Mr. Murset and Mr. Fisher testified that Plaintiffs did not agree to reimburse Davco for the 
improvements. Thereafter, Plaintiffs increasedDavco'smonthlypayments without Davco's consent 
and Davco refused to pay the higher monthly payment. The increase in rent would not be applied to 
the monies Davco owed Plaintiffs. 
Davco stopped making payments after August 2008 because Plaintiffs would not honor their 
promise to provide corrected fmancials to Davco, because Plaintiffs would not honor their promise 
to give Davco an additional year to create two years of fmancials under its ownership of the 
apartment complexes, and because Plaintiffs raised Davco's monthly payments without Davco's 
consent. Without the fmancials, Davco could not obtain loans to refinance the apartment complexes, 
would not be able to complete the purchase of the apartment complexes, and would continue to pay 
payments, etc., until Plaintiffs foreclosed. 
If Plaintiffs are awarded deficiency judgments, Davco will be injured by having paid to 
Plaintiffs payments under the promissory notes and paying the costs of the improvements to the 
apartments. If Plaintiffs are awarded the rent paid by tenants from September 1, 2008 to February 
20, 2009, Davco will be further injured by having to pay Plaintiffs the additional monies. 
Plaintiffs should be estopped from taking unfair advantage of Davco by promising to provide 
fmancials and promising Davco that it could have sufficient time to create financial statements under 
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its ownership and failing to keep their promises. 
C. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver 
"[A] waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. 
D &KMgmt„ Inc., 2008 UT 73, <h 6, 196 P.3d 588. The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an 
existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent to relinquish the .right." Id. 
Plaintiffs knew they had the right to declare the promissory notes due and payable in 
December 2007 when Davco failed to pay the balance due under the promissory notes. Plaintiffs 
demonstrated their intent to waive their right to declare the promissory notes due and payable by 
promising Davco that they would provide the financial statements, and/or give Davco sufficient time 
to create the financial statements through its ownership of the apartment complexes, and/or accepting 
the payments from Davco through August 2008. 
Therefore, the evidence establishes that Plaintiffs in December 2007 had and knew they had 
the right to foreclose on the apartment complexes and demonstrated their intent to relinquish it by 
not declaring default, by continuing to accept payments from Davco, by promising in March 2008 
that Davco could have sufficient time to create two years of financials, and by continuing to 
represent to Fisher after December 2007 that Davco could purchase the apartment complexes. 
D. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by their breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on 
judicially recognized duties not found within the four corners of the contract. (See Beck v. Farmers 
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Ins. Exck, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985)). These duties, unlike the duties expressly stated in the 
contract, are not subject to alteration by the parties. They exist whenever a contract is entered into 
and are imposed on the parties "consistent with the agreed common purpose" of the contract. 
{Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 116 P.3d 259, 261-2 (Utah,2005) \ 10). 
"Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will 
not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to 
receive the fruits of the contract. Bastian v. Cedar Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 
(Utah 1981); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). A violation of the covenant gives rise 
to a claim for breach of contract. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798." (St Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp.., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah, 1991). 
"The obligation of good faith requires each party to refrain from actions that will 
intentionally 'destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.' To 
determine the legal duty .a contractual party has under this covenant, a court will assess whether a 
'party's actions [are] consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of 
the other party.' This court determines the 'purpose, intentions, and expectations' by considering 'the 
contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties."' (Oakwood Village 
LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Utah,2004) f 43). 
Plaintiffs breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide fmancials 
and failing to honor their promise that Davco could have an additional year to create two years of 
financial statements, and by raising the payments. 
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Therefore, Davco was relieved of its duty to perform under the Real Estate Purchase 
Contracts, and Plaintiffs claims are barred . 
III. THE AMOUNT OF RENTS PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COLLECT FROM 
DAVCO. 
1. Casa Grande. 
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to $106,575.00 forrents collected by Davco from 9/1/08 
to 2/20/09. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 81) 
Plaintiffs have the burden to prove the amount of rents actually collected by Davco. Plaintiffs 
presented summaries of rents at trial which they claim were collected by Davco. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
81 and Exhibit 80) However, the evidence presented at trial proves that Plaintiffs' accounting is not 
accurate. 
Mr. Murset admitted at trial that he assumed that rents not paid to the Court were paid to 
Davco and included them in his summaries. He also testified that he had receipts from tenants 
showing that Davco received the rents. On cross examination, Mr. Fisher presented the receipts to 
the Court and demonstrated that the receipts were for rent for other apartments or otherwise were 
not proof that Davco was paid the rent. Mr. Fisher testified and Mr. Murset agreed that Plaintiffs also 
included monies paid by tenants for utilities and maintenance in the rents. Therefore, Plaintiffs' 
accounting is flawed and Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof. 
Mr. Fisher admitted at trial that Davco had collected rents and presented summaries showing 
the amount of the rents collected by Davco. (Defendant's Exhibits 86, 87, and 89) The summaries 
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not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to 
receive the fruits of the contract. Bastian v. Cedar Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 
(Utah 1981); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). A violation of the covenant gives rise 
to a claim for breach of contract. Beck 701 P.2d at 798." (St Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah,1991). 
"The obligation of good faith requires each party to refrain from actions that will 
intentionally 'destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.' To 
determine the legal duty a contractual party has under this covenant, a court will assess whether a 
'party's actions [are] consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of 
the other party.' This court determines the 'purpose, intentions, and expectations' by considering 'the 
contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties.'" (Oakwood Village 
LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Utah,2004) Tf43). 
Plaintiffs breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide fmancials, 
by failing to honor its promise to give Davco sufficient time to create two years of financial 
statements under its ownership of the apartment complexes, and by raising Davco' monthly payment. 
Therefore, Davco was relieved of its duty to perform under the purchase contracts, and 
Plaintiffs are barred from collecting deficiency judgments and a judgment for rents. Davco is also 
entitled to judgment against Plaintiffs for the improvements he made in the sum of $128,633.35. 
V. CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
Plaintiffs request in the Pretrial Order that David Fisher be held in contempt of court for 
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^ 3 ^ 
Davco's failure to timely pay the rents it collected from November 10, 2008 to February 20, 2009. 
However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the contempt charges. For the Court to have 
jurisdiction, an affidavit of the facts constituting the contempt must be given to the Court. (See UCA 
§78B-6-303) ("When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court 
or judge, an affidavit setting forth a statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be presented to 
the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt."); (see also Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 
20 P.3d 307 (Utah,2001) at % 28) ("Thus, in Utah, the statutory requirement of an affidavit is a 
procedural prerequisite to the imposition of any sanctions for indirect contempt.") (See Robinson v. 
City Court for City of Ogden, Weber County, 185 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)) ("A contempt 
proceeding is separate from the principal action, and in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction of 
the offense when committed, affidavit or initiating pleading must be filed, and unless that is done, 
subsequent proceedings are void."). 
Since a contempt proceeding is separate from this lawsuit and Plaintiffs have not filed an 
affidavit setting forth the alleged acts of contempt, this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether 
Mr. Fisher should be held in contempt of courtin this trial. 
At the contempt hearing, if the Court finds Mr. Fisher in contempt, "the court may impose 
a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, 
or both." (UCA § 78B-6-310). The Court may also award the Plaintiffs the actual loss they suffered 
and the actual attorney fees and costs they incurred caused by Mr. Fisher's contempt. 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding is caused by the 
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contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for 
the contempt, may order the person proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a 
sum of money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses. The 
order and the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved 
party for the loss and injury. (TJCA 78B-6-311) 
Davco did not immediately pay the rents to the court because; 1) Plaintiffs had promised that 
Davco would have sufficient time to create financial statements for the apartment complexes to 
enable Davco to obtain a loan to refinance the apartments; 2) based on Plaintiffs' promise, Davco 
expended more than $128,000 to refurbish the apartments; 3) before the two years had passed 
Plaintiffs asked for a deed in lieu or they would foreclose on the apartments; 4) Davco agreed to give 
Plaintiffs a deed in lieu if Plaintiffs would reimburse it the monies it had expended on refurbishing 
the apartments; 5) Plaintiffs refused to reimburse Davco for Davco's costs in refurbishing the 
apartments; 6) Davco believed it was entitled to the rents to reimburse it for the costs of refurbishing 
the apartments because Plaintiffs had breached their agreement to allow Davco sufficient time to 
create financial statements. 
It is important to note that Plaintiffs' original complaint included Mr. Fisher as a defendant 
even though Plaintiffs knew that Mr. Fisher had not guaranteed payment of the promissory notes. 
Plaintiffs moved for an expedited ruling, received the order requiring Fisher to pay the rents into the 
Court, and then filed an amended complaint dropping Mr. Fisher as a defendant, all before Mr. 
Fisher had served an answer. (See Court file) 
It is clear that Plaintiffs included Mr. Fisher as a defendant in the original complaint so that 
the Court could have personal jurisdiction over him to include him in the Court's order requiring the 
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* I 
rents be paid into the Court. It is equally clear that Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in violation 
of Rule 11 knowing that they did not have a valid cause of action against Mr. Fisher. 
Therefore, Davco and Mr. Fisher request that the Court rule that Mr. Fisher is not bound by 
the Court's order requiring rents to paid into the Court. 
It should be noted that Plaintiffs did not present any evidence of the actual loss they suffered 
and the actual attorney fees and costs they incurred caused by Davco's and/or Mr. Fisher's alleged 
contempt. Therefore, Plaintiffs should not be awarded a judgment against Davco or Mr. Fisher for 
contempt of Court. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of April, 
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agreement executed by 
I-O-T-A? 
A No. 
Q On behalf of I-O-T-A, did you ever enter 
into a one-year extension of this note? 
A No. Neither written nor verbal. 
Q When was the first time that you had heard 
that there was a claim by Davco that the maturity date 
had been extended for one year? 
A After he stopped payment on the checks in, 
I think that was September. 
Q Okay. 
A And he wrote a letter and he contained 
that in the letter. 
Q Okay. Let's go from the time of maturity, 
up to that point in time of approximately September 
and go quickly through this. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's make sure. 
This is September, 2008, sir? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. VEASY: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Veasy) So, loan matures December 
of 2007. Were there monthly payments received by 
I-O-T-A after the loan had matured? 
A Yes. 
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Page 68 
1 weren't getting paid off. And so partially in an 
2 effort to, I don't know, console my wife, whatever, I 
3 asked for an additional--an increase in the payment to 
4 be made to her. 
5 Q Okay. Let me ask you this. In June of 
6 2000, (sic) do you recall sending an e-mail--
m 7 THE COURT: Counsel, the record is a 
8 little murky because your last question to Murset 
9 referred to June, 2007. Do you really mean June, 
10 2008? 
11 MR. VEASY: Thank you. 
12 THE WITNESS: Oh. Yes. 
13 
14 MR. VEASY: I do. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I thought so. 
16 MR. VEASY: Thank you. Okay. 
17 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Let's--let's go back here. 
18 June of 2008. Was there an event in 2008 where you 
19 requested from Davco that the loan be paid off? 
2 0 A Every time I saw them. 
21 Q Okay. In June of 2 0 08, did you request 
22 that the loan be paid off by--in July of 2008? 
23 A Yes. 
24. Q Okay. What was the response of Davco? 
25 A I don't recall there being, really, any 
26 response, other than "I'm trying." 
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1 MR. FISHER: No objection to that. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. No. 16 is now the 
3 notice of default. That's where we'll stop, there. 
4 MR. VEASY: But we're not quite there. 
5 Okay. 
6 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Now, the Court has taken 
7 aware of the fact of the dates, the maturity dates, 
8 the provisions within the deeds--
9 THE COURT: All of those are now in the 
10 record, Counsel, and they speak for themselves. 
11 MR. VEASY: Okay. We'll move along here. 
12 Q. (By Mr. Veasy) Now, are you aware of, 
13 with--with the Casa Sonoma deed of trust, are you 
14 aware of any amendments, written amendments executed 
15 by I-O-T-A of that deed of trust? 
16 A No. 
17 Q With respect to the promissory note and 
18 deed of trust for Casa Grande, are you aware of any 
19 written amendments executed by California Benefit for 
2 0 either the note or the deed of trust? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Your testimony with respect to Casa 
23 Sonoma, would it be fair to state to this point, 
24 including the monthly payments were also done on 
25 behalf of Casa Grande? 
26 A Yes. 
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1 A I just told him I was going to give him 
2 some names of some other mortgage brokers. 
3 Q Okay. And do you recall receiving Mr. 
4 Fisher's e-mail the next day on March 2 6th? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q And he refers to a--an e-mail that he 
7 received .from his broker asking him the status of 
8 2006/2007 year-to-date operating statements, how were 
9 those coming? Did I read 
10 that--
11 A That's correct. 
12 Q What was your understanding as to the 
13 purpose of his e-mail to you? 
14 A Well, just like when we asked 
15 pros--prospective tenants, Are you a good renter? 
16 We--we don't really ask them that, we ask their former 
17 landlords. And so, mortgage companies typically will 
18 go to the source of the information to make sure that 
19 it's correct. So, I was being asked to, again, 
20 provide the 2005/2006 financials to the mortgage 
21 company so that they know it came from me. 
22 
23 MR. VEASY: 
24 THE COURT: 
2 5 MR. FISHER: 
2 6 THE COURT: 
Offer Exhibit 24. 
Any objection to 24? 
No objection. 
24 is in. 
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1 Q (By Mr. Veasy) 25. 
2 
3 MR. FISHER: Exhibit what? 
4 MR. VEASY: 25. 
5 Q (By Mr. Veasy) This is the June 3, 2 008, 
6 e-mail from Richard Murset to David Fisher. Do you 
7 recognize this e-mail? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And what was the purpose behind you 
10 sending this e-mail to David Fisher? 
11 A Just to remind him that we were in default 
12 and six months passed and I want to get cashed out. 
13 Q Okay. Why had you continued to accept the 
14 monthly payments? 
15 A Because I was giving--I guess I was trying 
16 to help him get what he needed and that was to 
17 refinance. I didn't--you know, I don't want to be 
18 here, I wanted it to be refinanced. 
19 Q Why didn't you simply foreclose? 
2 0 A Could have, but then we'd be here. 
21 Q . Were there representations being made to 
22 you that refinancing was coming? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Okay. 
2 5 A Every month. 
26 Q Okay. In this e-mail, Exhibit 25, you're 
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1 checks. 
2 Q Okay. Was that a fair statement made by 
3 David Fisher in that first sentence of Paragraph 3? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Was that the first time other than--and 
6 the first time in writing--well, strike that. With 
7 respect to the issue on improvements,, was the first 
8 time you had heard about payment for improvements at 
9 that September 9, 2008, meeting? 
10 A I believe so. 
11 Q Okay. During--do you know when these 
12 improvements were made to the apartments? .'. 
13 A They were made in the--right after he 
14 bought them until maybe March or so, 2006--2007. 
15 
16 Q Okay. Do you recall ever being consulted 
17 during the time the improvements were being made? 
18 A No. I don't think I even was on the 
19 property after that. 
20 Q Okay. Were you ever invoiced at any time 
21 for the improvements prior to September 9, 2008? 
22 A No. 
2 3 MR. VEASY: Offer Exhibit 31. 
24 THE COURT: Any objection to 31, Counsel? 
25 MR. FISHER: No. 
2 6 THE COURT: 31 is in. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 A That's the records that we received from 
2 the Court showing payments by tenants and the total of 
3 $7,400. 
4 Q Okay. So, what is the amount you're 
5 claiming owed by David Fisher after the entry of the 
6 Court order dated November 4th, 2 0 08? 
7 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, we're going to 
8 object to any amounts owed by David Fisher. 
9 THE COURT: I understand the nature of 
10 your objection, Counsel, and that'll be a legal 
11 conclusion that the Court will have to reach. I'll 
12 receive the testimony, though the actual liability and 
13 the assignment of liability, if there is any, will be 
14 determined by the Court as a conclusion of law, at the 
15 afterward portion; but this is the claim made by the 
16 plaintiff and you do in fact, claim this $71,119.17? 
17 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Exhibit No. 81 is 
19 received; however, the Court's got some questions and 
2 0 you've got it there in front of you, sir. 
21 I'm interested with your left-hand column 
22 breaks it out between the two apartment buildings and 
23 if you will look with me, Unit No, 15 in Casa Grande. 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
2 5 THE COURT: You show $1,4 00 received after 
2 6 the Court order of November 4. And then--the total of 
Page 127 
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1 says from the maturity date--
2 THE WITNESS: Oh. Okay. 
3 MR. FISHER: --which is 12-1-07 to 
4 February 20th, '09. Here, it's only the six months, 
5 which would be from September through 2009, February 
6 20th, 2009. 
7 Q . (By Mr.. Fisher) Why the difference? 
8 A They're written under different trust 
9 deeds, such as the Casa Grande note, which your 
10 Prestige Title provided, it says a default -rate, but 
11 there is no default rate. And so, we've used seven 
12 percent, which is the normal rate. 
13 Q I'm not referring to the discount rate. 
14 I'm referring to differences in the dates. 
15 You're charging for interest starting in 
16 December, 2 0 07, for Casa Sonoma, but you don't 
17 charge--or you're charging for interest starting 
18 September, 2008, for Casa Grande. Do you know why? 
19 A I don't--I don't really recall this. It's 
20 been a little while since I looked at this, but--
21 Q Okay. No, that's fine, if you don't 
22 recall, you don't recall. 
23 Did you, after December, when--in 2 007, 
24 when the balloon payment was due, after that period of 
25 time, did you send David a notice of default? 
26 A No. 
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Q In fact, you were continually trying to 
help, or hoping that you could--that he'd be able to 
refinance and purchase them; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q You also testified that in June or July of 
2 008, someone asked you for a pay-off amount; is that 
correct? . . 
Okay. Who was that that asked? 
A InWest Title. 
Q And did you give it to them? 
A Yes. 
Q I'm just trying to clean up just a couple 
of little things before I actually start with what I 
have. 
Would you turn to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36, 
please? 
MR. VEASY: Darwin, which exhibit? 
MR. FISHER: Pardon? 
MR. VEASY: Which exhibit? 
MR. FISHER: 36. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) Do you have that? 
A Yup. 
Q Now, if you'll go down near the bottom 
where it says total? 
A Yes. 
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1 Q Now, t h a t ' s d i v i d e d by 11 i n s t e a d of 12 
2 months; c o r r e c t ? 
3 A Yes . 
4 Q Okay. Why was that? 
5 A 'Cause this is dated January 31st. 
6 Q Okay. Would you go to Exhibit No 28, 
7 please? We've — we've looked at that document a number 
8 of times. You--you mentioned that you feel it was not 
9 unreasonable to ask for a request for the deed in lieu 
10 because of the--he'd only put $40,000 down; .correct? 
11 A That's correct. 
12 Q Do you consider it reasonable, where he's 
13 already put down $128,000 in improvements? 
14 A That was his choice. 
15 I must say, if I got a deed in lieu at 
16 that time and if he was able to provide a deed in 
| 17 lieu, and I'm not sure he could with the five--50 0,0 00 
18 on there, we wouldn't be here and there would be no 
19 damages, other than we would both have lost a little 
2 0 money and we could have been as we were at the 
21 beginning. 
22 Q Who is Sandra Asunsolo? 
23 A . That woman right over there. 
24 MR. FISHER: Are you going to have her 
25 testimony? . 
26 MR. VEASY: Not today. 
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THE COURT: He might be the best source of 
this information. 
MR. FISHER: That would be fine. That 
will be fine. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) Now, you knew that David 
would need financials for the apartments in order to 
refinance and pay the promissory notes when they 
matured; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you provide him with financials? 
A Yes. 
Q And if you look at Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 
3, are those the financials that you provided to him? 
THE COURT: Counsel, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 3 is a Deed of Trust. 
MR. VEASY: Plaintiffs' or Defendants', 
Page 176 
Darwin? 
MR. FISHER: Defense. 
THE COURT: That's what I thought. 
THE WITNESS: Defendants' 3? 
MR. FISHER: I hate this--I hat« this. 
THE COURT: In the white book. 




Too confus ing t o have two 
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4 1 THE COURT: I'm glad you didn't both us 
2 black binders, Counsel, we'd have been really lost. 
i 3 
4 





10 the--Exhibit No. 3 are the documents that you said in 
11 your deposition that you had given to David, financial 
12 documents; correct? [ 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q All right. The--now, you also testified 
15 that on PL-265, 266, 267, 269, the address that's 
16 written down below is David's writing; is that 
17 correct? 
18 A
 T Yes. 
19 Q Are you still certain of that? 
2 0 A I'm certain that he was the only one who 
21 wrote on them besides me. 
22 Q Okay. And that's not your writing? 
23 A No. 
24 Q . So you're certain that that's David's 
2 5 writing? 
26 A Yes. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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Q Okay. Now, you, in fact, in deposition, 
you testified that you know that this is--or these are 
the documents you gave to David because he did write 
the address on some of them; correct? 
A That's one way, yes. 
Q 
Page 178 






Everything in No. 3? 
Uh huh (affirmative). 
No. . 
Okay. There are some documents that you 
received from David; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So, how could these be the--the 
documents that you gave to David for financials, if 
some of them were prepared by David? 
A Those aren't financials. 
Q Well, there's--some are financials in 
here; correct? 
A I provided from 2002 to year-to-date 2006 
financials to David for Casa Grande--or actually, 
California Benefit and I-O-T-A. 
Q If you didn't--
A If you're trying to say that all of these 
other things that David produced, that I gave him, no, 
I didn't give those to him. 
lepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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Q But you initially testified in deposition 
that Exhibit No. 3 were the financials that you gave 
to David; correct? That was your initial testimony. 
A The financials that I gave David, yes. 
Q This packet? You gave this packet to us 
and said, this is the packet I gave David; isn't that 
correct? . , 
A Oh, then--then I was mistaken, because 
David produced some of these documents. 
Q And not only that, in your deposition, you 
HL realized there couldn't have been--
MR. VEASY: I'm going to object, your 
Honor, on an improper use of the deposition. If he 
has a question to pose to him and it's (inaudible) in 
the deposition, there's an--an inconsistency, that's 
fine; but for Counsel to just simply say, you said 
this in your deposition is improper. 
THE COURT: Well, where, within the Utah 
Rules of Evidence do we look at that? Is it because 
we don't have a proper foundation for this 
cross-examination? He's on cross, he can ordinarily 
lead and suggest and do all sorts of things on cross. . 
MR. VEASY: But--but my understanding 
under Rule, I think it's 32, use of a deposition is, 
to ask him a question and if he--and if he's 
inconsistent with that, then he can use his deposition 
imim»f*fitmVzt? 
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THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FISHER: I--I think he's--
THE COURT: So, Mr. Fisher has now asked, 
Do you remember in your deposition testifying like 
this? The witness has responded. If he wants to 
really.nail it down, he can pull out the deposition, 
but if he doesn't want to go that far, Counsel, I'll 
let it stand where it is. That's overruled. 
(By Mr. Fisher) Let's turn to PL-272, 
please. 
THE COURT: This is within Exhibit No.--
MR. FISHER: 3. 
THE COURT: --3? 
Let me get down to it. 
PL-272 is a document with I-O-T-A. LLC at 
the top, the address in Hurricane, January 1, 2006, 
December 31, 2 006; is that right, Counsel? 
MR. FISHER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) And you prepared this 
document; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And now, this document, this page, PL-2 72, 
you couldn't have possibly given to David prior to the 
IDepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 closings; correct? 
2 A No. I--I didn't give him this document. 
3 I gave him a year-to-date. 
4 Q That's--year-to-date. And that's what he 
5 had in order to purchase the--the apartments; correct? 
6 
7 . A That's right. 
8 Q All right. 
9 A Through May of '06. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Murset, was this document 
11 generated through the software that you've earlier 
12 told me about? 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. And when you gave it to 
15 David, it would have ended some time, I'm presuming, 
16 August or September, 2 0 06? 
17 THE WITNESS: No. I didn't have that one 
18 then. I--I don't--the one I produced that was a 
19 partial year was to the end--I believe the end of May 
2 0 of 2 0 06. 
21 THE COURT:. May of 2006? Okay. Thank 
22 you. 
23 THE WITNESS: This particular item was 
24 given in February of 2007. 
25 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Why do you say that? 
26 A Because when I was looking through to 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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find--see, this one was printed in 2009 and so I was 
looking for the one that I had printed earlier and 
that's when it was, after I had done my taxes. 
Q And this is printed February 27th, 2009; 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And you said you did give this to 
him at a later date? Not--
A At a later date. 
Q Okay. • . 
A In--
Q So, your--in your deposition testimony, 
when you testified that this packet, you had given it 
to him in your meeting prior to the closing of the--of 
the sale is incorrect? 
A I just re-read my deposition and we had 
probably 50 copies of all of these and I can tell you 
it was pretty confusing. And you were asking me to 
decide if I gave him one copy or another and they all 
have the same information on them. So, I could have 
been confused in my deposition on what I gave 
him--well, no, I'm not confused on what I gave him. 
Which individual paper I gave him, I may be confused 
on. 
Q Now, do you specifically recall giving 
PL-272 to David? 
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Y e s . 
And when did you do that? 
In February of 2008--or 2007. 
And how--how do you know it was February, 
A That's where you're asking me that kind of 
question, because that was printed in--in '09 and so 
that particular printing of that one, I don't recall 
giving to him. That information, yes, I did give him. 







A 'Cause that's the print date and I had 
a--I had a note on it. 
Q Okay. Now,--
THE COURT: So the record's clear, sir, 
what you're telling me is that you had the ability to 
look at a different document than is PL-272 and by 
looking at that document and seeing the print date on 
it of February, 2 007, assure yourself that that was 
roughly the time that you gave the data that is shown 
on PL-272 to Mr. David Fisher, as he requested a 
year-to-date--not a year-to-date, but a full year of 
2006, that's when you printed it out and gave it to 
him 'cause you had it in your tax records? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: I think I've got it put 
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1 together. 
2 THE WITNESS: And so, actually--
3 THE COURT: Oh, you don't have to go back 
4 there, just wait for Mr. Fisher's next question. 
5 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, we have the 
6 originals and we'd ask that be published, although I 
7 think under the rules, we don't need to do that 
8 anymore, but--
9 THE COURT: I don't think we need to 
10 publish it anymore, but if you've got a copy.of it, 
11 Counsel, let's make it part of the record. 
12 Thank you, Counsel. 
13 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Would you go to Page 5 0 
14 of your deposition, Mr. Murset? 
15 On there, I'm going to read the, where it 
16 says Q-Question and then it you'll read Answer, which 
17 is your answer. 
18 Says--I'm starting with Line 23, Page 50. 
19 All right. Going to PL-272 which is 
20 I-O-T-A LLC profit and loss statement for January 6, 
,21 through December '06, any writing on that page 
f;22 David' s? 
L23 A No. 
24 Q And how do you know he received that 
p5 document? 
*26 A Because I gave it to him. 
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Q And you specifically recall that the 
document you gave him contained PL-272? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Referring to P--oh, excuse me. 
Skip down if you would, to Line 16. 
Okay. Why would PL-272 be part of these 
documents that you gave David, then? 
A The part you're--you're skipping--
THE COURT: It's not your problem to worry 
about what he skips, sir. Would you just read the 
answer beginning on Line 18? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Where--where am I? 
MR. FISHER: Down to 18. 
THE COURT: What was your answer at Line 
18? 
THE WITNESS: Because I don't keep a 
year-to-date ones, he would have that one. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) No. No. What I'm 
referring to is, why is PL-2 72 included with the 
documents that you gave David? 
A Oh. 23, you mean. 
Okay. I did give these to David. You're 
asking me, did I give him at the same meeting? No. 
Q Okay. And if you'd go to 52?; 
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1 to him, how would he have it? 
2 A I did give it to him. You. asked me if I 
3 recalled giving it to him. 
4 Q Okay. How do you know you gave it to him 
5 if you don't recall giving it to him? 
6 A When you were in this deposition with me, 
7 you were asking me specifically, such as, was this 
8 particular paper, the paper that--that I gave him, or 
9 do you remember being there, you know, what was the 
10 day like, all of that; I know that I gave him the 
:11 information. 
^ 
[12 Q But you also said in your deposition that 
|13 Exhibit No. 3, all of those docu--all of those papers 
£l4 in Exhibit No. 3 you gave him prior to closing. 
,|l5 A Well, I didn't. 
w 
116 Q Obviously. 
[^ 17 And okay, that's--
E8 A All the financials--
9 Q --that's enough. 
0 A --in that exhibit I gave him. 
|1 Q And looking at No.--Exhibit--or PL-273, 
2 again, that's a profit and loss statement for 
|3 California Benefit from January 1st, '06 through 
:4 December 31st, '06; correct? 
5 A Yes. It•s--
J6 Q And that date on that is also February 
Page 187 
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27th, '09, the print date. 
A That's correct. 
Q So, you couldn't have given that to David 
prior to the closing; correct? 
A I can show you what I did--the print-out 
that I did give him. 
Q Well, I only have what I--what you've 
given me so far and what I have on deposition, so--
A It looks just like this. 
Q .Well--
A But it has the different print date. 
Q . Yeah. 
THE COURT: Sir, the California Benefit's 
transaction for Casa Grande closed before the end of 
2006; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So, the data that you might 
have given David if you did give him any data prior to 
that closing would not have been this full, total 
calendar year, 2.006? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct,. ;; 
THE COURT: It would have been 
year-to-date? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, it would have had the same 
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column numbers on the left-hand, designation of 
utilities, gasoline, et cetera, et cetera, but the 
actual dollar figures on the right-hand side would 
have been different because they were year-to-date and 
not total year? 
THE WITNESS: That's right. It was only 
through May. 
THE COURT: And it would have probably 
borne a different print date, because this one that 
you had here was actually printed almost two years 
after the fact? 
THE WITNESS: That's right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Next question, Counsel? 
MR. FISHER: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) And--and also with 
PL-273, you don't recall giving that to David? Or 
that was your testimony in deposition; correct? 
A It's--no. I--not that one. 
Q I'm confused by that. You're saying that 
you do not remember giving that one to him either; 
correct? 
A I gave him this one. 
Q Okay. But you just--
A That one is dated later, so, I didn't give 
him that one in February. 
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1 MR. FISHER: Okay. Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: --next question. 
3 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Now, going to PL-276, 
4 that couldn't--that document could not have--you could 
5 not have given that document to David prior to the 
6 closing; correct? 
7 A That's David's document. 
8 Q Pardon? 
9 A That's David's document. 
10 Q Okay. So, it was not one you gave to him? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Okay. 277. Is that--are you--is it still 
13 your testimony that you gave this to David prior to 
14 the closing? 
15 A No. He gave that to me prior to the 
16 closing. 
17 Q Okay. 278. Is it still your testimony 
18 that David gave--or that you gave this to David, 
19 this--this document packet to David prior to the 
20 closing? 
21 A That's David's document. I did not give 
22 it to him. 
23 Q Okay. And 2 79, same testimony? 
24 A Same testimony. I obviously understood 
25 that what we were talking about in 3 9 was my 
26 production and not any of David's production. 
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f 1 Q Pardon? You're--you're--
2 A If you're saying in--what you're trying to 
3 do is say that I produced these documents and gave 
4 them to David prior to closing. When you asked me in 
5 deposition, Did you give these documents to David, I 
6 was referring to the financial statements, not David's 
7 statements. 
8 If you look on Page 54, I answer all those 
9 that they are David's. 
10 Q Oh. I was looking at the wrong one. 
11 (Inaudible) 
12 A And Page 59, also refer--I mean--
13 Q Please don't--
14 A --55. 
15 Q Please don't talk until--
16 THE COURT: There's not a question 
17 pending, sir. Just hang on a second until Mr. Fisher 
18 finds what he wants. 
19 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Okay. If you'd go to 
20 Page 46 of your deposition, please. 
21 Let's see, this one (inaudible) you have, 
22 do you have the first or second (inaudible) 
23 On Line 4, I'll read the question and if 
24 you'll read the answer: I'm showing you what we've 
25 marked as Exhibit 39. Are these the documents that 
26 you say you gave to David prior to him purchasing 
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Q Going to Page 47, Line 2. Okay. And 
Exhibit No. 39 consists of pages that are Bate stamped 
PL-265 through PL-281. 
THE COURT: And your answer, sir? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. Sorry. 
Q (By Mr. Fisher) And now, again, these are 
the financial statements you referred to that you said 
that you provided to David in a meeting; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, would you go back to Exhibit--well, I 
don't want to have to go through all of these. No, 
we don't have that one. 
Okay. Going back to, if you look at 
PL-269, Exhibit 3, now, you--that's your writing up 
there that says corrected to show only 13 years; 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And why did you have to correct that to 
show just the Casa Sonoma Apartments? 
A 'Cause I-O-T-A has more assets than Casa 
Sonoma. 
Q Okay. Because for I-O-T-A, it contains 
more apartments or more property than Casa Sonoma--
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q --correct? 1 
3 A Yes. I 
4 Q And so you had to go back and correct 1 
5 that; correct? I 
6 A Yes. I 
7 Q Now, is that true on--for example, if we I 
8 go to PL-272, did you have to correct that? I 
9 A If I was trying to show just Casa Sonoma, I 
10 I would have tried to--I would have had to correct I 
11 that. I 
12 Q Okay. And then would that be the same for I 
13 PL-273? I 
14 A No. | 
15 Q And why is that? I 
16 A Because California Benefit only has that 1 
17 one property. I 
18 Q Okay. So, it's only Casa Sonoma that you I 
19 have to weed out the other properties when you-- I 
2 0 A That's correct. 8 
21 Q All right. Now, did you have to, for your I 
22 accountant, did you have to also correct the I-O-T-A I 
23 statement to show each property? 8 
24 I 
25 A Separating-- I 
2 6 THE COURT: Counsel, when you say for your | 
L - •__ I 
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1 THE COURT: No. 3's in. 
2 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Would you turn to 
3 Defendants' Exhibit No. 1, please? 
4 MR. VEASY: No. 1? 
5 MR. FISHER: 1. 
6 MR. VEASY: Thank you. 
7 . Q (By Mr. Fisher) Do you recognize that 
8 document? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q What is it? 
11 A It's things that I sent to Darcy Thompson. 
12 Q Okay. 2005? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Okay. And do you recall why you sent them 
15 to Mr. Thompson? 
16 A Just trying to find a buyer for my 
17 property. 
18 Q And did you prepare the documents in 
19 Exhibit 1? 
2 0 A Most of them. 
21 Q Okay. Which ones didn't you re--prepare? 
22 A DT-027, DT-026, DT-025, DT-023, DT-021. 
23 Q And you sent those to him because, at that 
24 point, he thought he had a buyer for the property? 
25 A He had someone interested in multi-family 
2 6 property. 
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Okay. Did you later find out that was 
I did, later. 
Okay. The sale with--in 2 0 05 to Davco did 
not go through; correct? 
Page 200 L 
I 1 
6 A I don't even recall ever seeing earnest 
7 • money. 
8 Q In fac t , I think in your deposi t ion, you 
9 t e s t i f i e d you don ' t r e c a l l of anything happening in 
10 2 0 05; correct? 
11 Yeah. Your first recollection is in 
12 approximately August or September of 2006; correct? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q Going--
15 MR. FISHER: We'd ask that Exhibit 1 be 
16 admitted, your Honor. 
17 MR. VEASY: No objection. 
18 THE COURT: All right. There being no 
19 objection, it's in. 
2 0 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Turning to Exhibit No. 2, 
21 do you recognize that document? It's--the first page 
22 is profit and loss statement for California Benefit, 
23 January 1, '05, through July 31, '05. 
24 A Yes. 
2 5 Q Did you prepare that? 
26 A Yes. 
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1 A Pardon? 
2 Q You state in there rents are good and 
3 vacancies are usually filled fast; is that correct? 
4 A That's what I was told. 
5 Q Okay. And that's what you believe? 
6 A -I had no reason not to believe it. 
7 Q . Okay. When did you draft this letter? 
8 A Probably two weeks, three weeks prior to 
9 the sale. 
10 Q Okay. You knew that David was doing 
11 renovations; correct? 
12 A He said he was or he said he had. 
13 Q Did you ever go and check on those 
14 renovations? 
15 A No reason to. 
16 Q After you acquired the apartments back in 
17 February, 2 0 09, did you go in and look at the 
18 apartments that were refurbished? 
19 A I went to whatever one--I went to the ten 
2 0 empty ones. 
21 Q They were refurbished? 
22 A No. 







refurbished apartments? | 
n 
I've seen some of them. | 
Okay. And do you believe that they § 
Dpnnm^YMprif I ifinatinn ^prvlc.&s 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 206 | 
1 increased the value of the property? P 
2 A N o . & 
3 Q Now, you agreed with--you agreed that I 
4 David could refurbish the apartments; correct? I 
5 A He said he was going to, yes. I 
6 Q And I think you testified in deposition I 
7 that you believed the only--that in refurbishing you I 
8 saw some repairs, such as carpets replaced, stoves 1 
9 replaced, dishwashers replaced and walls painted; I 
10 correct? I 
11 A Yes. I 
12 • Q Did he also replace the cabinets? I 
13 A Some. I 
14 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, could I just have I 
15 a minute? I think I'm basically done. I 
16 THE COURT: Counsel, maybe this is a good I 
17 time to take our mid-afternoon recess and let everyone I 
18 sort of get things in order. I 
19 Why don't we take 15 minutes, come back I 
2 0 into session at 3:30 and give you a better idea to 1 
21 know where you are. I 
22 MR. FISHER: Okay. Thank you. I 
23 THE COURT: We'll be in recess 15. I 
24 (Recess) I 
2 5 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. We're B 
26 back on the record in I-O-T-A vs. Davco. I 
"
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THE COURT: --that's Ms. Asunsolo's note 
and she's not--you're not offering 48, are you, Mr. 
Veasy? 
MR. VEASY: I--I was, that's fine, I'll 
get that in through her. 
THE .COURT: Okay. She can testify as.to_ 
that. 
MR. FISHER: 49, no objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: No objection to 49.- That's 
in. 
MR. VEASY: 56 through 59, you'll have the 
same concern with the one. 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel. 
Q (By Mr. Veasy) Now, on cross-examination, 
you were posed the question, do you recall whether you 
provided the financial statements for 2005 and 2006 to 
Davco. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And your answer was yes; correct? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q How do you know you provided the 2 0 05 
financial statements to Davco? 
A They were the basis of the whole purchase. 
Q What do you mean by that? 
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1 A All of those numbers were used in David's F 
2 analysis and offers. 1 
3 Q By offers, you mean offers, the purchase 1 
4 price--the offer to purchase the apartments? I 
5 A Yes. He did it at various cap rates. I 
6 Q Okay. I 
7 ' MR. FISHER: . Excuse me, was that 2 0 05, . 1 
8 Counsel? I 
9 MR. VEASY: 2 005. 1 
10 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Now, 2006, there was a I 
11 conversation with the Court where you stated that it I 
12 was your recollection that you had provided a I 
13 document, February, 2007. Do you recall that answer? I 
14 A Yes. I 
15 Q Okay. And it was correct that you I 
16 provided that document to Davco in February, 2 0 07, I 
17 . which reflected the 2006 financials? I 
18 A Yes. Year-end. I 
19 Q Do you have that document that you were I 
20 holding up in your left hand? I 
21 A Yes. I 
22 THE COURT: This is the document that had 1 
23 the sticky note on it, Counsel? I 
24 MR. VEASY: Yes. I 
25 THE COURT: We should note for the record 1 
2 6 that today is the 3 0th anniversary of the sticky note. i 
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1 Its inventors have been inducted into the Inventors 
2 Hall of Fame. 
3 MR. VEASY: I--I can't let that go by 
4 without asking the Court, how do you know that trivia? 
5 THE COURT: Every now and then I listen to 
6 the radio, Counsel, and that floated through my brain 
7 this, morning. 
8 MR. VEASY: So noted. 
9 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Okay. Is this the 
10 document you're referring to? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Was this document in the documents you had 
13 at the deposition? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And at the deposition, you were requested 
16 to bring all of the documents of I-O-T-A and 
17 California Benefit; correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And you have these milk cartons, I know, 
2 0 back here as your files; right? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Was this document within those documents? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And as I recall, you didn't have all the 
25 documents when the deposition started; correct? 
2 6 A That's correct. 
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1 Q You went home and you pulled everything 
2 and brought it there; correct? 
3 
4 A That!s right. 
5 Q Did you then take all these documents and 
6 give them to Mr. Darwin Fisher for him to look at? 
7 A Yes. 
8 • Q And this is one of the documents in that 
9 stack of documents? 
10 A Yes. 
11 MR. VEASY: Let's mark this. 
12 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, we're going to 
13 object. That document was not presented to us, all 
14 the documents that had financials in that deposition 
15 that he presented to us on Casa Sonoma--Cas--or Casa. | 
16 Grande and Casa Sonoma, I took copies of and made I 
17 exhibits to the deposition. And there is--that I 
18 document is not found in any of those financials. I 1 
19 took copies of every one of them and I made them part I 
2 0 of the deposition. I 
21 THE COURT: Counsel, I have the original I 
22 deposition in front of me. I do not have any exhibits I 
23 appended to the deposition that I have here in front 1 
24 of me nor is the deposition that I have in front of me . I 
25 even signed by Mr. Murset, The-- | 
26 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I do have the | 
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1 deposition exhibits here. 
2 MR. VEASY: Well--
3 THE COURT: --the basic concern that I 
4 have is this, Mr. Fisher, and I don't know exactly how 
5 you want to address is. There appears to be a 
6 question of fact between the sides as to whether or 
7 not the document that Mr.. Veasy. has just handed to the 
8 clerk to have marked was delivered at discovery. 
9 The real bottom line question I have is, 
10 why is there a fight over this one when the real 
11 determination that the Court's going to have to make 
12 is whether or not prior to close on the Casa Grande as 
13 well as the Casa Sonoma properties, Mr. David Fisher 
14 had these financials? 
15 MR. VEASY: Let me--
16 THE COURT: -That's the real heart of it. 
17 The fact that this particular document here was used 
18 by Mr. Murset in order to refresh his memory of the 
19 transactions and when various things were delivered, 
20 specifically when this document was delivered, not at 
21 closing, but within 30 days of the end of 20.06, when 
22 Mr. David Fisher would have begun the process of -
23 seeking refinancing on the property and seeking to 
24 support that refinancing with the financials. 
25 How is that going to bear 3_ny relevance to 
whether or not it--this particular version of that 26 
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1 data was produced at the deposition? 
2 MR. FISHER: Well, what they complain is 
3 that he had the 2 0 05 and 2 0 06, therefore, he had two 
4 years of financials to be able to refinance by 
5 December, 2 0 07. That was not the case. We did not 
6 have 2 006, we could not--
1 7 THE COURT: Well, I know that's your 
8 position in the matter, Counsel. The testimony that I 
9 have right now, it's unrebutted because I've only got 
10 one witness so far. The testimony that I have right 
11 now is that it was delivered. You will give me 
12 testimony and evidence that it was not delivered, it 
13 was not had in David's hands prior to closing, was not 
14 had during any of the pertinent time periods in 2 00 7 
15 and in fact, it was even requested in one of the 
16 e-mails that's already been placed into evidence right 
17 now, i.e., the 2005-2006 financials, David even made 
18 that request in one of his reply e-mails to Mr. 
19 Murset. That's already in the evidence before me. 
2 0 MR. FISHER: I understand. 
21 THE COURT: How is this going to help me 
22 as to whether or not it was available at Mr, Murset's 
23 deposition in August of 2 00 9? Why are we fighting 
24 over this? 
25 MR. FISHER: Well, I guess the reason I'm 
26 fighting is one, that we had, as Counsel's already 
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1 done to us, that this is a late delivery of a document 
2 that was never produced, therefore, it should not be 
3 admitted into evidence and that's exactly what I'm 
4 saying. It was never produced to us and therefore, it 
5 should not be admitted now on the say-so that they did 
6 produce it when they cannot prove they did. 
7 THE COURT: Well, Counsel--
8 MR. VEASY: That was not--
9 THE COURT: --the other concern that I 
10 have is making a record as to what it was, sometimes 
11 this document was unreferenced in Mr. Murset's 
12 testimony. I am going to, at least at this time, 
13 sustain your objection, but have this document marked 
14 and filed with the clerk of the Court so that the 
15 record is secure. Frankly, I'm not convinced of its. 
16 probative value yet, but at least it's there and if 
17 you want to move to re-enter it at some time, Mr. 
18 Veasy, during the litigation, if it becomes key, then 
19 we can re-visit this and I shall humbly go to the 
2 0 annotated version of the Rules of Evidence that I have 
21 on the computer screen here and go where we need to. 
22. MR. VEASY: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: So, let's take that--what mark 
24 have you got on it, Counsel? 
2.5 MR. VEASY: That is Exhibit 82. 
26 THE COURT: Defendants' 82 is filed with 
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1 the clerk of the Court, offered by not received. 
2 MR. VEASY: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 82. 
4 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Mr. Murset, is there any 
5 reason why you would not provide the 2005 and 2006 
6 financial statements to Davco? . 
7 . A None. That would be contrary to what I 
8 was trying to accomplish. 
9 Q And that is to get refinanced and paid? 
10 A That's right. 
11 MR. VEASY: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 Anything more, Mr. Darwin Fisher? 
14 MR. FISHER: No. No. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Murset, thank 
16 you, sir. You may step down. I'm not going to make 
17 you lug the milk boxes with you, we can wait until we 
18 recess. 
19 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thanks. 
2 0 THE COURT: Okay. Your next witness, Mr. 
21 Veasy. 
22 MR. VEASY: Thank you. I'd like to call 
23 David Fisher as an adverse witness under Rule 6-1.1 (c) . 
24 THE COURT: All right. Mr. David Fisher, 
25 if you'll come forward, sir? And Mr. Fisher, if 
26 you'll face my clerk, raise your hand and be sworn. 
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1 Q Do you recall testifying in your r 
2 deposition that Mr. Murset told you after he examined | 
3 your file that he had given David the same financials I 
4 that you had in your file? J 
5 A Yes. I 
6 Q In one of your conversations with Mr. I 
7 Murset, do you recall him telling him that he had 1 
8 given David an additional year to finance the " ' 1 
1 9 apartments? . 1 
10 A Vaguely. I 
11 Q Okay. Would you like to refresh your I 
12 memory? I 
13 A Sure. I 
14 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, again, I only I 
15 have the two. 1 
16 THE COURT: Come on up and you can-- •* 1 
17 MR. FISHER: Oh, I could—I could share I 
18 with him. I 
19 THE COURT: If you want to share with Mr. I 
20 Thompson, that's fine, Counsel. I 
21 What page are we on? I 
22 MR. FISHER: We are on Page--excuse me, 1 
23 I've got to go back, I can't remember from walking up I 
24 here. I 
2 5 Page 41. I 
2 6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, I 
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1 Counsel. 
2 THE WITNESS: Uh huh (affirmative). 
3 MR. FISHER: Help to refresh--
4 THE WITNESS: Yeah. You bet. 
5 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Page 41. When--if you'll 
6 read where it says "A" and I'll read where it says 
7 "Q" . 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q Okay. Says, before we get to the second 
10 meeting--
11 A The only meeting. The--the wit--
12 Q Yeah. 
13 A Yeah. The witness: It was only--the only 
14 time we ever met face-to-face, wasn't it? 
15 Q And let's skip down here, Getting back to 
16 the telephone conversation, did you tell him what 
17 documents you had required? 
18 A During the telephone conversation, no. He 
19 asked me if I had a file and I said yes, I have it, I 
2 0 haven't looked at it in a couple years, and if he 
21 could take a look at it and see if it was the same 
22 thing I--he had. 
23 Q Did you ask--did he ask you in that 
24 telephone conversation specifically about any 
25 documents that might be in your file? 
26 A No. He just wanted to see if I had the 
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1 same documents I had. 
2 Q What else do you recall him saying in that 
3 telephone conversation? 
4 A Other than he had taken it back on 
5 foreclosure, probably the only real thing briefly was 
6 said was the reason he had taken it is because Mr. 
7 Fisher wasn't able to get financing for them, he had 
8 given them, I think it was another year and then there 
9 was no payment received by Mr. Murset from Mr. Fisher. 
10 Q Okay. Thank you. Does that re.fresh your 
11 memory? 
12 A A little bit. 
13 MR. FISHER: That's all. 
14 THE COURT: .Anything more, Mr. Veasy? 
15 MR. VEASY: Just a few questions. 
16 * 
17 * 
18 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. VEASY: 
2 0 Q Exhibit 63. This real estate purchase 
21 contract in August, 2 0 05. 
22 A Okay. 
23 Q And it?s August of 2005; correct? 
24 A Correct. 
2 5 Q Counsel asked you, when he referred to the 
26 financials in Exhibit 61, specifically Bate stamp No. 
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1 THE WITNESS: No. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 Anything else, Counsel? 
4 MR. VEASY: Two more questions. 
5 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Counsel referred to your 
6 deposition--
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q --and I'll just note on line, Page 42, 
9 Line 13. Quote: So, they had worked out something 
10 for seller financing for another year, I guess. 
11 A Yes. Sounds correct. 
12 Q Okay. And I asked you in direct if you 
13 were part of any meeting in 2 0 08, with either Mr. 
14 Fisher or Mr. Murset and your answer was no--
15 A No. 
16 Q --correct? 
17 And you have no knowledge as to whether 
18 there was any written agreement signed by either party 
19 with respect to a one-year extension? 
2 0 A Correct. 
21 Q And sir, would it be correct to state that 
22 you're guessing as to whether there was a one-year 
23 extension? 
24 MR. FISHER: I'm going to object. He 
25 testified that he was told--
2 6 THE COURT: Counsel, his testimony in the 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 292 
1 A Because that was--there's a different 
2 entity involved. I was working to refinance the 
3 properties owned by Davco Management and I had no 
4 knowledge of any other ownership, so--
5 Q Let me ask you this. Do you recall 
6 putting together an application for a loan? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Do you recall who the applicant was? 
9 A It was David Fisher. 
10 Q Okay. If it was David Fisher, you 
1 11 mentioned Davco, would you not be submitting an 
12 application in the name of Davco if you thought Davco 
13 was the owner? 
14 A I was assuming that David Fisher and Davco 
15 were the same entities. 
16 Q Okay. Now, we talked about David Fisher 
17 supplying you with some financial statements for the 
18 apartment complexes. 
19 A Yes. 
2 0 Q Do you recall what year that was? 
21 A Partial year of 2006 and then 2007. 
22 Q Okay. Do you ever recall Mr. Fisher 
23 supplying you with any financial operating statements 
24 for 2005? 
25 A No. 
2 6 Q Okay. Do you ever recall asking him for 
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1 credit report, the--the appraisal and the rent rolls, 
2 he--he said that the file was--was too weak to be able 
3 to--to move forward. 
4 Q Okay. Were applications submitted in the 
5 name of David Fisher? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Okay. Do you recall why the loan 
8 applications were denied? 
9 A Again, it was--it was a combination of--of 
10 layered risk, of--of weak credit. The appraisal did 
11 not come--did not provide sufficient equity and--and 
12 the lack of the two-year history. 
13 Q From the owner of the property? 
14 A From the owner of the property, yes. 
15 
16 Q Okay. You mentioned the credit, what do 
17 you mean by that? 
18 A There were numerous foreclosures on the 
19 credit report that dated back into 2004, 2005, as I 
2 0 recall. Those were a big problem. 
21 Q How so? 
22 A Because it indicated a history of 
23 financial mismanagement. 
24 Q Okay. Let me have you look at Exhibit 65 
25 for--' 
2 6 THE COURT: Which color book, Counsel, so 
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1 we don't get confused? 
2 MR. VEASY: I always like the plaintiffs' 
3 book. The black one, please. 
4 THE COURT: The black one. Okay. 
5 Q (By Mr. Veasy) Do you recognize Exhibit 
6 65? 
7 A Yes. This is the--the standard credit 
8 denial form that we use when we are indicating 
9 that--that we are not going to be able to provide 
10 financing. 
11 Q Do you recognize the signature on this 
12 document? 
13 A Yes. That's Tracy O'Kelley. 
14 Q Who is she? 
15 A She was the operations manager for E 
16 Mortgage. 
17 Q And what was your duty or title at that 
18 time? 
19 A I was a senior mortgage consultant, I 
2 0 believe. 
21 Q Okay. And as part of the duties of being 
22 a senior mortgage consultant, would you have 
23 involvement with Ms. O'Kelley? 
24 A Yes, 
2 5 Q And would you have discussed the 
26 application and the denial with her? 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And would you have been a part of this 
3 Exhibit 65 Statement of Credit Denial, Termination or 
4 Change? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Okay, Would she have sent that out 
7 without having reviewed it with you? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Okay. Let's go through this briefly. 
1 
10 Applicant is David Fisher; correct? 1 
' 1 
1 11 A Yes. I 
12 Q And it's not Darwin Fisher? 1 
13 A No. I 
14 Q And it's not Davco? 1 
15 A Correct. I 
1 
16 Q And that was who was told to you to be the | 
17 applicant? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Okay. And we have a series of boxes here. 
2 0 talking about Paragraph 1, renewal or credit has been 
21 denied; correct? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q Expla in t h o s e boxes t o u s . 
24 A Okay. De l inquen t c r e d i t o b l i g a t i o n s | 
I 
2 5 has--has been checked. And then information from a f 
26 consumer reporting agency has been checked. Again, 
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1 those refer to the credit reports, the--the problems 
2 with credit as--as one of the reasons for credit 
3 denial. 
4 Q Okay. Then you also have on the right 
5 side "other" under Box F; right? Insufficient funds 
6 to close loan. 
7 A Yeah. And--and that would require to 
8 the--the lack of equity, because the appraisal did not* 
9 support enough equity in the property. 
10 Q And the box you have below that, checked 
11 "seasoning requirements," what does that mean? 
12 A That, again, has to do with--with the lack 
•13 of the two-year history. 
14 Q By the owner of the property? 
15 A By the owner of the property, yes. 
16 Q Okay. Now, I notice at the bottom of the 
17 page--
18 THE COURT: Counsel, let me explore that a 
19 little bit more--
2 0 MR. VEASY: Sure. 
21 THE COURT: --carefully. 
22 Sir, when you say seasoning requirements 
23 means a two-year history by the owner of the property, 
24 are you telling me that the lenders are requiring that 
2 5 the owner/applicant be able to show a two-year history 
2 6 in the property? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: A prior history from a prior 
3 owner within that same two-year window would not be 
4 acceptable? 
5 THE WITNESS: Apparently, in this case, 
6 no. As I recall in talking with Mr. Martositz, he 
7 felt--it was his opinion, as the lender, that--
8 MR. FISHER: Your Honor, I'm going to 
9 object. That is hearsay. 
10 THE COURT: Well, and it does look like 
11 we're getting into hearsay and I can't solicit hearsay 
12 and be free from error in my own proceedings, sir. 
13 Much as I would love to do that, I can't get away with 
14 it either, my hands would be stained. 
15 My concern about it is after you inquired 
16 into this one lender represented by Mr. Martositz, did 
17 you look at any other lenders? 
18 THE WITNESS: No. He was the--again, I 
19 was--I had--I started with three. 
2 0 THE COURT: Right. 
21 THE WITNESS: But quickly eliminated two 
22 and he was my re--only remaining source. 
23 THE COURT: And his response was 
24 insufficient seasoning and we can't get into the 
25 reasons for that. 
2 6 Thank you. 
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1 that--that the rep here locally was incompetent. 
2 Q Okay. And I believe you stopped the one 
3 with the bank because Mr. Martositz made some comments 
4 to you; correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q How long had you been doing commercial 
7 loans up to that point with apartments? 
8 A This was the first one that I'd'ever 
9 attempted to do. 
10 Q And that's why you relied so heavily on 
11 Mr. Martositz? 
12 A Well, as a broker, again, my job is only 
13 to line up, to connect the individuals. The lender is 
14 the one that ultimately has all the control and makes 
15 all the decisions. 
16 Q Okay. My question again, is--is that why 
17 you relied so much on Mr. Martositz, because you--this 
18 was really your first commercial--
19 A Yes. 
2 0 Q --loan? 
21 . A Yes. 
22 Q Just starting out? 
23 A I--
24 Q I mean in the commercial loan--
25 A Yes. 
26 Q --for apartments? 
Page 307 
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1 A Yeah. And I - - a n d I approved the form, 
2 yes. 
3 Q Is there anywhere on there that you marked 
4 that you approved it? 
5 A No. 
6 Q No? And do you recall actually looking at 
7 this form for--that we've been talking about, these 
8 forms? Do you have a memory right now, do you 
9 remember sitting down and looking at those forms? 
10 A I do-. 
11 Q Now, do you recall testifying in your 
12 deposition that you do not know if the loan would have 
13 been approved if the seasoning requirements had been 
14 met? 
15 A At the time that I did the deposition, I. 
16 said that, yes. As I have thought about it since, I 
17 would say that that was not entire issue. 
18 Q But that's what you said in your 
19 deposition; correct? 
2 0 A That's correct. It's hard to remember 
21 things that far back. 
22 Q Yeah. It is, isn't it? 
23 Do you recall ever talking with David, 
24 that because of his financial--personal financial 
25 situation, that he should--or whether or not there 
2 6 might be someone else that he could put the 
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1 apar tments- -use-- in t h e i r name and use them as 
2 financing? 
3 A I think that--I--in talking with Mr. 
4 Martositz, we talked about bringing in a co-signer, if 
5 you would, but he did not feel that that would even 
6 work. 
7 Q Okay. But do you--my question was, do you 
8 recall suggesting that to David? 
9 . A I can1t recall. 
10 Q Okay. Could have? 
11 A I could have, but I--I can't recall. 
12 Q Now, is it your understanding in 2 007, 
13 that for a person to obtain a loan on apartments, that 
14 that person had to have those apartments in his name 
15 for at least two years? 
16 A It's my understanding, correct, yes. 
17 Q You did not--but you got that from Mr. 
18 Martositz? 
19 A Yes. 
2 0 Q Okay. Had you done any loans on 
21 apartments other than this loan that you attempted 
22 to--
23 A No. No. 
24 Q Okay. Would it be fair to say that as to 
25 the requirement of financials, that the owner had to 
26 have financials or whether he could use the financials 
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1 Q Okay. You've already been--I'm sorry. We 
2 don't need to go through that. 
3 Okay. David, would you please tell us how 
4 you first become involved with the Casa Sonoma and 
5 Casa Grande Apartments? 
6 A It was in summer of 2005. 
7 Q Okay.
 # And at that time, did you meet Mr. 
8 Murset? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Okay. And tell me what your involvement 
11 was? 
12 A I had an interest in purchasing it, Casa 
13 Sonoma and Casa Grande. 
14 Q Okay. Both of them? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Okay. And was there a contract--
17 A Just--I'm sorry. Just one of them, but 
18 the--it was a combined deal. 
19 Q Okay. What do you mean by a combined 
20 deal? 
21 A I couldn't buy just one. • 
22 Q Okay. 
23 A I was mostly interested in Casa Sonoma, it 
24 had better numbers, but he was only willing to sell 
25 both of them or neither one of them. 
26 Q All right. And was there actually a real 
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1 estate contract drawn up? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And did you sign it? 
4 A I had my realtor sign it. I wasn't 
5 available to sign it. 
6 Q Okay. Did--do you know if Mr. Murset 
7 signed it? • 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Okay. And--
10 A Well, I wasn't there when he signed it. 
11 I--I assume that's his signature on it. 
12 Q And did that sale go through? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Why not? 
15 A After we'd agreed upon price and--and 
16 signed it, Mr. Murset notified us--notified me that 
17 his son was a realtor and they were looking at 
18 improving the property, raising the rents and--or his 
19 son had indicated to him, apparently to Mr. Murset, 
2 0 that he felt that he could improve the property, raise 
21 the rents and--and sell it for more. 
22 
23 Q Okay. Did you receive any financials on 
24 the apartments in 2005? 
25 A I did. 
26 Q Would you turn to Exhibit 1 of the 
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1 plain--defendants' exhibit book. P 
2 A Okay. I 
3 . Q Do you recognize that document? 1 
4 A These documents in Exhibit 1? I 
5 Q Yes. I 
6 A Yes. I 
7 Q And what are they? I 
I 8 A They're--well, it says on these, rent I 
9 roll, but all it does is just indicate what the rent i 
1 
10 is that's being charged at the time and it has the I 
11 person's--the tenant's name, phone number, what size 1 
12 filter they use and what their monthly rent is. - I 
13 I 
14 Q Okay. And there was profit and loss I 
15 statements as well? 1 
16 A Yes. I 
17 Q And looking at that, there's on DT-019, I 
18 there's a profit and loss from I-O-T-A from January to I 
19 July--through July, 2005; correct? 1 
2 0 A Correct. I 
21 Q Did you receive that? 1 
22 A I did. 1 
I 
23 Q Then DT-02 0 is the profit- and loss for 1 
24 California Benefit for the same time--period of time 1 
25 from January through July of 2 0 05; correct? I 
26 A C o r r e c t . I 
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1 Q Did you receive that? 
2 A I did. 
3 Q Okay. The I-O-T-A profit and loss 
4 statement, the DT-019, did Mr. Murset indicate to you 
5 that that included other properties? 
! 6 A I'd asked him about it when I read what 
7- was down at the bottom. 
.8 Q Okay. And what did he say? 
9 A Which indicated that this profit and loss 
10 for 
11 I-O-T-A represented income and expenses for more than 
12 just Casa Grande--Casa Sonoma. 
13 Q In 2 005, did you actually get a profit and 
14 loss statement from Mr. Murset that showed you the 
15 profit and loss, solely for the Casa Sonoma 
16 Apartments? 
17 A No. 
18 Q Okay. So, as I understand it, the 
19 transaction did not close then in 2 005? 
2 0 A Correct. 
21 Q You became involved again in the purchase 
22 of the apartments in 2 006? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And how did that happen? 
2 5 A Darcy Thompson, that I understood was 
2 6 representing Mr. Murset, contacted Lori Muscolino, 
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1 which i s a r e a l t o r tha t I was using on a regu la r 
2 basis. 
3 Q Let me interrupt you there. I'm going to 
4 follow this in order if I can. 
5 MR. FISHER: I'm sorry, your Honor. 
6 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Go to Exhibit No. 2. 
7 A Okay. 
8 Q And do you recognize that? 
I 9 A Yes. 
10 Q And what is it? 
11 A It looks like the same page as Exhibit No. 
12 1, but the page marked DT-019. 
13 Q Okay. And is Exhibit No. 2 the actual 
14 documents you received in 2 0 05? 
15 A I believe so, yes. 
16 Q Okay. Now, would you go back then and say 
17 how were you involved, continue, in 2 006? 
18 A Darcy Thompson representing Mr. Murset, 
19 contacted Lori Muscolino, who I was using on a--using 
2 0 on a regular basis to buy and sell properties and from 
21 her remarks, she said that he had called to see if I 
22 was still interested in purchasing Casa Sonoma and 
23 Casa Grande. 
.24 And, so, I responded to her that I had 
25 some interest and she got that back to him. 
26 Q Okay. Did you request financials from Mr. 
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1 Murset in 2006? 
2 A I did. 
3 Q Okay. Would you turn to Exhibit No. 3, 
4 please? 
5 Now, this has already been identified by 
6 Mr. Murset in his testimony as the documents that, in 
7 deposition,.he stated that he had given to you in--in 
8 2 006; do you recall that? 
9 A Him stating that? 
10 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
11 A Yes. I recall that. 
12 Q Okay. Did you get that packet in 2006? 
13 Exhibit No. 3, which is Exhibit 3 9 to the deposition? 
14 A I got some of it. 
15 Q Let's go to Exhibit No. 4. Do you 
16 recognize that document? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q What is that? 
19 A That's the profit and loss statement year 
20 to date for I-O-T-A from January 1st to May 31st of 
21 '06. 
22 Q Okay. And looking at the other documents, 
23 are these the documents you received from Mr. Murset 
24 in 2006? 
25 A Yes. 
2 6 Q Okay. Going back to Exhibit No. 3, if 
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1 Q Okay. Did you a l s o r e c e i v e t h a t document? f 
2 A I d i d . 
3 Q All right. Now, is that your writing on 
4 that document as well? 
5 A Yes. All of it is. 
6 Q Okay. Could you explain to us why you 
7 were writing on these documents? 
8 A Well, when I received them, it had a lot 
I 9 of charges on it I--I'm not accustomed to, like dues 
10 and subscriptions, gasoline, things like that. So, I 
11 called Rick to ask him what they were for, if those 
12 were things that were normal with that piece of 
13 property because I--I hadn't run into it with 
14 properties I'd been involved with. 
15 And so, he says, no, that's--that has to. 
16 do with another property and I said, okay. And asked 
17 for another one. Then another--when I say "another 
18 one,1' another expense item. And--and so at that 
19 point, I--I said, well, how--how many of these are not 
2 0 accurate? And he said, well, there's a few of them in 
21 there. I said, well, let's go through them one by 
22 one. So--
23 Q Let's take number one, then, where you 
24 have the $206.81. Is that for office supplies? 
25 ' A Yes. 
26 Q Okay. Why did you write "closer" there? 
npnnmaYMerif Litiaation Services 
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1 and made this sheet. And then I called the appraiser, 
2 Stan McConkie, and I knew him, he was my stake 
3 president, so, I knew he did commercial appraisals, 
4 and so, I gave him a call, I said, how do you 
5 determine value? And--and so, he--he told me how to 
6 calculate--
7 MR. VEASY: Objection, hearsay. 
8 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, he's not 
9 (inaudible) 
10 THE WITNESS: Correct. He didn't 
11 tell--I'm sorry. He didn't tell me the numbers, he 
12 just said, well, you add this up to get potential 
13 gross income, then you subtract the vacancy rate which 
14 gives you effective gross income. And then from that, 
15 you subtract your expenses to get a net operating 
16 income and then you use a capitalization rate and from 
17 that, you can determine the value. 
18 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Okay. And that's what 
19 you did? 
20 A That's what I did. 
21 Q Going back to Exhibit No. 4. Did you ever 
22 get a corrected profit and loss statement, which 
23 showed just the Casa Sonoma Apartments from Mr. Murset 
24 for the year 2005? 
25 A Not for 2005 nor 2006. 
2 6 Q Okay. Now, if you, on--on this first page 
pjm*^^^ii^mf!iir^^*M"m,i5"^^ 
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1 of Exhibit No.--well, I guess the third page of 
2 Exhibit No. 4, did you try to use that in order to 
3 obtain a loan? 
4 A I couldn't, it was--it wasn't accurate. 
5 Q And that was because it included other 
6 properties? 
7 . A Yeah. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A And no lender's going to--try and convince 
10 . a lender saying, well, I know I've written these 
11 . numbers in, but they're true, so, you can believe me. 
12 And so, I--
13 Q Okay. Would you go to the--over to the, I 
14 think--believe it's the third, fourth, fifth page, the 
15 profit and loss statement for California Benefit from 
16 January through July, 2006--I mean, through May, 2 0 06. 
17 A Okay. 
18 Q Okay. 
19 A For? 
20 Q California Benefit? 











Which number are you on, 
It's Exhibit 4. 
Thank you. 
January through May; right? 
n — : i . i :*.;, 
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1 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Is that your writing on 
2 the--the full year of profit and loss statement for 
3 California Benefit for 2005? 
4 A Yes. All of it is. 
5 Q Okay. Now, tell us why your writing is on 
6 those two documents? 
7 A Same reason; after I was done with I-O-T-A 
8 profit and loss statements, I asked him if there was 
9 any expenses with California Benefits that weren't 
10 accurate, and so we went through each one, one by one 
11 and did the same thing. If--if he says no, 
12 that's--that wasn't there, that was for something 
13 else, then I drew a line through it. If he said that 
14 it is, yeah, that's a lot closer to being correct, I 
15 wrote down closer. If it was an average, then I did. a 
16 17-month average again. ? 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A In some cases, he--he--especially when you 
19 get into repairs and H.V.A.C. repairs, he was saying 
2 0 that a lot of that was just one-time only expenses and 
21 so, it's--that's not accurate and so, between the two 
22 of us came up with an amount of approximately, like in 
23 this case, $4 0 per unit. 
24 Q Did he ever give you a revised profit and 
25 loss statement for California Benefit for January 
2 6 through December, 2 0 05? 
P\iC»rvr\m-=j\/rv/l^Kif I ifin-54-i/-\r» Car\ Arac-
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1 A No. 
2 Q And you didn't use this--the profit and 
3 loss statement from January through December of 2 0 05 
4 for financing purposes, for the same reason you didn't 
5 use the Casa Sonoma? 
6 • A That's right. It wasn't accurate, so... 
7 Q . Did you ever receive a January through 
8 December profit and loss statement for the year 2006, 
9 for California Benefits 
10 A No. 
11 Q Now, you heard Mr. Murset's testimony that 
12 he had a--that he had given you one of those, I don't 
13 recall which one, if it was I-O-T-A or California--or 
14 Casa Sonoma or Casa Grande's financial--profit and 
15 loss statement for 2006 in February of 2007. Do you 
16 recall that? 
17 A Him saying he did? 
18 Q Yes. 
19 .- A I remember him saying he did. 
2 0 Q Did you ever receive it? 
21 A I did not. 
22 Q Okay. In the discovery, you--you've 
23 reviewed all the discovery we received from Mr. 
24 Murset; correct? 
2 5 A Correct. 
26 Q Did you ever see a profit and loss 
npnnmayMprif Litiaation Services 
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1 statement that was dated February, 2 0 07, for one 
2 of--either Casa Sonoma or Casa Grande, the print 
3 date--
4 A For the year--
5 Q --the print date of 2--or February, 2 007? 
6 A For the year 2006? 
7 
8 Q Right. 
9 A Printed in '07? No. 
10 Q Okay. Now, you--you determined.the price 
11 from the in--this information that was given to you; 
12 correct? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q Okay. And had you--was the re any fu r the r 
15 discussion with Mr. Murset about rece iv ing any fur ther 
16 financials? 
17 A Yeah. I needed the financials to be able 
18 to get financing. 
19 Q Okay. 
2 0 A The lenders needed more than just one year 
21 of financials. 
22 Q And what did Mr. Murset tell you? 
23 A He said he'd get them for me. 
24 Q Okay. And it's been pointed out in 
2 5 questioning that the contract that you signed does not 
2 6 provide for the providing of financials; is that 
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1 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
2 A We did. 
3 Q When was the first time you had 
4 conversation with him regarding, it? 
5 A I think we started talking about it 
6 in--no, I--if I remember correct, I think it as July, 
7 August, he was checking up on how things were going. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A And let him know that I had a lot of the 
10 improvements done, had talked to a couple of 
11 lenders--or brokers, I guess, and that--that they're. 
12 indicating to me that they would like to see a whole 
13 year, a complete calendar 
14 year--
15 MR. VEASY: Hearsay. 
16 Q (By Mr. Fisher) What did you tell Mr. 
17 Murset? 
18 THE COURT: Counsel, (inaudible) not for 
19 the truth, but (inaudible) any further (inaudible) 
2 0 MR. VEASY: No, thank you. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 THE CLERK: Which--which--
23 THE WITNESS: That they would like that I 
24 had a calendar year of financials myself, rather than 
25 just twelve months, so from whenever, December to 
26 December, they'd like to see a full calendar year. I 
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1 was mentioning that to him--to--to Mr. Murset and-- P 
2 Q (By Mr. Fisher) What did he respond? | 
3 A Well, I told him I--I might need a little | 
4 bit more time and not be able to finish it right on | 
5 December 1st. And he--he, of course, responded back, | 
6 he needed to talk to him family and I heard back from 1 
7 him that if--if I could, would like to close one in 1 
8 '07 and then one in '08, which would be better for him 6 
9 tax-wise. And I said, I'll--I'11 do what I can and 1 
I 
10 then what's when I told him I need--reminded him of I 
11 needing those financials, I needed those corrected 1 
12 financials from him, because obviously, the ones I 1 
13 have, I--I couldn't hand in. I 
14 Q Okay. And what did he say? 1 
15 A He said he'd get them for me. | 
16 Q Okay. And then the next conversation that 1 
17 you had with him regarding the balloon payments, when 1 
18 did that happen? B 
19 A As we got closer to December, I'd say 1 
2 0 October or November some time, asked again, I think at | 
21 that point, just about every time he gave to get a 1 
22 check, he'd ask about status and I said, still working 1 
23 on it, but I need those financials, I gotta--gotta 1 
24 have more than just my one year of financials in to I 
2 5 the lender, they needed to have a longer history. And | 
26 he says, okay, I'll get them for you and that happened I 
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1 mortgage broker and--and see if he could get some 
2 leads for me. And so, I responded thanks and then 
3 reminded him again that--that I needed those '05, '06 
4 operating statements, profit and loss statements, 
5 'cause my broker was asking the status of them. 
6 Q And this was, I think, the e-mail is dated 
7. March 26th, 2008? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Had he, before March 26th, 2008, ever told 
10 you that you were in default? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Or sent you a notice of default? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Okay. 
15 MR. FISHER: We'd ask for the admission of 
16 Exhibit No. 18, your Honor. 
17 MR. VEASY: It's already in. 
18 THE CLERK: It's already in. 
19 MR. FISHER: Oh. Is it in? Okay. Thank 
20 you. If it's already in then, that's fine. 
21 THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
22 MR. FISHER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
23 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Now, at some point after 
24 this, did you have--did you have any discussions with 
2 5 Mr. Murset involving whether or not he was going to be 
26 able to give you the financials? 
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1 A It was soon after this that we'd talked on 
2 the phone and again, I reminded him, I--I need two to 
3 three years' worth of financials and I can only 
4 provide one, one complete year and then three months 
5 of one year for one property and one month of another. 
6 And I needed to have three complete years. And it 
7 wasn't just the fact that the numbers needed to be 
8 corrected, but I also needed the difference between 
9 May 31st of '06 up to December, when I purchased that 
10 property, California Benefits. 
11 And at that point, that's--and I--it was 
12 strange, I--I didn't understand why I hadn't gotten 
13 them, I just assumed they would be done by then, they 
14 have to be prepared for accounting purposes, for his 
15 taxes, and so, again talked about it and asked what 
16 wast wrong, why he couldn't get it and at that point, 
17 he said, well, I'll just give you another year, 
18 and--because then that way, I'd have two full years of 
19 financials, rental history and everything. 
2 0 Q All right. Now, up to this point in time 
21 and in fact, even executing the contract, did you 
22 execute the contract relying on the fact that he was 
23 going to provide you financials? 
24 A Oh, yes. 
2 5 Q And did you make the payments under the 
2 6 notes relying on the fact that he was going to give 
*
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1 you financials? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And you made the improvements to the 
4 apartments relying on the fact he was going to give 
J 5 you financials? 
6 A Yeah, of course. 
.7 Q Now, after March, does there come a time 
8 that Mr. Murset began asking you about--or--or 
9 actually asked you to give him a deed in lieu of 
10 foreclosure? 
11 A Yeah. It surprised me. All of a sudden, 
12 I get this e-mail saying, we've gone six months past 
13 the deadline, we would like a deed in lieu. 
14 Q Okay. Would you--
15 AA And--
16 Q --would you turn to Exhibit No. 19, 
17 please? 
18 MR. FISHER: I'm sorry, your Honor, but I 
19 want to check and make sure we get all these in, 
2 0 if--but if they're already in, I don't want to do it 
21 twice. 
22 Q (By Mr. Fisher) Do you recog--
23 THE COURT: I'm sure that we've seen 
24 (inaudible) 
2 5 MR. FISHER: I--I'm sure we have, too, but 
26 we don't show it on ours as being admitted. 
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1 know I indicated to him at one time or another that 
2 they prefer three but they can get by with two. And I 
3 said, I — I've told you all along that I need at least 
4 two years financials, you haven't given me the 
5 financials. I need at least until the end of the year 
6 to--to have two years' worth of financials to give to 
7 the lender. And--
8 Q Okay. And what was his response? 
9 A He says, well,--again, I--I'm assuming the 
10 wording, but the gist of the conversation was that he 
11 said, well, what do you think, how far are you 
12 from--from getting this done? I said, I'm working on 
13 it every day, but the problem I'm having is, 
14 I--they're asking for two years financials, at least 
15 two years financials and I haven't got it. . 
16 Q How many places or people had you 
17 contacted for refinancing at--up to this point in 
18 June, 2008? 
19 A Actually contacted, probably about five. 
2 0 Q Okay. But do I understand correctly, you 
21 couldn't go any further in the process until you got 
22 the--actually got the financials? 
23 A Oh, yeah. I had two or three of them 
24 that--that were willing to--if I paid an up-front fee 
25 of anywhere from three to $5,000, it's non-refundable, 
26 it would go towards my closing costs if I closed, if I 
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1 paid that, then they would look at the file and--and f 
2 give me a letter of interest. And I knew the file was 1 
3 incomplete, I didn't have the financials. 1 
4 Q Now, after--m this conversation, did 1 
5 you--did Mr. Murset tell you what he was going to do? I 
•6 A Just, he'll talk to his family and--and 1 
7 see about getting more time and I reminded him that we I 
8 discussed this awhile back, that he'd given me another 1 
9 year and he--I need that, that's the only way I can I 
10 get this done if he doesn't provide me the financials. | 
11 Q And what was his response? 
12 A Well, he'll say, well, I'll talk to the 
13 family, see what I can do. 
14 Q Okay. Did he get back to you? 
15 A Oh, he got back to me, we talked again, 
16 but he never said, yeah, I talked to them, yeah, 
17 you've definitely got another year. He--he didn't do 
18 that, he just followed up in saying, okay, well, see 
19 what you can get done as soon as you can. 
20 Q Okay. He didn't reconfirm that you had 
21 another year? 
22 A No. He didn't. 
23 Q Going to Exhibit No. 23. Do you recognize 
24 that document? 
25 A Yes. 
26 Q And what is that? 
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1 Mr. Murset»s attorney, stating that I transferred it 
2 into someone else's name, I completely forgot that was 
3 the case, so, I corrected that and transferred it back 
4 into Davco's name. 
5 Q Okay. Now, at some point, you stopped 
6 making payments on the apartments; is that correct? 
•7 A . I did. 
8 Q And when was that? 
9 A September of 2008. 
10 Q Okay. Now, you actually made payment but 
11 you can--you cancelled the checks; is that correct? 
12 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q Okay. Why did you make payment in 
15 September? 
16 A Well, because I still planned on 
17 continuing making payments. He--he'd come in--
18 Q You say "he," are you--
19 A I'm sorry. Mr. Murset had come into my 
20 office to collect the checks like he normally did, 
21 most of the time, he came, sometimes his wife came or 
22 I think I met his wife in the parking lot of Dixie 
23 College one time to give them the checks; at any rate, 
24 he--it was after he'd sent that letter asking for a 
25 thousand dollars more in payment for Casa Sonoma and 
26 twenty-five hundred more for Casa Grande. And I told 
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1 him I didn't think it was fair that--to charge me 
2 more, I--I'm doing everything that I was supposed to. 
3 
4 And I said--at that point, I said, well, 
5 what if I just--if I was to go ahead and sign a deed 
6 in lieu back to you, would you reimburse me for the 
7 improvements? And he said, well, I'd have to talk to 
8 my family. And I said, well, I'd obviously need to 
9 know that and--and he said, well, if you go ahead and 
10 transfer it back to us, we'll--I'll consider it. And 
11 I--I said okay and I wrote out the checks and gave it 
12 to him and it just--it was just gnawing at me, I just 
13 didn't feel comfortable, the fact that if I just 
14 transfer it back to him, the only thing he promised me 
15 is that he'd consider it. And he could just consider 
16 no and--and then not reimburse me. 
17 And--and then in reviewing that one 
18 e-mail, where he said that he's wanting more money so 
19 that he can get reimbursed--or get covered for losses 
2 0 and for lost opportunities or whatever and then also 
21 to cover any foreclosure costs, made me realize that . 
22 he's got foreclosure on his mind, he's--he's--whether 
23 I make the payments or not, it sounds--I--I was--I got 
24 the feeling that he was going to foreclose anyway. 
25 And so, I put a stop payment on the checks. 
2 6 Q Okay. Now, up until September, 2 008, when 
Page 519 
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1 Q Now, about October 2 9th, 2008, you were 
2 served with the complaint and ex parte motions; is 
3 that correct? 
4 A What date? 
5 Q October 29th, 2008. 
6 A Oh. I'll take your word for it, I 
7 received it and it was.probably around that time. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A If that's the date, then that's--
10 Q Had--and you're aware from the testimony 
11 and the exhibits that have already been entered in 
12 this lawsuit that the Court entered an order requiring 
13 Davco and David Fisher to pay rents to the--or deposit 
I 
14 the rents from the apartments in the Court? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And that was November 5th, 2008/ correct? 
17 A That it's dated? 
18 Q Right. 
19 A Or when I received it? 
2 0 Q No, that--when it was dated.. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Okay. When did you receive that? 
23 A On the 10th of November. 
24 Q Okay. Now, before the 10th of November, 
25 had you made any--or filed any pleadings in this 
26 lawsuit? 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. We're 
2 back on the record in (Inaudible) 
3 MR. FISHER: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 Q (By Mr. Fisher) David, from September, 
5 2 008, through February 2 0th, 2009, who took care of 
6 the apartments? 
7 A I did. 
8 Q And what did you do? 
! 9 A Well, if there was any repairs to be made, 
10 then I--or certain ones, I did myself; otherwise, I 
11 called the property repairman to do it or an 
12 individual to take care of it. 
13 Q Okay. Did you, during September, 2 008, 
14 through February 2 0th, 2009, do anything different 
15 than you did prior to that period of time in your 
16 management of the apartments? 
17 A Through November, when? 
18 Q September, 2008, through—the period of 
19 time the foreclosure was taking place. 
2 0 A Did I do anything different? No. 
21 Q You continued making payments on the 
22 utilities? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And you paid the utilities? 
25 A Yes. 
2 6 Q Okay. And did you make the repairs' 
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Okay. Would you turn to 
Exhibit--Defendants' Exhibit No. 48, please? Now, at 
Page 534 
5 Davco--
6 A Oop. 
7 . Q Oop, excuse me. 
8 MR. VEASY: Excuse me. Which one is this? 
9 THE WITNESS: Oh. Okay. 
10 THE COURT: 48 in the white book. 
11 MR. FISHER: 48. Defendants. 
12 (Inaudible discussion - unable to 
13 understand) 
14 MR. FISHER: (Inaudible) rental rates. 
15 THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
16 MR. VEASY: May I see a copy of it from 
17 someone? Oh. Is it this one? 
18 MR. FISHER: This one right here. 
19 MR. VEASY: May I have just a moment? 
2 0 THE COURT: Certainly. 
21 MR. VEASY: Okay. 
22 . MR. FISHER: Probably, if I can help 
2 3 counsel out, I think you're referring to this one that 
24 you had objected to? 
2 5 MR. VEASY: Yes. 
26 MR. FISHER: It is. We're going to 
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paid to you? 
A Correct. I--I don't know who actually 
paid the Court, I never checked; however, I do know 
when people told me they either paid the Court or were 
going to pay the Court, but I have no way of verifying 
if they did. 
Q Okay. 
A So, even ones where it looked like he had 
checked with the Court to see which ones paid and even 
though I didn't count it as being received, 'cause I 
didn't receive anything, if they hadn't been paid to 
the Court, then he just assumed that I received it 
and--and added it in there. 
Q Now, you did a summary, which has already 
been (inaudible) correct? 
A Correct. That would be 89. 
Q Yes. And that is based upon these 
documents here which you have created and shows the 
differences and why the differences? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
MR. FISHER: That's all I have, your 
Honor. But before I sit down, I'd like to make a 
motion with the Court real quick. I would move the 
Court for an order to strike the November 
4th--November 5th order requiring the rents--requiring 
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1 Davco and David Fisher to pay the rents to the Court 
2 on the grounds that when it was obtained, it was 
3 obtained on the basis of Rule 6 7 of the Utah Rules of 
4 Civil Procedure, which requires that when it is--which 
5 states: When it is admitted by the pleadings or shown 
6 upon the examination of a party that he had in his 
7 possession or under his control any money or other 
8 thing capable of delivery. 
9 Well, before the--the order was entered 
10 before any pleadings, as David testified, any 
11 pleadings had been entered and he had no examination. 
12 So, at that point in time, I believe that under Rule 
13 67, the order should not have been entered. It--I 
14 think there had to be some pleading or some type of 
15 examination. That's all. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
17 Mr. Veasy, I'll give you a chance to 
18 respond --(inaudible) 
19 MR. VEASY: Your Honor already ruled on 
2 0 that motion and the validity of the order. I think 
21 probably, not twice, but three times in this lawsuit, 
22 each time, the order has been confirmed and it has 
23 been abided by by Counsel and Mr. David Fisher. It's 
24 a little late in the game to be attacking that, 
25 especially on a Rule 67, when there was fully 
2 6 opportunity to do it. 
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THE COURT: Counsel, the motion's 
You may cross. 
MR. VEASY: Thank you, your Honor. 
* 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 









I-m going to be using the plaintiffs' 
Okay. 
So, have you got that in front of you? 
Please look at Exhibit 1. 
Okay. You recognize this as the--
Oh, just hang on, I'm not there yet. 
Okay. 
Okay. 
Okay. You acknowledge this is the Casa 








I believe so. 
Okay. And your signature on it? 
And it was executed by you on or about 
29th; correct? Of 2--
As managing member of Davco Management. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes, I--that's correct. 
And you're not aware of any written 
. - i 








S S S S ^ S S E S S E S S ^ ^ 
n^nnmaYMorit-1 ifination Services 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
